"AN ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF SURETY BONDING ON AGGREGATE AND AVERAGE DETENTION COSTS AND COST SAVINGS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOR 2010 BY A SINGLE FLORIDA INSURANCE COMPANY: CONTINUITIES FROM EARLIER RESEARCH AND EXTENSIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION OF STATISTICAL MODELS TO DETERMINE THE UTILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SURETY BONDING."

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ABSTRACT

In the twenty-first century world and in light of a sub-optimally performing economy, counties and local governments are attempting to find more and better tested cost-effective and financially pragmatic strategies to contain costs and reduce operating expenses. The edict of "doing more with less" has been the perpetual mantra of local and county government officials when seeking to provide government services without increasing the size or the costs of the bureaucratic infrastructure.

This has been particularly true when it comes to the issue of jail overcrowding, and the question of how to reduce the costs of jail operations. Today's jails are filled with defendants who are awaiting trial, those who are awaiting sentencing or who are actually serving sentences, those who are awaiting transportation to state prison facilities, illegal immigrants who have been apprehended by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and those who are detained to civil commitment orders.

One pragmatic, viable, and workable solution to the problem of jail overcrowding and that oftentimes is routinely ignored by government officials continues to be the use of surety bonding as a way to effectuate the pretrial release of those defendants who are awaiting trial. To say the least, the use of surety bonding has a rich tradition in the United States.

One of the distinct advantages of surety bonding is that it functions as a cost-effective mechanism to provide for the pretrial release of defendants at an absolute zero-cost to taxpayers. Because the surety bonding industry operates in the private sector, surety bonding is a strategy that does not increase either the size of the government's bureaucracy or the expense of its operation. Government-funded pretrial release programs are unable to make either of these claims; nor can they substantiate the cost-efficiency of their performance through the use of empirical data.

This research is a third follow-up study to the original research that was originally conducted several years ago which, using 2007 data, documents the cost-savings associated with surety bonding as a pretrial release mechanism for one surety bonding company in the state of Florida. Follow-up studies were also conducted in 2008 and 2009 that expanded the scope of inquiry and the level of analysis.

This represents the fourth study that is an extension of the previous three pieces of research. The findings in this study are remarkably consistent with the findings observed in the first three. Based on the analysis of nearly 53,000 cases and an array of secondary data sources, this most recent study demonstrated two principal findings:

- The use of surety bonding by a single surety bonding company saved county governments in the state of Florida *over $400 million dollars in detention costs by admitting defendants to surety bonding instead of keeping them in pretrial detention;* and,

- The costs to build additional jail cells or dormitory-style beds to house these pretrial defendants alone would cost all Florida counties anywhere between 280.0 million and 983.1 million dollars on a statewide basis to construct the estimated 14,000 new jail beds that would be needed if surety bonding was *not* used.

In addition, this current research makes some comparisons between those Florida counties with unsecured pretrial release programs with those counties that do not have such programs. Moreover, simple yet elegant statistical techniques are utilized in an attempt to delineate and assess the strength and nature of the differences between these two different groups of counties. Specifically, this research represents an attempt to discern an explanatory and predictive model that will best explain the differences between counties with unsecured pretrial release programs and those without them.

This study also discusses the policy implications of these findings relative to the operation of the process of pretrial release. Statewide data are used to compare counties with unsecured pretrial release programs with those who utilize surety bonding as a principal form of pretrial release along several different variables.

Given the rhetorical arguments of the proponents of unsecured pretrial release who argue for its unqualified benefit, the findings discussed herein are indeed surprising. Finally, this current study also calls for more extensive and expansive research to further address the problems posed by government-sponsored pretrial release programs in terms of burgeoning costs to taxpayers, increasing the size of government infrastructure, and whether the government should arbitrarily tamper with the market forces of supply and demand in a free-market economy.

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Introduction and Overview

In the United States, there is a constitutional precedent for the use of bail, although the reference to its use in the Eighth Amendment is somewhat oblique. By virtue of the wording of the Eighth Amendment which specifies that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted," there is a presupposition as to the use of bail.[2] Obviously, excessive bail could not be constitutionally prohibited if it did not exist in the first place.

From an historical point of view, then, this constitutional provision appears to have evolved from the use, or abuse, of bail in England where sheriffs had the common law authority to grant and determine bail for criminal suspects. In response to abuses of

[1] Funding for this study was provided, in part, by Roche Surety and Casualty, Inc. of Tampa, Florida. The findings, conclusions, and opinions expressed herein are those of the writer, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of either Roche Surety and Casualty, Inc. or the University of Tampa.

[2] The Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to mean that bail may be denied if the charge, or charges, is sufficiently serious. In allowing the use of preventive detention without bail, the Supreme Court held that the only limitation imposed by the bail clause of the Eighth Amendment is "…the government's proposed conditions of release or detention not be 'excessive' in light of the perceived evil." See *United States v. Salerno and Cafero,* 481 U.S. 739 (1987).

power by the sheriffs in doing so, Parliament enacted a statute in 1275 that defined those offenses that were bail-eligible and those that were not considered as such.[3]

Ironically, even though such a bill had been passed, the King's judges often subverted both the spirit and the intent of the law. It was further believed that the accused could be held without bail upon command of the King. Some 350 years later, in 1628, the Petition of Rights argued that the King had no such authority. However, technicalities in the language of the law were often exploited to the extent that the accused was often remanded to jail even when charged with an offense that was bail eligible.[4]

The loopholes and technicalities in the law which had heretofore been successfully exploited to keep bail-eligible defendants in jail prior to the adjudication of their cases were ostensibly closed with the enactment of the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. In principal, judges were compelled to set bail; in practice, however, the judges often set required amounts for bail that could not possibly be met by the accused. Some ten years later, Parliament enacted the English Bill of Rights in 1689 which stated that "excessive ought not to be required." However, a major shortcoming of the English Bill of Rights was it did not elucidate the fundamental distinction between those offenses that were bail-eligible and those that were not.

The English experience notwithstanding, the use of bail has a rich tradition in the operation of criminal justice systems around the world. Nowhere is the system of bail and the use of surety bonding more distinctive than in the United States. So expansive is the

[3] A comprehensive chronicle on the use of preventive detention as opposed to bail as it emanates from its common law origins can be found in Karl Metzmeier's 1996 article, *Preventive Detention: A Comparison of Bail Refusal Practices in the United States, England, Canada and Other Common Law Nations.* This paper is posted at DigitalCommons@Pace. http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/intlaw/90

[4] Taking advantage of legal loopholes and technicalities, whether intended or unintended, is not unknown in the realm of even modern jurisprudence. The historical English experience indeed provides a substantive basis for this.

use of surety bonding as a form of pretrial release, some authors have even argued that forms of pretrial release are actually a part of the greater domain of what is considered "community-based corrections" (see, for example, Glick and Miller, 2008), [5] even though such pretrial release mechanism occurs well before the actual adjudication and disposition of the case.

In its traditional application, bail is nothing more than the legal act of releasing the accused, the defendant, by the court. The judge specifies the sum of money or property to be paid in the form of a bond as a condition of pretrial release. In turn, the bond, or surety, is the monetary amount pledged by the accused to secure his/her release before trial and their subsequent presence in court. To this extent, bail is supposed to be non-punitive in nature although it is usually reflective of the seriousness of the offenses with which the defendant has been charged.

The use of bail has considerable historical precedent and may be traced to the ancient Greeks. More than two thousand years ago, the Greek philosopher Plato wrote that prosecutors must:

> "…demand bail from the defendant (who) shall provide three substantial securities who guarantee to produce him at the trial, and if a man be unable or unwilling to provide these securities, the court must take, bind and keep him, and produce him at the trial of the case."

Even though there were some minor variations in admitting defendants to bail, the practice described by Plato prevailed over time until about one hundred years ago when guarantors and personal sureties were replaced by financial sureties. At one time, defendants had to deposit whatever amount was demanded by the judges to ensure their

[5] Glick and Miller (2008) consider several different forms of community-based corrections, including pretrial release, diversion, probation, reentry programs, and parole. The authors define pretrial release as "the release of an individual from pretrial detention or jail pending case adjudication" (Glick and Miller, 2008:420). Accordingly, surety bonding falls within the purview of the definition of pretrial release.

appearance at trial. If the defendant appeared as scheduled, the court returned the money. Since that time, however, direct financial surety paid by the defendant has been replaced by the commercial bail, or surety, bond system.

Traditionally, bail is some form of guarantee deposited or pledged in order to persuade the court having jurisdiction over the case to release a suspect from jail, on the understanding that the suspect will return for trial or forfeit the bail (and be guilty of the crime of failure to appear). In most cases, bail money will be returned at the end of the trial, if all court appearances are satisfied, and no matter whether the person is found guilty or not guilty of the crime for which the defendant stands accused. In some countries, granting bail is a common practice. Even in such countries, however, where the use of bail is relatively common, bail may not be offered by some courts under certain types of circumstances. For example, if the accused is considered likely not to appear for trial, bail will not be set. However, even in those countries without established or formalized bail practices, the detention of the suspect before the trial occurs only if such confinement is deemed necessary by the court.

Although the specific form of bail varies from one jurisdiction to another, there are several common forms of bail that may be discerned:

> *Recognizance* — a promise made by the accused to the court that, upon their word of honor, he/she will attend all required judicial proceedings and will not engage in further illegal activity or other prohibited conduct as set by the court. Typically a monetary amount is set by the court, but is not paid by the defendant unless the court orders it forfeited; [6] this is denominated an *unsecured appearance bond* or *release on one's own recognizance*.
>
> *Surety* — when a third party agrees to be responsible for the debt or obligation of the defendant. In many jurisdictions this service is provided commercially by a bail bondsman, where the agent will receive 10% of the bail amount up front and will

[6] In reality, even though the amount is forfeited, it rarely gets collected by the Court.

keep that amount regardless of whether the defendant appears in court. The court in many jurisdictions, especially jurisdictions that prohibit bail bondsmen, may demand a certain amount of the total bail (typically 10%) be given to the court, which, unlike with bail bondsmen, is returned if the defendant does not violate the conditions of bail. This also known as *the ten percent plan.* If the bond is forfeited, the remaining ninety percent is rarely collected.

Conditions of release - many varied non-monetary conditions and restrictions on liberty can be imposed by a court to ensure that a person released into the community will appear in court and not commit any more crimes. Common examples include: mandatory calls to pre-trial intervention case managers, surrendering passports, home detention, electronic monitoring, drug testing, alcohol counseling, surrendering firearms.

Protective order - also called an order of protection, one very common feature of any conditional release, whether on bail, bond or condition, is a court order requiring the defendant to refrain from criminal activity against the alleged crime victim, or stay away from and have no contact with the alleged crime victim. The former is a *limited* order, the latter a *full* order. Violation of the order can subject the defendant to revocation of bail in a proceeding that is heard by a judge.

Cash — typically "cash only," where the defendant must provide the amount of the bail to the court.

Combinations - courts often allow defendants to post cash bail or bond, and then impose further conditions, as mentioned above, in order to protect the community or ensure attendance.

The net effect of bail is that if the defendant fails to appear in court when required to do so, bail is forfeited, and the defendant is remanded to jail.[7]

According to the United States Department of Justice, there are a number of mechanisms that are utilized by the state courts for purposes of pretrial release. These different pretrial release mechanisms fall under one of three general headings: financial release, non-financial release, and emergency release.[8] These are defined and described below in tabular format.

[7] For Federal cases, if the defendant violates a condition of bail, the bail is forfeited.
[8] http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf

Types of pretrial release used in State courts

Type of release	Defendant	Financial liability for failure to appear	Liable party
Financial			
Surety bond	Pays fee (usually 10% of bail amount) plus collateral if required, to commercial bail agent.	Full bail amount	Bail agent
Deposit bond	Posts deposit (usually 10% of bail amount) with court, which is usually refunded at successful completion of case.	Full bail amount	Defendant
Full cash bond	Posts full bail amount with court.	Full bail amount	Defendant
Property bond	Posts property title as collateral with court.	Full bail amount	Defendant
Non-financial			
Release on recognizance (ROR)	Signs written agreement to appear in court (includes citation releases by law enforcement).	None	N/A
Conditional (supervised) release	Agrees to comply with specific conditions such as regular reporting or drug use monitoring.	None	N/A
Unsecured bond	Has a bail amount set, but no payment is required to secure release.	Full bail amount	Defendant
Emergency release	Released as part of a court order to relieve jail crowding.	None	N/A

In light of all of the existing pretrial release mechanisms that are currently available, one must consider the distinct advantages of using commercial bail, or surety, bonding. The American Legislative Exchange Council (2009) has neatly summarized these advantages. First and foremost, commercial bail bonding is both a necessary and integral part of the pretrial process. Commercial bail agents assist the court in maintaining social control over pretrial defendants in ways that are fundamentally unknown to alternative pretrial service bureaucracies. The linkage that exists between the commercial bail agent and the defendant is one of the ways to ensure the defendant's appearance in court.

Second, in light of a poorly performing economy and the increasing demand for police-related services, commercial bail agents are invaluable tools by which absconded defendants are apprehended. Commercial bail agents are able, therefore, to reduce the workload of law enforcement agencies so that they may devote increased attention to providing crime suppression and crime prevention services to the public.

Third, commercial bail agents provide valuable assistance to the courts in terms of the courts' case management functions by helping the court to resolve erroneous and

mistaken court dates for defendants. The bail agent is intricately involved with the courts in this capacity in the sharing of vital information regarding the defendant and the dates of his/her future court appearances.

Fourth, the surety bonding industry assists in reducing jail overcrowding by taking responsibility for those defendants that the court could not otherwise release on an unsecured pretrial basis. Where other types of pretrial release mechanisms are either inappropriate or unavailable, surety bonding provides both an efficient and effective mechanism for otherwise underserved defendants who might not qualify for other forms of pretrial release.

Finally, the commercial bonding industry actually provides a source of unanticipated revenues to the state. In the event that a defendant absconds while on bond and is never apprehended, the surety bonding agent pays the forfeiture judgment to the state. Thus, the judge has an incentive to use the commercial bail agent because the responsibility for the defendant's release is shared between judge and bondsman.

According to the American Legislative Exchange Council (2009), the utility of commercial bail bonding is demonstrated by the fact that bail agents do not determine who actually gets out of jail on pretrial release – they merely deal with reality as they find it. According to ALEC (2009), bail bondsmen "…do not create the court or dictate its release policies. Contrary to the claims of its opponents, the jail's keys never leave the hands of this nation's judiciary."

In the state of Florida, the statutory basis for the use of bail is found in Chapter 903 of the Florida Statutes. Accordingly, there are certain conditions that accompany admittance to bail. Accordingly, while on bail, the defendant shall refrain from criminal

activity of any kind; refrain from contact of any type with the victim, except through pretrial discovery pursuant to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure; and, finally, comply with all conditions of pretrial release.[9]

There are other conditions for which bail may be revoked. In the state of Florida, for example, the court may, on its own motion, revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime on pretrial release.[10] Similarly, a person who has been admitted to bail on appeal commits and is convicted of a separate offense while free on bail, the bail on appeal shall be revoked and the defendant committed forthwith.[11] Finally, any person who makes false or misleading statements, or omits material information, to the court may have their bail revoked or modified.[12] Persons who are on probation or other type of community control status and who are accused of violating the terms or conditions of their probation or community control are not eligible for bail prior to the resolution of the probation violation hearing.[13]

The Historical Basis and Use of Bail in the United States

Prior to the signing of the Declaration of Independence, bail law in the colonies was generally based on the common law of England.[14] Whether for purposes of political or legal expediency or an attempt to retain some vestige of English common law in the American colonies, some of the colonies simply guaranteed their subjects the protections

[9] 2008 Florida Statutes, 903.047.
[10] 2008 Florida Statutes, 903.0471.
[11] 2008 Florida Statutes, 903.131.
[12] 2008 Florida Statutes, 903.035.
[13] 2008 Florida Statutes, 903.0351.
[14] This existing use of bail in the colonies even prior to the Declaration of Independence probably explains the verbiage contained in the Eighth Amendment that prohibits the use of excessive bail.

of British law as established at that time. In 1776, after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, those colonial states which had not already done so enacted their own versions of bail law. For example, Section 9 of Virginia's 1776 Constitution states that "excessive bail ought not to be required..." Nine years later, in 1785, the following language was added to the Virginia Constitution:

> "Those shall be let to bail who are apprehended for any crime not punishable in life or limb...But if a crime be punishable by life or limb, or if it be manslaughter and there be good cause to believe the party guilty thereof, he shall not be admitted to bail."

In addition, Section 29 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 states that "Excessive bail shall not be exacted for bailable offences; and all fines shall be moderate."

Finally, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution is derived from the Virginia Constitution, stating in part that, "Excessive bail shall not be required..." Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court has never decided whether the constitutional prohibition on excessive bail applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. And the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, like the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1678, requires that a suspect must "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation", thus enabling a suspect to demand bail if accused of an offense for which bail may be considered.

The Judiciary Act of 1789

In 1789, the same year that the United States Bill of Rights was introduced, Congress passed the Judiciary Act. This legislation specified those types of crimes that were considered bail eligible and set boundaries and limits on a judge's discretion in setting the actual conditions of bail and the amounts pledged for bail. The Act states that

all non-capital crimes are bail-eligible, and that in capital cases the decision to detain a suspect, prior to trial, was to be left to the judge. The Judiciary Act states,

> "Upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where punishment may be by death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a circuit court, or by a justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who shall exercise their discretion therein."

The Bail Reform Act of 1966

Ever since the Judiciary Act passed in 1789, defendants in federal courts have possessed a statutory right to bail. According to that statute, defendants in federal courts shall be bailed, except in those cases involving capital crimes. The Bail Reform Act of 1966 favored the nonmonetary release if such release assured the appearance of the defendant in court. The most common form of nonmonetary release, release on recognizance, or ROR, releases defendants solely on the promise to appear in court for trial. A second form of nonmonetary release is conditional release. In conditional release, judges may impose a range of nonmonetary conditions. Release on unsecured bail does not require putting up any money or property, but it results in bail forfeiture if the defendant fails to appear in court as so ordered by the judge.

The federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 thus states that a non-capital defendant is to be released, pending trial, on his personal recognizance or on personal bond, unless the judicial officer determines that such incentives will be insufficient to guarantee the defendant’s appearance at trial. In that case, the judge must select an alternative from a list of conditions, such as restrictions on travel. Individuals charged with a capital crime, or those who have been convicted and are awaiting sentencing or appeal, are to be released unless the judicial officer has reason to believe that no conditions will

reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to the community. In non-capital cases, the Act does not permit a judge to consider a suspect's danger to the community; only in capital cases or after conviction is the judge authorized to do so.

As applied to defendants facing federal charges, the Bail Reform Act of 1966 also specifies what information the court may use to determine the conditions of release, including the nature of the offense charged; the amount of evidence against the defendant; the past criminal record of the defendant; the ties of the defendant to the community; the mental condition of the defendant; the length of residence of the defendant in the community; and the failure of the defendant to appear in the past at required court proceedings. The Bail Reform Act further stipulates that defendants denied release can demand that judges promptly reconsider the conditions of bail. If judges reaffirm their initial decision *not* to release the defendant, they must provide written reasons for the conditions imposed. The Act also prescribes potentially severe penalties for defendants who fail to appear. Defendants who "jump" bail forfeit any security pledged, and pursuant to such forfeiture, are subject to as much as a $5,000 fine or a maximum of five years in prison. The net effect is that courts can release defendants on fairly liberal conditions of bail but reserve the right to punish them severely for failure to appear.

The federal 1966 Bail Reform Act was particularly criticized within the District of Columbia, where all crimes formerly fell under the purview of Federal bail law. In a number of instances, persons accused of violent crimes committed additional crimes when released on their personal recognizance. These individuals were often released yet again. Accordingly, the Judicial Council committee recommended that even in non-

capital cases, a person's dangerousness should be considered in determining conditions for release. The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 thus allowed judges to consider dangerousness and risk of flight when setting bail in non-capital cases.

Current U.S. Bail Law

In 1984, Congress replaced the Bail Reform Act of 1966 with new bail law, codified at United States Code, Title 18, Sections 3141-3150, as the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The main thrust of the new law was that it allowed the pretrial detention of individuals based upon their alleged danger to the community. Under prior law and traditional bail statutes in the United States, pretrial detention was based solely upon the risk of flight.

Accordingly, 18 USC 3142(f) provides that only persons who fit into certain categories are subject to detention without bail: persons charged with a crime of violence, an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death; certain drug offenses for which the maximum offense is greater than 10 years; repeat felony offenders; or if the defendant poses a serious risk of flight, obstruction of justice, or witness tampering. There is a special bail hearing held to determine whether the defendant fits within these categories; and anyone not fitting within one or more of these categories must be admitted to bail.

In its most traditional sense, bail is a sum of money or property specified by the judge that will be presented to the court by the defendant as a condition of pretrial release. The bail will be forfeited if the defendant does not appear in court as scheduled. Like many other aspects of the modern American criminal justice system, the concept of

bail was originally developed in England so that sheriffs would not have to fill their jail cells with people awaiting trial. This issue remains particularly relevant today, especially in terms of the problems of jail overcrowding, the costs to build new detention facilities, construct additional beds or cells or existing facilities, maintaining minimum staffing levels, reduced revenues from a shrinking tax base, and so forth.

From a purely legal standpoint, it has been well-established that there is no constitutionally protected right to release on bail, nor is there an absolute right to have the court set an amount as a condition of release. Any release on bail is statutorily based. The only aspect of bail that is constitutionally protected is through the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution that forbids the imposition of *excessive* bail. State bail laws are typically structured to prevent discrimination in the actual setting of the bail amount or the conditions attached thereto. However, these same bail laws do not guarantee that all defendants have a realistic chance of being released before trial (Nagel, 1990).

Another purpose of modern bail is to ensure that the community is protected from further crimes that some defendants might commit while out on bail. With a notable exception being recent cases of suspected terrorists, defendants are entitled to a hearing before they are denied bail or setting bail at such a high level that they are certain to be kept in jail despite the fact that they have not been yet convicted.

As early as 1835, the Supreme Court ruled that the purpose of bail is to ensure the presence of the accused in court to answer the indictment and submit to trial.[15] In *Milburn*, the Court reasoned that the right to release is conditioned upon the defendant's

[15] See, for example, the Court's decisions in *Beers v. Haughton,* 34 U.S. 9 Pet. 329 (1835) and *Ex parte Milburn,* 34 U.S. 710 (1835).

providing adequate assurance that he (or she) will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty. This holding is consonant with the belief that accused persons are innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that they should not suffer undue personal or financial hardship while awaiting trial. In point of fact, releasing the accused on bail better affords the opportunity for the accused to assist in the preparation of his/her defense. However, because the accused has not been found guilty, bail should not be used as a punishment. The amount of bail should, therefore, be high enough to ensure that the defendant appears in court for trial, but not so high that it takes on a punitive, post-conviction flavor.

This reasoning was further expanded in the 1926 case of *United States v. Motlow*[16] in terms of defining what is meant by excessive bail relative to the defendant's likelihood of appearance in court. Justice Butler of the Seventh Circuit writes in this case:

> "Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of responsible persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the modern practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence of an accused. Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment." [17]

Following the *Motlow* decision in 1926, two twentieth century Supreme Court cases decided after the 1950s have attempted to fundamentally clarify just what is meant by excessive bail, and to likewise determine those conditions under which no amount of money may secure the appearance of a defendant in court.

[16] *United States v. Motlow,* 10 F.2d 657 (1926)
[17] Ibid.

In the 1951 landmark case of *Stack v. Boyle*[18], the United States Supreme Court, guided by the principles established in *Motlow*, attempted to delineate just what the phrase "excessive bail" actually means. In effect, the Court attempted to attach some degree of clarity to an otherwise vague and nebulous legal concept. In *Stack*, twelve defendants were charged with conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the government by force, an act which constituted a crime under the federal law. The trial court set bail at $50,000 for each defendant who, in turn, protested that the amount was "excessive." In an attempt to persuade the Court as to the merits of their decision, the defendants submitted evidence for the Court's consideration that indicated that their appearance in court could be assured with less money actually having to be posted. Ignoring this information, the court accepted the government's premise that four other defendants in similar circumstances but in an unrelated case had fled the jurisdiction of the Court, and bail was subsequently denied. Upon hearing the case on appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that in this particular case that bail had "not been fixed by proper methods."

A second Supreme Court case in 1978 affirmed the idea that sometimes no amount of money can secure a defendant's appearance. In the case of *United States v. Abrahams*[19], the defendant was arrested for defrauding the federal government. Since this was a felony under the United States Code that was punishable by up to five years in prison, a federal magistrate set bail at $100,000. Defendant Abrahams posted the bail, was released, and promptly jumped bail by failing to appear for a hearing to remove the case to another jurisdiction. When the defendant was charged before a U. S district court,

[18] *Stack v. Boyle,* 342 U.S. 1, 72 S. Ct. 1 (1951)
[19] *United States v. Abrahams,* 575 F.2d. 3 (1st Cir, 1978)

the prosecutor for the government argued that Abrahams should be held without bail for no less than seven different reasons:

(1) Abrahams had three previous convictions in both federal and state courts;
(2) He was an escaped state prisoner from New Jersey;
(3) Had had given false information at the previous bail hearing;
(4) He had failed to appear for a previous hearing before a federal magistrate;
(5) Using another fictitious name, Abrahams had failed to appear in a California case and was a fugitive from justice in that state;
(6) He had used several additional aliases in the past; and,
(7) He had transferred 1.5 million dollars to Bermuda during 1976 and 1977.

Upon hearing this evidence and following a compelling and persuasive argument by the prosecutor who argued strenuously against bail, the judge remanded Abrahams into custody - without bail. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Admittedly, the *Abrahams* case is a case in the extreme – where no amount of money can secure a defendant's appearance in court. At the other end of the continuum, however, there are those cases where indigent defendants cannot even pay $50 to secure their release. Even in light of these two extremes, the Supreme Court has never decided, nor has it established any legal middle ground, that money bail amounts to excessive bail for indigent defendants.

In the 1977 case of *Pugh v. Rainwater*[20], a group of indigent defendants brought an action challenging the legality of bail practices in the state of Florida. The principal thrust of their argument was that money bail was unconstitutional for indigents, because they were jailed to await the outcomes of their cases simply because they were economically disadvantaged. In the midst of the lawsuit, the Florida legislature adopted

[20] *Pugh v. Rainwater*, 557 F.2d. 1189 (5th Cir. 1977)

new rules that provided alternatives to money bail for those released prior to the actual disposition of the case and which were almost identical to the provisions of the federal Bail Reform Act. Unlike federal law, however, the new bail law in Florida did not establish priorities among the alternatives; nor did it indicate any presumption favoring non-monetary conditions of pretrial release over money bail.

The same group of Florida indigents brought suit yet again.[21] In challenging the constitutionality of Florida bail rules, newly crafted by the Florida legislature, they brought suit once again on grounds that were similar to their challenge to the old Florida "pure money" bail practice. In its decision, the Court stated that:

> "At the outset, we accept the principle that imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible. The punitive and heavily burdensome nature of pretrial confinement has been the subject of convincing commentary."

However, the Court did go on to hold that indigence *per se* does not require Florida either to establish either a presumption in favor on nonmonetary bail or to create priorities among various bail conditions. The Court fundamentally argued that each case had to be decided individually, leaving the outcome to the discretion of magistrates and judges to determine what conditions or combinations thereof best serve the interests of impoverished defendants and the interests of society. Thus, the fundamental finding in this case was the indigent defendants do not have a constitutional right to non-monetary bail, and are not unconstitutionally discriminated against simply because they are required to advance money bail to secure their release.

[21] *Pugh v. Rainwater*, on rehearing, 572 F.2d. 1053 (5th Cir. 1978)

State Bail Laws

Bail laws vary somewhat from state to state, as is typical of jurisprudence in a diverse society such as the United States and wherein there is a traditional reliance on "states' rights".[22] The map below displays the nature and extent to which commercial bail is currently used in the United States.[23]



In a general yet practical sense, state statutes generally convey the idea that a person charged with a non-capital crime is presumptively entitled to be granted bail, or at the very least, to have bail considered. Recently, some states have enacted statutes modeled on federal law which permit the pretrial detention of persons charged with serious violent offenses, if it can be demonstrated that the defendant is a flight risk or a danger to the community. Some states have very strict guidelines for judges to follow, with a published bail schedule while some states go so far as to require certain forfeitures,

[22] The use of commercial bail is not permitted in four states (Oregon, Kentucky, Illinois, and Wisconsin). In the District of Columbia, Maine, and Nebraska, the use of bail is permitted but rarely used. In all other states, the use of commercial bail is permitted and used.
[23] SOURCE: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf

bail, and fines for certain crimes.[24] However, it is likewise important to note that since the 1970s and with a demonstrable shift in public opinion toward greater crime control and public safety, state bail statutes have generally reflected a move away from emphasizing the rights of the defendants and toward a more concentrated effort to control crime and promote community safety. For example, the current applicable statute in Florida states that:

> "The purpose of a bail determination in criminal proceedings is to ensure the appearance of the criminal defendant at subsequent proceedings and *to protect the community against unreasonable danger from the criminal defendant*".[25]

Two Supreme Court cases which emphasize the protection of the community as articulated in the Florida statute are the cases of *Schall v. Martin*[26] (1984) and *United States v. Salerno and Cafero* [27](1987). Even though critics of preventive detention have argued that its use is a violation of the due process clause of the United States Constitution since the defendant is held in detention prior to the completion of the adjudicatory phase of the criminal justice process, the Court has ruled that pretrial detention is sometimes necessary. In *Schall*, the Court argued that the pretrial detention of a juvenile is constitutional in order to protect both the welfare of the minor and the larger community. In the *Salerno and Cafero* decision, the Court upheld the preventive detention provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. Furthermore, the justices held that preventive detention was a legitimate use of governmental power because the act of preventive detention was not designed to punish the accused, but rather to address the problem of people committing crimes while on bail.

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[24] See, for example, the Los Angeles Bail Schedule and the requirements established by the courts in Utah.
[25] Florida Statutes, 903.046; emphasis added in text.
[26] *Schall v. Martin*, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)
[27] *United States v. Salerno and Cafero,* 481 U.S. 739 (1987)

Whether or not state statutes formally prescribe the bail consideration procedures in detail, most judges act similarly in actual practice when it comes to the application of bail statutes. Typically, judges render decisions regarding bail primarily on the seriousness of the offense(s) with which the defendant is charged. Although this particular standard is fairly easy to apply, other factors may influence the judge's decision in setting bail. These factors include the strength of the prosecution's case against the defendant as well as the prior criminal history of the defendant. In most jurisdictions, however, judges seem to give little or no weight to community ties or the defendant's background and character in the bail decision-making process (see Wice, 1974: LaFave and Israel, 1984; and Goldkamp, 1985).

However, in the state of Florida, state statute requires that the court consider a multitude of factors in determining bail and the conditions surrounding it, including:

(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged.

(b) The weight of the evidence against the defendant.

(c) The defendant's family ties, length of residence in the community, employment history, financial resources, and mental condition.

(d) The defendant's past and present conduct, including any record of convictions, previous flight to avoid prosecution, or failure to appear at court proceedings.

(e) The nature and probability of danger which the defendant's release poses to the community.

(f) The source of funds used to post bail.

(g) Whether the defendant is already on release pending resolution of another criminal proceeding or on probation, parole, or other release pending completion of a sentence.

(h) The street value of any drug or controlled substance connected to or involved in the criminal charge.

(i) The nature and probability of intimidation and danger to victims.

(j) Whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release.

(k) Any other facts that the court considers relevant. " [28]

In almost all courts, the determination of both the amount and type of bail is based mainly on a two-pronged test: the judge's view of the seriousness of the crime and the defendant's prior record. In part, this two-pronged emphasis results from a lack of information about the accused. Because bail is typically determined within a time period of 24- to 48-hours after an arrest, there is little time to conduct a more thorough assessment as to the worthiness of the defendant to be placed on bail. As a result, judges have developed standard rates of bail that are offense-specific. In some cases, the judge will set a high bail if the police or prosecutor is seeking to have a certain person kept off the street.

The bail system, while necessary, is not without its critics in terms of the way that bail is administered. For example, some argue that the current bail system discriminates against the economically and financially disadvantaged. In point of fact, this criticism may be more ideological since there are a number of forms of bail that are not financial in nature that are available to the judge when establishing the type of bail to be afforded.

According to a 1999 study by Reaves and Hart of felony defendants in the nation's most populous counties, 62 percent were released before disposition of their cases, but the rates of release depended primarily on the seriousness of the charge(s). Only 21 percent of murder defendants gained release while two-thirds of those charged with assault or some type of drug offenses were released on bail. Among those released, half left jail within one day after their arrest and most of the others were in jail less than one week prior to their release. Defendants who were unable to make bail faced the

[28] Florida Statutes, 903.046, "Purpose of and Criteria for Bail Determination."

prospect of spending several months in jail because the median time period from arrest to adjudication ranged from seventy-three days for burglary defendants to over three hundred days for those accused of murder. The median time period for processing all felony cases was 89 days.

Other research, however, has suggested that the poor and the financially disadvantaged may be adversely affected by the structure and operation of the existing bail system. A 1996 study of Hispanic American arrestees in the Southwestern United States by Holmes and his colleagues demonstrated that those who retained private counsel were seven times more likely to gain pretrial release than those who were represented at public expense. This result may indicate that those more affluent defendants have greater ability to come up with bail money, and have private attorneys who advocate more strenuously for their clients at even the early stages of the criminal justice process.

At least one study finds that bail may also reflect racial or ethnic disparities and discrimination by criminal justice officials, or the social class of the defendant. The study by Houston and Ewing (1991) of the Connecticut State Bail Commission showed that at each step of the process, African American and Hispanic males with "clean" records were given bail amounts that were double those given to white defendants. Disparate treatment by the criminal justice system notwithstanding, the study also recognized that the higher bail might result from the fact that African Americans and Hispanics were more likely to be charged with a felony than whites. Another reason for the difference might be that poor defendants, regardless of race or ethnicity, often do not have jobs and a permanent residence – both of which are strong determinants in setting bail. Houston and Ewing

further observed that the greatest disparities in bail were in felony drug cases. In these types of cases, the average bail for African Americans and Hispanic Americans was four times high than for whites at the same courthouse and for the offense of similar gravity.

The problems for poor defendants are compounded by the lack of a constitutional right to representation by an attorney at bail hearings (Colbert, 1998). Defendants who cannot afford to hire a private attorney may have no one to make arguments on their behalf at the bail hearing itself. In point of fact, the prosecutor's argument in favor of high bail or the denial of bail altogether may be the only arguments heard by the judge. For many impoverished, financially disadvantaged defendants, bail is set even before an attorney has been appointed to represent them in the preparation of their defense.

One practical application of the use of bail is that bail provides the criminal justice system with a distinct, specific mechanism to ensure that pretrial detention facilities do not become more overcrowded than they currently are. Similar to the use of negotiated pleas of guilty (or plea bargains), the use of bail, then, is a necessary adjunct to partially ensure the continuous operation of the criminal justice system. Without the use of bail generally, or surety bonds in particular, local jail facilities and detention centers would quickly overflow their capacities, and strain the operation of these facilities to their breaking points.

Regardless of the process or statute by which bail is set, the issue of bail generates fundamental and conflicting policy questions. For example, society has a compelling interest in crime control; to this extent, granting freedom to defendants prior to trial may endanger public safety. Moreover, bailed defendants might escape the jurisdiction, and while free on bail, might commit even more crimes. Finally, the argument against bail

emphasizes one element of the public safety approach – bailed defendants can threaten, intimidate, and injure both victims and witnesses who are a party to the defendant's case, thereby potentially affecting the outcome of the case in court.

The other side of the argument is equally persuasive. From a purely legal point of view and in accordance with the elements of due process, pretrial detention is tantamount to incarceration *before* trial. This condition is analogous to the petulant child who is whipped and put to bed without supper. Accordingly, the public interest also requires protecting legally innocent persons from unwarranted government deprivations and intrusions. Detaining legally innocent defendants not only encroaches on their liberty, it impairs the capacity of those accused to assist in their own defense. Moreover, pretrial detention reduces the bargaining power of the defendant, either when entering a plea or at the sentencing phase of the judicial proceedings. In addition, pretrial detention is rather expensive. The direct economic costs of pretrial detention are enormous. According to Steven R. Schlesinger, "A defendant who is detained on a petty theft involving a few dollars may cost the government thousands of dollars" (Schlesinger, 1986: 178-179).

Though the use of commercial bail has its critics, there are several distinct advantages associated with its use as a type of community control mechanism which justify its continued and expanded use. First, commercial bail reduces jail overcrowding by providing defendants a mechanism for pretrial release. Second, commercial bail provides for pretrial release and monitoring within the community *at zero-cost to taxpayers*. Third, commercial bail creates an incentive that results in the majority of the defendants being returned to court since the bail agent, and ultimately the surety company, is financially liable for those defendants who fail to appear. Finally,

commercial bail provides for defendants to secure their freedom while awaiting the disposition of their case.

In order to offset some of the criticisms surrounding the use of a financial bond to secure a defendant's pretrial release, the state of Florida, like many other states across the country, employs on a county-by-county basis pretrial release programs which do not require financial surety as condition of pretrial release. Originally trumpeted as a mechanism to provide pretrial release for clients without the use of financial surety, the effectiveness of these programs is somewhat suspect when it comes to actual empirical support to justify and perpetuate their existence.

In the state of Florida, and depending upon which county in which the case is actually being decided, the presiding judge may have the option to place the defendant on a surety bond or admit the defendant to a government-sponsored, government administered, and government funded *unsecured* pretrial release program. Of the sixty-seven counties in Florida, twenty-eight of them have such programs in place. The remaining thirty-nine counties have no such programs in place, and rely strictly on the use of surety bonding as a mechanism of pretrial release.

At least one Florida county, Pasco County, had a unsecured pretrial release program in place, but decided to abandon it in 2007 ostensibly because of the extraordinary financial burden placed on the county to continue its operation. On one hand, county officials argued that eliminating the government-administered pretrial release program saved the county's taxpayers 348,000 dollars per year. On the other hand, advocates of the pretrial release program predicted that discarding the program would cause the jail population to increase beyond manageable proportions. The increase

in jail population that was foretold by pretrial release advocates simply did not occur. In fact, when the population growth of the county was factored into the analysis, the *per capita* jail occupancy actually declined by 2.2 percent during the next year. The major conclusion by Pasco County was that the complete elimination of the taxpayer financed pretrial release program in Pasco County had no significant impact on jail population**.** If any impact could be observed, one could conclude that eliminating the program actually reduced the per capita jail population while saving taxpayers nearly $350,000 per year. The fact that the per capita jail population actually declined could be neatly attributed to the fact that surety bonding was used an alternative pretrial release mechanism – a pretrial release mechanism that cost the taxpayers absolutely nothing.

Interestingly, the use of surety bonding and the use unsecured pretrial release in the state of Florida received legislative attention during both the 2010 and 2011 legislative sessions. In 2010, two companion bills were filed – HB445 and SB782 – in order to clarify the conditions under which surety bonding and unsecured pretrial release should be used. Similar pieces of proposed legislation were filed in the 2011 session – SB 372 and H1379.[29] On its face, each piece of legislation was designed to define, delineate, and clarify when unsecured pretrial release should be utilized, and the conditions under which it should be used vis-à-vis surety bonding. The twin pieces of legislation in 2010 and 2011 would have imposed conditions on the functioning of unsecured pretrial release programs that were generally in line with their historical intent. A number of legislators, however, seemed to believe that such legislation created an uneven playing field to the advantage of the bail bond industry. The debate that ensued during committee hearings

[29] Both bills were merely different versions of one another – one was filed in the Florida House of Representatives while the other was filed in the Florida Senate.

on the bills in both chambers can be objectively characterized as lively, contentious, and emotional. The legislature was not persuaded, however, and for a variety of reasons, both bills in 2010 were defeated.[30] Similarly, the proposed legislation filed in the 2011 legislative session died in committee. The defeat of these bills in both chambers of the Florida legislature ensured that unsecured government-funded pretrial release programs would be allowed to function *without* the more traditional restrictions that had been historically attached to their operation.

Interestingly enough, however, recent empirical evidence goes a long way in making the case for the continued use of surety bonding. For example, in a study recently released by the U. S. Department of Justice, Cohen and Reaves (2007), using robust statistical analysis on state court data over a fifteen-year period between 1990 and 2004, observe some interesting findings regarding the use of pretrial financial release as a type of pretrial community control. The authors observed that, "compared to release on recognizance, defendants on financial release were more likely to make all scheduled court appearances. Defendants released on an unsecured bond or as part of an emergency release were most likely to have a bench warrant issued because they failed to appear in court."

Similarly, a study by Block (2005) using a dataset that included over 20,000 cases from California's twelve largest counties between 1990 and 2000 concluded that surety bonding was more effective than release on recognizance (ROR) or conditional release (CR) in terms of ensuring court appearances, that surety bonding was more effective in reducing the number of fugitives from justice, and that a more widespread use of surety

[30] The reasons for the defeat of this legislation are beyond the scope of this research and will not be discussed here. Whether they would have been signed into law by the Governor had they passed in both the House and the Senate is a matter of sheer speculation.

bonding would save California taxpayers in the twelve largest counties anywhere between $1.3 million and $10 million in budget outlays if surety bonding replaced release on recognizance or conditional release.

Furthermore, a 2004 study by Helland and Tabarrok finds that the public is appreciably safer with defendants released by commercial bail as opposed to pretrial services where the taxpayer actually funds the system, that being pretrial services. Helland and Tabarrok argue that unsecured pretrial release programs have greater liabilities and disadvantage associated with their operations than with the use of commercial bail. The implications of their findings are that commercial bail operates much more safely and at no cost to the public (Helland and Tabarrok, 2004).

Finally, the American Legislative Exchange Council (2009) presents a cogent analysis of pretrial release services as currently structured. Citing an array of statistics that document the problems associated with these programs' operation, the ALEC argues that:

> "Government entities that try to replicate the success of the free-market system invariably fail. Pretrial services are no exception. To the misfortune of jurisdictions that have pretrial services, these programs tend to focus on their release mechanism without regard for its consequences."

The Council further asserts that government entities:

> "…congratulate themselves on having a successful release system if they (1) have a 10 percent deposit bond option, (2) have other release mechanisms like *release on own recognizance*, (3) and have sidelined commercial bail. This is done without regard to the effect on detention or failure-to-appear (FTA) rates. Once pretrial services reach these goals the means become the end. In fact, such programs have proven to suffer from higher detention and FTA rates than other jurisdictions that rely on bail bondsmen."

Along similar lines, the cost-savings of surety bonding taxpayers was further demonstrated by Krahl (2008, 2009, and 2010). The studies combined showed that the

use of surety bonding in Florida alone by a single surety bonding company alone saved Florida taxpayers nearly $500 *million* dollars in pretrial detention costs over a three-calendar year period, and functioned as a financial mechanism to offset exorbitant capital outlays if additional detention facilities had to be constructed to accommodate the resulting overcrowding if pretrial detention would be used as an alternative to surety bonding as a pretrial release mechanism.

The twin issues of jail overcrowding and jail expansion/construction is particularly problematic in light of the recent passage of Amendment 1 by voters in 2008 in Florida as well as the collateral conditions associated with recent economic downturn not only in Florida, but across the entire nation as well. Ostensibly designed to provide tax relief to property owners and supported by the Florida governor, the passage of this amendment to the Florida Constitution, while reducing property owner's taxes by about $240 per year, has had a significant and potentially irreparable adverse financial impact on the state, county, and municipal levels of government, particularly the criminal justice system. Law enforcement has been mandated to think of new and innovative ways of providing valuable police services at lower cost or eliminating certain types of policing program altogether. Prosecutors are re-evaluating their prosecutorial priorities; and some jails are overcrowded well beyond their established capacities because of pretrial detainees awaiting trial, those defendants serving post-conviction sentences, and those convicted of more serious offenses but awaiting transport to a state correctional facility.[31]

[31] Ironically, one sheriff, for example, in one of Florida's larger counties, indicated that because of increased fuel and transportation costs, his agency would no longer transport prisoners to and from state correctional facilities. His argument is that there is nothing in state law that mandates or compels the sheriff to provide such transportation services.

Although Amendment I was ostensibly designed to provide relief to Florida taxpayers, the statewide economic downturn is based at least in part upon a deteriorated housing market whereby many homeowners find themselves in a position of negative equity because of the devaluation of their property relative to the amount of their home loans. Increased rates of home foreclosures based upon the over-reliance on sub-prime loans which ended up in default have also exacerbated the situation. In light of the large-scale and protracted economic downturn which has affected not only Florida but the rest of the nation as well, government officials are continually being tasked with shaving literally millions of dollars from their operating budgets. Even though government officials all over Florida are being charged with the mandate of "doing more with less"[32], both the direct and indirect costs of housing persons in jails across the state will be directly affected by the recent passage of Amendment 1 by voters in Florida in 2008 along with a poorly performing economy. If one assumes even a fixed number of detainees at a fixed cost along with a decrease in the revenue base available to sustain them while in detention, then the relative costs of detention will actually be increased as counties continue to find themselves in an adverse financial position because of a continued shrinkage of the revenue base.

Across the state of Florida, the cost of housing inmates at the county level alone[33] exceeds 1.8 *billion* dollars per year. Even though counties have different per-diem costs, the number of inmates on a daily basis multiplied by the established "per-diem" rate

[32] It should be noted that over time, the extreme outcome of the exhortation of "doing more with less" is to "do everything with nothing." Thus, the implication that follows from "doing more with less" is logically meaningless.

[33] This figure includes only inmates housed in county detention facilities. It does not include the costs of housing inmates at state correctional institutions, nor does it include the rates charged to the Federal government for housing Federal detainees.

gives a reliable estimate as to the direct costs associated with the operation of county detention facilities and lock-ups.[34]

In light of increasing financial constraints, then, one compelling research question is how much money does the use of surety bonding as a type of bail actually save the taxpayers on a yearly basis? That is, how much money does the county save in direct costs of maintaining jail and detention facilities by allowing pretrial defendants to be released on a surety bond? A second related question is, what would be the financial impact of actually placing all pretrial defendants in detention who are otherwise free on a surety bond? Answering both of these questions provides valuable insight into the viability and cost-advantage of surety bonding to taxpayers within the state in terms of a cost-containment strategy.

Furthermore, given the robust debate surrounding the use of unsecured pretrial release programs relative to the use of surety bonding as a pretrial release mechanism, it is useful to make direct comparisons regarding these two different types of approaches. For purposes of this analysis, it makes sense to compare counties with unsecured pretrial release programs with those counties who do not utilize such programs on a variety of different variables.

Intuitively, then, it seems that the use of surety bonding as a form of bail makes sound financial sense, if for no other reason than to maintain reduced operating costs, forestall the construction of new jail and detention facilities, and to release defendants back into the community if there is no compelling reason to keep them in pretrial detention. The overarching question, then, to be addressed by this research is: what is the

[34] The standard formula used by county officials to compute direct per-diem costs is to take the total costs of housing and supervision and divide that number by the total number of inmate-days.

overall financial impact of the use of surety bonding to taxpayers and county governments?

From both a philosophical and substantive point of view, the decision to release or detain defendants before trial attempts to balance the competing policy goals of the criminal justice system. The public interest in maintaining public safety and crime control directly conflicts with the deprivation of pretrial liberty and economy in government. It is this debate that perpetuates itself over time. The prospect of defendants on bail committing more criminal acts disturbs those who are committed to crime control efforts. However, those committed to constitutional due process have their sensibilities offended when legally innocent persons are incarcerated prior to trial and conviction. Finally, fiscal conservatives who emphasize government accountability, demand that taxpayers get the most of their tax dollars and object to spending money that does not demonstrably or effectively control criminal behavior in either the short-term or the long-term.

Thus, this study will look solely at the financial impact of the surety bonding system in Florida, in an attempt to determine the overall anticipated financial impact of surety bonding to counties across the state by one insurance company. This study is both an extension and expansion of two similar studies that were conducted by the author over the last three years using data for 2007, 2008, and 2009 (see Krahl, 2008; Krahl, 2009; and Krahl, 2010). This year's analysis of 2010 data utilizes a more inclusive and expansive dataset to better assess the overall financial impact and the economic utility of surety bonding as a pretrial release mechanism.

This year's study also looks at the data not only on a statewide basis, but also on the basis of subsets of the larger population of statewide data whereby the different

counties were grouped into categories based upon the size of the counties' populations. Consequently, there were six population tiers that were identified and utilized in this year's study. Disaggregating the overall statewide data into smaller data groups that were based on county population size provided the opportunity for a more extensive analysis, the implications of which have direct bearing on the financial stability of the counties themselves if they would be required to build new jail or detention facilities if surety bonding were not utilized as a method pretrial release. Finally, this year's study examines the data in light of whether the counties with unsecured pretrial release programs and those counties where secured pretrial release mechanisms are different than or are similar to one another on a number of different factors.

Methodology

It must be emphasized that this study reflects the surety bonding activities in the state of Florida by one, and only one, surety bonding agency. Thus, in order to assess the broader, overall financial impact of the use of surety bonding in the state of Florida by this single company in terms of aggregate estimated cost savings and potential new jail cell/dormitory construction costs, multiple data sources were utilized to collect the requisite data. First, there were historical data for the 2010 calendar year that contained a number of relevant data elements on a county-by-county basis, including the total number of days on bail bond status. This type of data is critical when computing the cost-advantage of bail as opposed to the use of pretrial detention.

Originally, the database of surety bond records for the 2010 calendar year contained 52,647 records of defendants from across the state of Florida who had been placed on surety bond status by this one insurance company. However, because a limited number of records contained significant data entry errors or lacked the requisite data altogether, the size of the database was reduced from 54,461 original records to 52,246 usable records. This represents a reduction in the size of the dataset of 401 cases, or 0.7 percent.[35]

When assessing the validity of the original data, there were two principal reasons to not include certain bond records from the original database. First of all, some records did not accurately reflect the "total number of days" on surety bond status; or the record actually had a negative number associated with that variable. In addition, there was no

[35] It should be noted that the 2010 database in this year's study was marked by significantly fewer unusable cases. The data attrition for 2010 was *less than one percent*, 401 out of the original 52,647. Comparatively, the attrition rate for the 2007 database was 53 percent; in 2008, 29.33 percent; and in 2009, 39.51 percent.

indication as far as the status of the bond was concerned at the end of the year. In other words, it could not be determined if the bond was still in force or whether the bond had been exonerated by the end of the 2010 calendar year. Other records were missing a discernible "county" designation which would have made that record impossible to utilize in the county-by-county analysis. Hence, measurement error would have been a significant issue to include any of these cases with such limitations in the final dataset

After all of the data exceptions were removed from the original database through sorting and data cleansing procedures, the original database population was reduced from its initial size of 52,647 to 52,246 usable data records. This represents an attrition rate of slightly less than one percent from the original number of cases in the larger database.[36] However, because the population of all 52,246 usable records in the population were used in this analysis, no sampling was required. Thus, all results in this analysis are based on data from the entire database of 52,246 cases from across the state of Florida.[37]

By virtue of the business activities represented by this one Florida insurance company, all but one county (66 out of 67 counties) in Florida are represented in the

[36] Because of the nature and extent of data entry errors in the database initially provided, it is impossible to accurately determine or even estimate if the exclusion of these 401 records from the original database did anything other than reduce the size of the resulting database. It is impossible to determine if there were any significant differences between the group of cases that were deleted when compared to the cases in the final usable database after the data had been subject to quality assurance scrutiny. It is further impossible to determine the net impact of the data reduction on the outcome of the county-by-county analysis, and whether some counties were disproportionately affected by the reduction in the size of the database. The only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that the original database was reduced in size by 0.7 percent, from an original size of 52,647 to 52,246 cases. As with last several years' reduction in the size of the dataset because of faulty or defective data, the effect of such a reduction is both unknown and indeterminate, and the effect of such data loss cannot be reliably estimated. However, it is safe to assume that such data loss from this year's dataset would be potentially less problematic than in previous years.

[37] The total number of cases included in this study (52,246) includes those individual defendants with one charge and one surety bond, along with those defendants that have multiple charges, and therefore, multiple bonds. This is consistent with the current way that crime incident data is reported to the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) using the National Incident Based Reporting System, whereby all offenses against the defendant are reported, not just the most serious one.

database itself.[38] Nearly one-third (30.88 percent) of all of the cases used in the analysis were from two of Florida's sixty-seven counties: Hillsborough (18.81%) and Polk (12.07%). The remaining sixty percent of the cases in the database were from the remaining counties in Florida with the exception of Lafayette County. No cases were included in the database from this county. Hence, it is impossible to ascertain the financial impact of surety bonding in this county because there were no usable records to document the use of surety bonding. There were no usable data available.[39]

Data regarding per-diem detention rates of county detention facilities were obtained from reports submitted to the state's Department of Corrections' Bureau of Research and Data Analysis and contained in yearly reports pertaining to the operation of county detention facilities. This supplementary report is separate and apart from the annual reports that are compiled by the Department of Corrections. *Per diem* detention costs reflect the direct costs of supervision, inmate housing, food, clothing, and certain limited medical expenses. *Per diem* rates are typically calculated by dividing the total operating budget of the facility by the number of inmate-days for any particular time period. *Per diem* rates may be calculated monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, or annually. In this analysis, the most recent *per diem* detention cost (typically, fourth quarter data) was used in the calculation of the total costs of detention and detention cost savings for the entire 2010 time period.[40]

[38] There was no surety bond data from Lafayette County included in the study. This indicates that there was no usable data from this particular county even if surety bonds were written by the company.
[39] It should be noted that the language in this document that makes specific reference to "statewide data" is based on the sixty-four counties that are included in the analysis regarding the use of surety bonding and for which data was collected. Lafayette County, for which no surety bond data exist for purposes of this study are only included for purposes of comparing counties with unsecured pretrial release programs with respect to those that utilize surety bonding as a pretrial release mechanism.
[40] For several counties, it was impossible to determine "per-diem" detention costs, even after numerous and repeated telephone calls to jail administrative personnel. Nor had such data been submitted to the

Other data used in the analysis were "average daily populations" (ADP) and incarceration rate (IR) data for Florida county detention centers.[41] The average daily population rate for each county was based on average daily population counts for each of the twelve months in 2010, for each county detention facility. The incarceration rate is based upon the number of persons incarcerated in county detention facilities per 1,000 persons in the county population. Obtained from the state Department of Corrections in their statewide reports on county detention facilities in the state, these annual data were critical in estimating annual detention costs for each of the different counties based upon detention center population figures.[42]

"Total detention costs" for each county in Florida were calculated by multiplying the average daily population (ADP) for the year for that particular county by the county's per-diem rate. This figure, in turn, was multiplied by 365, as follows:

TDC = ADP x PDR x 365, such that

TDC is the total yearly detention costs for the county;
ADP is the average daily population for that county on an annualized basis;
PDR is the per-diem rate per inmate; and
365 is the number of days in the year.

Department of Corrections by these counties in DOC-requested reports. Missing per diem data in this study was reconciled by using the average per diem rate for the counties within the same population group (or population tier) was used using averaged data (arithmetic mean) for that group from available 2009 data.

[41] The average daily population (ADP) and the incarceration rates (IR) are based on all inmates who are incarcerated at the county detention facilities. This data is reported in both monthly and yearly format by the Florida Department of Corrections. The Average Daily Population (ADP) data includes those defendants awaiting trial, those awaiting sentencing in post-conviction status, those actually serving sentences, those inmates awaiting transport to state prison facilities, undocumented aliens, those that are being held for other jurisdictions, and those who are under some type of civil commitment (Baker Act, Marchman Act). The use of this overall average daily population yields the best measure of what the true population of the jail facility actually is, and this is important in computing overall detention costs for the county for the year. Thus, the Average Daily Population is a more inclusive figure since it incorporates a multitude of different categories that comprise a facility's true daily population.

[42] See *Florida County Detention Facilities Average Inmate Population 2010 Annual Report*, published by the Florida Department of Corrections. Per-diem cost data were also supplied by the Department's Bureau of Research and Data Analysis separate and apart from the data to be included in the Department's *2010 Annual Report.*

The "total detention cost savings" for each county was calculated by multiplying the total number of days on bond status by the established per-diem rate for that county. This may be represented by the following computational formula:

TDCS = NDBS x PDR, such that

TDCS is the total detention cost savings for the county;
NDBS is the total number of days on bond status; and
PDR is the established per-diem rate.

Comparing these two variables on a county-wide and state-wide basis will allow one to reliably estimate the overall magnitude of the financial impact that surety bonding has on each individual county within Florida and the state as a whole.[43] The resulting data may also be used in reasonably inferring as to how many additional detention facilities would be required if surety bonding were *not* used as an alternative to pretrial detention.

The total number of cases included in this analysis, by county, as well as the county's population, and the total number of days spent on surety bond status for defendants are displayed in Table I.

Table I shows that of the total number of cases in the dataset, Hillsborough County had the greatest number of cases (9,826 cases; 18.81% of all cases). In addition, Hillsborough County defendants spent an aggregate of 911,571 days on bond status (17.73% of total). Orange County, Palm Beach County, Lee County, and Polk County were those counties that had the next highest number of cases and the number of defendant days spent on bond status, Curiously, Citrus, Lee, and Escambia counties had

[43] Originally, data regarding bond forfeitures were going to be included in this study. However, the data regarding the amount of revenue returned to the counties from forfeited surety bonds was going to be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain from the different counties. All of these monies go into fines and forfeitures at the state level, and then redistributed to the individual counties (Florida Statutes 903.26, 903.27). Accordingly, there is no specific line-item to extract that data. For each Clerk of Court office to actually sift and sort through this data would require almost six months of effort because the surety bond forfeiture data is so deeply embedded in the other "fines and forfeitures" data. Including the "fines and forfeiture" data is the subject of future research.

significantly fewer cases included in the dataset and accounted for fewer number of defendant days spent on bond status than either Orange County or Polk County. However, in total, these five counties account for slightly over fifty percent of all of the cases in the data array (51.2%) and under fifty percent of all of the days that defendants spent on bond status (48.6%). These five counties account for just over one-fourth (26.1%) of the population in the state's sixty-seven counties.

In addition to the summary table for all sixty-seven counties included in this analysis, the relevant data are broken down by county population size.[44] Accordingly, there are six different tiers that are shown the different tables. Tier 1 counties are those counties (11) with populations greater than 500,000 persons; Tier 2 counties (3) include those counties with populations between 350,000 and 499,999 persons; Tier 3 counties (9) include those counties with populations between 250,000 and 349,999 people; Tier 4 counties include those counties (6) with between 150,000 and 249,999 persons; Tier 5 counties (14) are those with populations between 50,000 and 149,999 individuals; and Tier 6 counties are those counties (24) with less than 50,000 people.

For purposes of statistical analysis in this study, a number of univariate and multivariate statistical techniques were employed. In addition to frequency distributions and tabular percentages to assess overall financial impact of surety bonding, t-tests and zero –order and partial correlations were utilized, as were multiple regression and discriminant analysis. The use of these tools enable one to ascertain whether there are statistically significant differences between counties with unsecured pretrial release programs and counties that do not have such programs but which rely on surety bonding

[44] Population data for each of the sixty-seven counties included in this study are county population counts from the 2010 decennial census.

as a secured pretrial release mechanism. The results of these different statistical analyses for explanatory and predictive purposes may be found in Tables IX through XV of this research and are discussed in the following sections of this study.

Results and Findings

The Use of Surety Bonding in the State of Florida as a Cost-Containment Mechanism

The total average detention costs, by county, are displayed in Table II. For the state overall, and using the computational formula identified in the previous section, the total costs to keep defendants in jail exceeds 1.81 *billion* dollars of expense for the 2010 calendar year. Indeed, the operation of detention facilities across the state is an expensive enterprise. Table II also displays the total average detention costs for each county for the same time period. The top five counties with the highest average annual detention costs across the state include the following counties: Miami-Dade ($284.9 million), Broward ($186.6 million), Palm Beach ($134.1 million), Orange ($125.2 million), Hillsborough ($94.9 million). In the aggregate, these five counties by themselves account for 971.2 million dollars in detention costs, or just over fifty percent (53.6%) of all county dollars spent for detention services across the state. The remaining sixty-two counties in Florida account for the remaining 46.4 percent of the total cost of detention.

The total detention cost savings to each county from using surety bonds as opposed to pretrial detention are also displayed in Table II. Based on the total population of 52,246 cases used in the analysis, there were a total of 5,125,995 days spent by defendants in surety bond status. This is an average of 98.11 days per defendant in this study.

Based upon the total number of days that defendants were on surety bond status, per county, and multiplying that number by that county's per-diem cost, the annual cost savings to the counties across the state through the use of surety bonds by one Florida insurance company alone is staggering, and exceeds four hundred *million* dollars in 2010.

Table II further indicates that this $400 *million* dollars was saved by the counties and their taxpayers through the use of surety bonds that were written by a surety bonding company a*s an alternative to pretrial incarceration*. This savings represents roughly 22.32 percent of total detention costs statewide for those sixty-seven Florida counties that were included in this study.

Counties that realized the greatest detention cost-savings through the use of this company's surety bonds include Hillsborough ($73.6 million), Orange ($43.6 million), Polk (23.0 million), Palm Beach (41.4 million), Seminole (11.3 million), and Miami-Dade ($17.8 million). In the aggregate, these seven counties accounted for nearly sixty (59.2) percent, or $239.5 million dollars, of all of the documented detention cost-savings through the use of surety bonding.

There also was a tremendous amount of variation in the per-diem detention costs. Per-diem detention costs ranged from lows of $20 in Union County and $27.20 in Jackson County to highs of $134 in Miami-Dade and $135 in Palm-Beach County. Closely behind Miami-Dade and Palm Beach County were Charlotte ($118.81), Broward ($113), Collier ($107.17), and Pinellas ($126.11) counties. After these six counties, the next closest counties were Orange ($94.94) and Flagler ($102.2) counties. The average (mean) per-diem detention cost across the state was $64.33 for 2010. This represents an increase of 3.63 percent from the 2009 average per diem cost of $62.04.[45]

[45] It is important to note that this fluctuation is probably due to the inclusion of all 67 Florida counties in the calculation of the average per diem rate in 2010 and 2009. Only 60 of the 67 counties were used in the calculation of this figure in 2008.

Average Daily Populations (ADP) and Incarceration Rates (IR)

"Average daily populations" (ADP) for county detention facilities are displayed in Table III-A and Table III-B, and in each of the tables that display the data by different population tiers. Significant variations are observed between counties throughout the state. The average daily population (ADP) ranged from lows of 19 in Union County , 26 in Lafayette County, and 30 in Gilchrist County, to a high of 5,825 in Miami-Dade. In addition to Miami-Dade, the highest average daily populations were in Broward (4,525), Orange (3.613), Hillsborough (3,218), Duval (3,825), Pinellas (3,162) and Palm Beach (2,721) counties. The overall average daily population (ADP) across the state was 877.63. This represents a decline of 3.43 percent from the statewide overall ADP in 2009 of 909.40. [46]

Incarceration rates (Table III) are based on the number of detainees in county detention facilities per 1,000 persons in the county's population. Hence, along with the number of individuals actually incarcerated in detention, incarceration rates are sensitive to fluctuations in the number of persons in the population. The overall incarceration rate for the 67 counties in the state covered under this study is 4.09 persons per 1,000 in the county population. This represents a net increase in the incarceration rate of 5.1 percent over the previous year (2009, 3.89). These data also illustrate there are substantial

[46] If one examines the average daily populations for only felony and misdemeanor defendants who were awaiting trial in detention, a slightly different picture emerges. Overall, in 2009, these felony and misdemeanor defendants comprised 61.31 percent of the entire statewide ADP. It is estimated that pretrial felony defendants had an ADP of 497.40, while misdemeanor defendants had an ADP of 87.03. It is important to remember that pretrial felony and misdemeanor defendants are a subset of the larger jail population, and that in and of themselves, they do not adequately represent the larger population of jail inmates at any give point in time.

differences in the incarceration rates *between* the different counties in the state. Union County (1.7), Gilchrist County (1.8), and Palm Beach County (1.7) have the lowest incarceration rates, closely followed by Clay (2.4), Gulf (2.7), Hillsborough (2.7), Miami Dade (2.4), Okaloosa (2.6), Sarasota (2.1), Seminole (2.3), and St. John's (2.6) counties. Alternatively, some of the highest incarceration rates (5.0 and over) are found in Baker (15.3), Bay (5.2), DeSoto (5.8), Dixie (6.1), Escambia (5.3), Franklin (8.5), Hamilton (5.0), Hendry (5.6), Jackson (5.1), Liberty (7.7), Marion (5.2), Monroe (6.3), Okeechobee (6.2), St. Lucie (5.2), Wakulla (7.5), and Washington (5.4) counties over the course of the 2010 year.

These data also reveal that a number of counties within the state have substantially higher rates of incarceration than do others. The data also demonstrate that the counties with the highest rates of incarceration may be significant in terms of better utilizing surety bonds as a mechanism by which to reduce jail overcrowding and reduce the number of pretrial defendants who are in pretrial detention.[47]

Distinguishing Between Florida Counties on Surety Bonding Effectiveness

Because of the financial impact associated with the use of surety bonding in the larger counties within the state, it would be valuable to examine the financial impact of surety bonding across the state if one looks at the largest fourteen counties in Florida and the remaining counties in the state who utilized surety bonding in 2010 based on the bonds written by one surety bonding company (see Table IV).

[47] Please refer to footnote 35 herein regarding the average daily population (ADP) and incarceration rates (IR) use in this research.

If we examine the fourteen largest counties[48] in Florida based upon population (Tier 1 and Tier 2 counties), the total detention cost savings in these counties alone approximates 277.9 million dollars per year in detention cost savings alone. This aggregate amount within these fourteen counties represents 68.7 percent of all of the 404.2 million dollars in cost savings across the state.[49] On average, each of these fourteen counties saved an average of 19.8 million dollars in detention costs through the use of surety bonding. Looking at the remaining 53 counties, there was an aggregate savings in detention costs of 126.3 million dollars through the use of surety bonding. This represents 31.2 percent of the aggregate detention cost savings across the state. This amounts to an average detention cost savings of $2.38 million dollars per county. These findings generally show that larger counties have greater use of surety bonding, and therefore, these same counties realize the greatest amount of savings though surety bonding use.

The following summary tables, Table IV-A and Table IV-B, both summary compilations of Table IV, examine the average detention cost savings, the average per diem rate, the average detention costs, and the average detention costs if surety bonding were not utilized. The data is further broken down by statewide totals, totals for the fourteen largest counties in the state, and the remaining fifty-three counties in the state where surety bonding is utilized as a pretrial release mechanism and as an alternative to pretrial confinement.

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[48] These fourteen counties are as follows: Tier 1 - Brevard, Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Lee, Miami-Dade, Orange, Palm Beach, Pinellas, Polk and Volusia counties; and Tier 2 – Pasco, Seminole, and Sarasota.

[49] Since this study considers only one Florida surety bonding company, it is important to mention that their bail agents are not equally distributed throughout the state within the different counties themselves. Consequently, some counties have more bail agents; other counties, fewer. Similarly, other surety bonding companies also operated within the state that have bail agents differentially distributed throughout Florida. The results of their surety bonding efforts and activities in terms of financial impact are not included in this particular study. A more comprehensive analysis of all bonding companies across the state with respect to their overall financial impact in the state of Florida is the subject of potential future research.

Table IV-A
Comparison of Largest Florida Counties with Remainder of State
Detention Cost Savings, Costs of Detention, and Detention Costs Without Surety Bonding

	Annual Total and Average Detention *Cost Savings*	Average Per Diem Rate	Annual Total and Average *Cost of Detention*	Annual Total and Average *Detention Costs Without Surety Bonding*
Statewide – All Counties Across Florida (n=67)	**$ 404,231,161** **$ 6,033,301**	**$ 64.33**	**$ 1,810,820,137** **$ 27,027,166**	**$ 2,215,051,297** **$ 33,060,467**
Largest Counties in State (n=14)	**$ 277,855,096** **$19,848,935**	**$ 87.49**	**$ 1,298,706,274** **$ 92,764,734**	**$ 1,576,591,370** **$ 112,613,669**
Remaining Counties in State (n=53)	**$ 126,346,064** **$ 2,383,888**	**$ 58.21**	**$ 512,113,863** **$ 9,662,526**	**$ 638,459,927** **$ 12,046,414**

This summary table illustrates the following major findings:

- The fourteen largest counties across the state account for approximately 71.8 percent of all of the detention costs on a state-wide basis;
- These same counties account for 68.7 percent of all of the savings in annual detention costs;
- Finally, the 53 remaining counties across the state account for 28.2 percent of the annualized detention costs, and 31.3 percent of the total detention cost savings through the use of surety bonding.

These findings, then, confirm that which is intuitively obvious - the more that surety bonding is used in any county, the greater that the detention cost savings will be to that particular county. Statewide average *daily cost savings* through the use of surety bonding by this company alone is approximately $1,107,483 dollars for all counties statewide; $761,329 dollars for the fourteen largest counties in Florida; and $346,154 dollars for the remaining 53 counties in the state. Comparatively speaking, the average *daily detention costs* across the state are $4,961,151 for all Florida counties; $3,553,099

dollars for the fourteen largest counties across the state; and $1,403,052 in the 53 remaining counties in Florida.

It is also instructive to look at these same statewide data when displayed by the six different population tiers (Table IV-B). Referring back to the breakdown as far as population tiers are concerned, the table below displays annual total and average detention cost savings through the use of surety bonding, the average per diem rate, the annual total and average cost of detention, and finally, the annual total and average cost of detention without surety bonding.

Based upon these population tiers, these data indicate that Tier 1 counties accounted for nearly sixty percent of the annual cost-savings through the use of surety bonding during 2010. The breakdown by population tiers relative to the percentage of cost-savings accrued through the use of surety bonding in 2010 is shown below:

Tier 1 Counties	63.2%
Tier 2 Counties	5.6%
Tier 3 Counties	10.1%
Tier 5 Counties	7.2%
Tier 5 Counties	8.7%
Tier 6 Counties	5.2%

Table IV-B
Detention Cost Savings, Costs of Detention, and Detention Costs Without Surety Bonding By Six Population Tiers

	Annual Total and Average Detention ***Cost Savings*** within Population Tier	Average ***Per Diem Rate*** within Population Tier	Annual Total and Average ***Cost of Detention*** within Population Tier	Annual Total and Average ***Detention Costs without Surety Bonding*** within Population Tier
Tier 1 Counties (11)	**$ 255,277,618** **$ 10,409,830**	**$ 91.93**	**$ 1,218,389,064** **$ 110,762,642**	**$ 1,473,666,682** **$ 133,969,698**
Tier 2 Counties (3)	**$ 22,607,479** **$ 7,535,826**	**$ 71.22**	**$ 80,317,210** **$ 26,772,403**	**$ 102,924,689** **$34,308.230**

Tier 3 Counties (8)	**$ 40,018,354** **$ 5,127,294**	**$ 64.67**	**$ 227,759,766** **$ 28,469,471**	**$ 268,778,210** **$ 33,597.265**
Tier 4 Counties (7)	**$ 29,219,213** **$ 4,174,173**	**$75.67**	**$ 120,555,598** **$ 17,222,228**	**$ 149,774,811** **$ 21,396,401**
Tier 5 Counties (13)	**$ 35,277,476** **$ 2,713,652**	**$69.09**	**$ 107,742,233** **$ 8,287,864**	**$ 143,019,709** **$ 11,001,516**
Tier 6 Counties (25)	**$ 20,831,021** **$ 833,241**	**$ 50.27**	**$ 56,056,266** **$ 2,242,151**	**$ 76,887,287** **$ 3,075,492**

In order to evaluate the overall impact of surety bonding, it is useful to examine the ratio between the average aggregate daily costs saved through surety bonding and the average aggregate daily costs incurred as a result of using pretrial detention. The results regarding the percentage of detention costs saved on a daily basis in 2010 in Florida counties are displayed in Table V-A and Table V-B, as derived from summary Table VIII.

Within the state of Florida, all sixty-seven counties used in the analysis had aggregate average daily detention costs of nearly 4.82 million dollars. Overall, on a daily basis, the state saved approximately $502,000 per day in detention costs.

Table V-A
Average Aggregate Daily Detention Costs, Average Aggregate Daily Costs Saved Through Surety Bonding, and Percentage of Costs Saved on Daily Basis
Statewide and by 14 Largest and Other Counties

	Average Aggregate Daily Detention Costs	Average Aggregate Daily Costs Saved through Surety Bonding	Percentage of Costs Saved on Daily Basis through Surety Bonding
Florida Statewide – All Counties (67)	**$ 4,961,151**	**$ 1,107,483**	**22.32**
14 Largest Florida Counties	**$ 3,558,099**	**$ 761,329**	**21.34**
Remaining 53 Florida Counties	**$ 1,403,052**	**$ 346,154**	**24.67**

The data show that on a statewide basis, the use of surety bonding saves approximately 22.32 percent of the average daily detention costs on a daily basis. In

Florida's fourteen largest counties, a savings of 21.34 percent is realized through the use of financial surety. In Florida's remaining 53 counties, the percentage of daily costs saved is just slightly higher (24.67 percent) than for either the state as a whole (at 22.32 percent) or the fourteen largest counties within the state (at 21.34 percent).

The table illustrates that over all of Florida counties that were included in the analysis, surety bonding saves, on average, just over $1 million dollars in detention costs on a daily basis. This translates to 22.32 percent of the average aggregate daily pretrial detention costs across the state. Moreover, the fourteen largest counties the state save, on average, slightly over $760,000 dollars in average aggregate daily detention costs through surety bonding, or roughly 21.34 percent of average aggregate daily detention costs. For the remaining fifty-three counties in the state, the average daily detention cots are just over $1.40 million dollars. In these counties, surety bonding saves, on average, slightly more than $350,000 per day in detention costs. This figure represents nearly twenty-five percent of the average aggregated detention costs in these fifty-three counties.

These results are even more striking if the same data is broken down according the pre-established population tiers (Table V-B). Using these six different population tiers, the following table displays the average daily costs saved through the use of surety bonding as related to the average daily detention costs. The results regarding the percentage of detention costs saved on a daily basis in 2010 in all Florida counties are displayed in the following table. In general, this table reveals some interesting findings relative to the impact of the use of surety bonding with respect to the average daily costs of pretrial detention from one population tier to the next.

Table V-B
Average Aggregate Daily Detention Costs, Average Aggregate Daily Costs Saved Through Surety Bonding, and Percentage of Costs Saved Through Surety Bonding on Daily Basis, by Six Population Tiers

	Average Aggregate Daily Detention Costs	Average Aggregate Daily Costs Saved through Surety Bonding	Percentage of Costs Saved on Daily Basis through Surety Bonding
Tier 1 Counties (11)	**$ 3,333,052**	**$ 699,331**	**20.93 %**
Tier 2 Counties (3)	**$ 220,047**	**$ 61,993**	**28.17 %**
Tier 3 Counties (8)	**$ 623,999**	**$ 112,379**	**18.01 %**
Tier 4 Counties (7)	**$ 330,289**	**$ 80,053**	**24.24 %**
Tier 5 Counties (13)	**$ 295,184**	**$ 96,651**	**32.74 %**
Tier 6 Counties (25)	**$ 153,579**	**$ 57,071**	**37.16 %**

Although each population tier demonstrates considerable cost savings through the use of surety bonding, *with five of six population tiers exceeding twenty percent in terms of percentage of costs saved*, the percentages from one population tier to the next generally indicate that the greatest returns from the use of surety bonding are realized by the smaller counties within the state.[50] Although Tier 3 counties have the lowest percentage of costs saved (18.01 percent), it is the thirteen Tier 5 counties (those with populations between 50,000 and 149,999 persons) and the twenty-five Tier 6 counties (those with populations under 50,000 persons) that truly realize the biggest return on the use of surety bonding as a mechanism to offset the daily costs of pretrial detention. In the

[50] The only distinctive exception as far as this general trend line is concerned is with Tier III counties, which include Collier, Escambia, Lake, Leon, Manatee, Marion, Osceola, and St. Lucie counties.

Tier 5 counties, the average daily costs save through the use of surety bonding are 32.74 percent of those counties' average daily detention costs. In the Tier 6 counties, the average daily costs saved through the use of surety bonding represent 37.16 percent of those counties' average daily detention costs. In the aggregate, Tier 5 and Tier 6 counties save 34.25 percent of their average daily detention costs through the use of surety bonding.

This analysis has shown that the financial impact of surety bonding in the state of Florida is significant in terms of reducing the operational costs of detention facilities. On a statewide basis, this number exceeds $404 million dollars in 2010 alone, by this single surety bonding company. Even if this magnitude of savings was relatively constant over a five- or ten-year period, the estimated detention cost savings to Florida's taxpayers would be between 2.2 *billion* dollars (over five years) and 4.04 *billion* dollars (over a ten-year period).

The greatest cost savings in terms of actual magnitude were in Hillsborough ($73.7 million), Orange ($43.6 million), Polk ($23 million), Lee (28.8 million), and Palm Beach (41.4 million) counties. In the aggregate, these five counties alone accounted for over fifty percent (52.1%) of the aggregate cost savings across the state through the use of surety bonding as a pretrial release mechanism.

The Cost of Returning Pretrial Defendants to Pretrial Detention and the Cost of New Jail Bed Construction

Just as important is the question of financial impact on county detention facilities if there were no defendants on surety bonds. In other words, what would be the financial impact of placing these individuals in pretrial detention instead of using surety bonding to secure their pretrial release? Table VI addresses this particular question.

These data indicate that removing the defendants in this study from surety bond status and placing them in pretrial detention would have increased the total costs of jail operations across the state by slightly over 20 percent (22.32%). This percentage increase is not insignificant with respect to its policy implications. Furthermore, the impact of this increase is especially noteworthy, especially if one considers that this 22.32 percent increase translates into an excess of $ 404.2 million dollars of added detention operating expense. For a number of individual counties across the state, the financial impact of having to place all defendants into pretrial detention status would stretch their detention center operating budgets to the sheer breaking point in an alarming fashion. This has been a conclusion that has been identified consistently in the past by this author (see Krahl, 2008; Krahl, 2009; and Krahl, 2010).

Given the current rates of surety bond utilization in a number of these counties, the overall operating budgets of their county detention facilities across the state would be increased significantly if these same defendants were to be placed in pretrial detention. Counties that would have experienced increases in operating costs in excess of thirty percent include the following Florida counties: Charlotte (42%), Citrus (39%), Clay (30%), Flagler (313 %), Gadsden (74%), Glades (150%), Hendry (60%), Hardee (141%), Hernando (59%), Highlands (50%), Hillsborough (77%), Holmes (57%), Lee (58%), Liberty (44%), Okeechobee (98%), Orange (24%), Palm Beach (31%), Polk (55%), Putnam (31%), Sarasota (42%), Seminole (44%), and Washington (44%). In these counties alone, placing defendants in pretrial detention as opposed to releasing them on surety bonds would have increased these counties' detention centers annual aggregate operating costs by $300 million dollars in 2010. Indeed, roughly one-third of all Florida

counties would experience increases in detention operating costs that exceed thirty percent.

Moreover, it is important to consider the extent to which surety bonding acts as a way to contain construction costs of new facilities across the state, or forestall the construction of additional jail beds to accommodate increases in the pretrial detention population. Suppose, for example, no defendants were released on surety bonds, and that all of these defendants were placed in pretrial detention. The data from this analysis indicate that there were 52,246 defendants released on surety bonds, and that they were under a surety bond for an aggregated total of 5,125,995 days until the bond was satisfactorily discharged, or exonerated. On average, defendants across the state on surety bond spend an average of 98.11 days on bonded status with substantial variations from one county to the next. The question then becomes: how many new beds or cells would have to be constructed in order to accommodate the increase in pretrial population if surety bonding were unavailable as a pretrial release mechanism?

For the state of Florida on an overall basis, the number of additional beds or cells can be calculated using the following formula:

NEW BEDS = PTD x DAYS/365, such that

NEW BEDS is the number of new beds or cells required;
PTD is the number of pretrial detainees;
DAYS/365 is the average number of days in bond status/PTD status assuming no surety bonding;
365 is the number of days in the year.

As an example to simplify this argument, assume that you have two pretrial detainees. One spends 200 days under a surety bond, while the second spends 165 days on bond status. Let us further assume that without being released on bond, both would

have spent their time (200 days + 165 days) in pretrial detention. In order to accommodate these two pretrial detainees, we need to determine how many additional beds will be required. Substituting the values into the formula above, we get the following result:

NEW BEDS = PTD x DAYS/365

NEW BEDS = 2 x 182.5/365

NEW BEDS = 2 x .5

NEW BEDS = 1.0

Thus, in order to accommodate these two new pretrial detainees in pretrial detention and for the time specified, one additional bed/cell would be needed.

If we look at the overall state of Florida and the impact of putting all pretrial defendants in pretrial detention status, there were 52,246 persons on surety bond during 2010. Furthermore, the average amount of time on bond status was 98.11 days. Accordingly, the total number of days on surety bond status for these 52,246 pretrial defendants was 5,125,995 days over the entire year. Calculating the number of new beds or cells that would be needed can thus be determined as follows by substituting the appropriate values into the formula:

NEW BEDS = PTD x DAYS/365

NEW BEDS = 52,246 x 98.11/365

NEW BEDS = 52,246 x .2638

NEW BEDS = 14,043.44

Therefore, in order to put pretrial defendants who were under a surety bond into pretrial detention, an additional 14,043.44 beds would need to be supplied across the state

in order to account for the increased demand for bed/cell space. These data are displayed county by county in Table VI. Counties across the state that would be most impacted from having to increase their number of inmate beds or cells by over one hundred new bed/cell constructions include the following counties: Alachua (177.78), Bay (115.89), Broward (275.41), Charlotte (219.28), Citrus (221.91), Clay (138.31), Collier (208.87), Duval 162.98), Escambia (363.27), Flagler (485.79), Gadsden (144.56), Hardee (122.58), Hendry (137.78), Hernando (338.27), Highlands (193.95), Hillsborough (2,497.48), Lake (347.91), Lee (1,022.64), Leon (178.46), Marion (322.62), Miami-Dade (364.68), Okeechobee (229.23), Orange (1,257.95), Palm Beach (840.21), Polk (1,204.04), Sarasota (370.53), Seminole (394.40), St. Lucie (210.19), and Volusia (300.94). Otherwise stated, 29 out of Florida's sixty-seven counties would need to fund or finance the construction of one hundred beds or more if defendants released on surety bonding were actually returned to pretrial detention status.

Even more striking are the cost estimates to increase detention capacities in order to accommodate the additional demand for bed/cell space from removing these pretrial defendants from surety bond status. According to Allen Beck, Ph.D., a nationally-recognized expert in jail facility design who has authored numerous articles on the subject, the cost of a single dormitory-style bed can be constructed for around $20,000. Comparatively, the construction cost of a jail cell (one- or two-person) can be anywhere between $60,000 and $80,000. For this analysis, the midpoint of this range, $70,000, will be used to estimate the upper limit of construction costs.

For the state overall, estimated construction costs for 14,043.82 dormitory-style beds are $280,825,918. To construct additional jail cells as traditionally defined,

anticipated construction costs are $982,890,712. Construction cost impact data are included for each of the counties in Florida who would be affected by placing all pretrial defendants into pretrial detention without the benefit of surety bonding. Those particular counties, just under fifty percent of all the counties in the state, that would be most affected by construction costs of dormitory-style facilities that exceed one million dollars are Alachua, Baker, Bay, Broward, Charlotte, Citrus, Clay, Collier, Duval, Escambia, Flagler, Gadsden, Glades, Hardee, Hendry, Hernando, Highlands, Hillsborough, Jackson, Lake, Lee, Leon, Manatee, Marion, Miami-Dade, Okaloosa, Okeechobee, Orange, Osceola, Palm Beach, Pasco, Pinellas, Polk, Putnam, Santa Rosa, Sarasota, Seminole, St. Lucie, Sumter, Volusia, and Washington counties. Average costs across the state for the construction of dormitory-style facilities would exceed 4.1 million dollars per county.

The financial impact of new jail cell construction (*not* dormitory style) is even more striking. By virtue of the number of new cells that would be needed to house those inmates who were not on surety bond status, the price tag associated with such an undertaking would be staggering from a financial point of view. Across the state, the average cost per county to construct new jail cells would exceed 14.6 million dollars per county. Those counties, representing nearly forty percent of all counties in Florida, that would experience construction costs that exceed ten million dollars for new jail cells are Alachua, Broward, Charlotte, Citrus, Collier, Duval, Escambia, Flagler, Gadsden, Hernando, Highlands, Hillsborough, Lake, Lee, Leon, Marion, Miami-Dade, Okeechobee, Orange, Palm Beach, Polk, Sarasota, Seminole, St. Lucie, and Volusia counties.

The six tables below (Tables VII-A through VII-F) are derived from Table VI, and reasonably estimate the costs of new jail bed or jail cell construction if all pretrial defendants were removed from surety bond status and placed in pretrial detention. Based on 2010 data, and based on these counties' population tiers, the tables below show the impact of removing pretrial defendants from surety bonding and placing them in pretrial confinement status. Using the $20,000 figure for the construction of jail beds in a dormitory setting, the aggregate cost for the eleven Tier 1 counties (the largest counties in the state) alone would exceed $160 million dollars. To actually construct more traditional jail cells at the estimated cost of $70,000 per cell, the cost of new cell construction would exceed $ 562 million dollars for these same eleven counties. Over 8,000 new beds or jail cells would need to be constructed. The counties that would experience the greatest number of new beds or cells (in excess of 1,000 new beds or cells) would be Hillsborough County, Lee County, Orange County, and Polk County, and thereby experience the greatest construction costs.

Table VII–A
Tier 1 Counties New Jail Construction Cost Estimates

TIER 1 COUNTIES (11)	NUMBER NEW BEDS/CELLS	COST DORM STYLE CONSTRUCTION	COST CELL STYLE CONSTRUCTION
Brevard	24.84	$ 496,767	$ 1,738,685
Broward	275.41	$ 5,508,219	$ 19,278,767
Duval	162.98	$ 3,259,562	$ 11,408,466
Hillsborough	2,497.45	$ 49,949,096	$ 174,821,836
Lee	1,022.64	$ 20,452,712	$ 71,584,493
Miami Dade	364.68	$ 7,293,644	$ 25,527,753
Orange	1,257.95	$ 25,159,014	$ 88,056,548
Palm Beach	840.21	$ 16,804,274	$ 58,814,959
Pinellas	80.49	$ 1,609,808	$ 5,634,329
Polk	1,204.04	$ 24,080,712	$ 84,282,493
Volusia	300.94	$ 6,018,740	$ 21,065,589
TOTALS	8,031.63	$ 160,632,548	$ 562,213,918
Average Tier 1	730.15	$ 14,602,959	$ 51,110,356

Using the same cost figures, the following table illustrates the estimated costs of new jail construction for Tier 2 counties in the state of Florida. This table shows that for dormitory style construction, the estimated costs would exceed 16 million dollars, while the cost for more traditional jail cells would approach 60 million dollars. For Tier 2 counties across the state, over 800 new jail beds or cells would need to be constructed if there was no use of surety bonding. Sarasota County and Seminole County would require the greatest amount of new jail beds or cell construction.

Table VII–B
Tier 2 Counties New Jail Construction Cost Estimates

TIER 2 COUNTIES (3)	NUMBER NEW BEDS/CELLS	COST DORM STYLE CONSTRUCTION	COST CELL STYLE CONSTRUCTION
Pasco	71.99	$ 1,439,781	$ 5,039,233
Sarasota	370.53	$ 7,410,521	$ 25,936,822
Seminole	394.40	$ 7,887,945	$ 27,607,808
TOTALS	836.91	$ 16,738,247	$ 58,583,863
Average Tier 2	278.97	$ 5,579,415	$ 19,527,954

For Tier 3 counties, the data indicate that for dormitory style construction, the estimated costs would exceed 35 million dollars, while the cost for more traditional jail cells would exceed $120 million dollars. Slightly more than 1,700 new beds or cells (1,762.40) would require construction, while Escambia County as well as Lake County and Marion County would experience the greatest increase in beds/cells constructed.

Table VII–C
Tier 3 Counties New Jail Construction Cost Estimates

TIER 3 COUNTIES (8)	NUMBER NEW BEDS/CELLS	COST DORM STYLE CONSTRUCTION	COST CELL STYLE CONSTRUCTION
Collier	208.87	$ 4,177,479	$ 14,621,178
Escambia	363.27	$ 7,265,315	$ 25,428,603
Lake	347.91	$ 6,958,247	$ 24,353,863
Leon	178.46	$ 3,569,151	$ 12,492,027
Manatee	61.96	$ 1,239,288	$ 4,337,507
Marion	322.62	$ 6,452,493	$ 22,583,726
Osceola	69.11	$ 1,382,137	$ 4,837,479
St. Lucie	210.19	$ 4,203,890	$ 14,713,616
TOTALS	1,762.40	$ 35,248,000	$ 123,368,000
Average Tier 3	220.30	$ 4,406,000	$ 15,421,000

For Tier 4 counties, the data indicate that for dormitory style construction, the estimated costs would exceed 21 million dollars, while the cost for more traditional jail cells would approach 75 million dollars. Tier 4 counties would be responsible for the construction of close to 1,100 new jail cells or dormitory beds. Within the Tier 4 category, Hernando County, along with Charlotte and Alachua counties, would experience the greatest volume of new jail construction and, therefore, absorb the greatest construction costs.

Table VII –D
Tier 4 Counties New Jail Construction Cost Estimates

TIER 4 COUNTIES (7)	NUMBER NEW BEDS/CELLS	COST DORM STYLE CONSTRUCTION	COST CELL STYLE CONSTRUCTION
Alachua	177.78	$ 3,555,562	$ 12,444,466
Bay	115.89	$ 2,317,808	$ 8,112,329
Charlotte	219.28	$ 4,385,699	$ 15,349,945
Clay	138.31	$ 2,766,192	$ 9,681,671
Hernando	338.27	$ 6,765,425	$ 23,678,986
Okaloosa	65.53	$ 1,310,521	$ 4,586,822
St. Johns	12.52	$ 250,356	$ 876,247
TOTALS	1,067.58	$ 21,351,562	$ 74,730,466
Average Tier 4	152.51	$ 3,050,223	$ 10,675,780

For Tier 5 counties, the data indicate that for dormitory style construction, the estimated costs would exceed 27 million dollars, while the cost for more traditional jail cells would approach nearly 100 million dollars. This table indicates that nearly 1,400 new cells or jail beds would be required. Flagler, Citrus, and Highlands counties would require the greatest investment in new jail construction costs.

Table VII –E
Tier 5 Counties New Jail Construction Cost Estimates

TIER 5 COUNTIES (13)	NUMBER NEW BEDS/CELLS	COST DORM STYLE CONSTRUCTION	COST CELL STYLE CONSTRUCTION
Citrus	221.91	$ 4,438,137	$ 15,533,479
Columbia	28.64	$ 572,767	$ 2,004,685
Flagler	485.79	$ 9,715,890	$ 34,005,616
Highlands	193.95	$ 3,879,068	$ 13,576,740
Indian River	13.52	$ 270,301	$ 946,055
Jackson	63.20	$ 1,264,000	$ 4,424,000
Martin	45.55	$ 910,959	$ 3,188,356
Monroe	6.45	$ 129,096	$ 451,836
Nassau	39.23	$ 784,603	$ 2,746,110
Putnam	99.80	$ 1,996,000	$ 6,986,000
Santa Rosa	70.97	$ 1,419,452	$ 4,968,082
Sumter	74.34	$ 1,486,740	$ 5,203,589
Walton	20.70	$ 413,918	$ 1,448,712
TOTALS	1,364.05	$ 27,280,932	$ 95,483,260
Average Tier 5	104.93	$ 2,098,533	$ 7,344,866

Finally, for Tier 6 counties, the data show that for dormitory style construction, the estimated costs would exceed 19 million dollars, while the cost for more traditional jail cells would approach nearly 69 million dollars. This range of construction costs would involve the construction of nearly 1,000 new jail cells or dormitory cells. Under the Tier 6 counties, Gadsden, Hardee, Hendry, and Okeechobee counties would have the greatest financial burden as far as new jail cells or dormitory construction is concerned.

Table VII –F
Tier 6 Counties New Jail Construction Cost Estimates

TIER 6 COUNTIES (25)	NUMBER NEW BEDS/CELLS	COST DORM STYLE CONSTRUCTION	COST CELL STYLE CONSTRUCTION
Baker	74.76	$ 1,495,123	$ 5,232,932
Bradford	5.63	$ 112,603	$ 394,110
Calhoun	5.84	$ 116,767	$ 408,685
DeSoto	12.94	$ 258,740	$ 905,589
Dixie	17.13	$ 342,575	$ 1,199,014
Franklin	7.15	$ 143,068	$ 500,740
Gadsden	144.56	$ 2,891,288	$ 10,119,507
Gilchrist	8.47	$ 169,425	$ 592,986
Glades	66.08	$ 1,321,589	$ 4,625,562
Gulf	5.93	$ 118,685	$ 415,397
Hamilton	2.30	$ 46,082	$ 161,288
Hardee	122.56	$ 2,451,288	$ 8,579,507
Hendry	137.78	$ 2,755,507	$ 9,644,274
Holmes	32.86	$ 657,151	$ 2,300,027
Jefferson	0.68	$ 13,644	$ 47,753
Lafayette	0.00	$ -	$ -
Levy	10.27	$ 205,479	$ 719,178
Liberty	22.68	$ 453,644	$ 1,587,753
Madison	0.60	$ 12,000	$ 42,000
Okeechobee	229.23	$ 4,584,658	$ 16,046,301
Suwanee	13.76	$ 275,178	$ 963,123
Taylor	0.47	$ 9,425	$ 32,986
Union	2.53	$ 50,521	$ 176,822
Wakulla	3.50	$ 69,918	$ 244,712
Washington	53.54	$ 1,070,795	$ 3,747,781
TOTALS	981.26	$ 19,625,151	$ 68,688,027
Average Tier 6	39.25	$ 785,006	$ 2,747,521

Given the data displayed in each of the six foregoing tables, the costs associated with new jail construction would be absolutely staggering if surety bonding was not utilized, and all pretrial defendants were placed in pretrial confinement while awaiting trial. Costs of housing pretrial detainees in county lockup facilities without the benefit of surety bonding would increase the aggregate costs of detention across the state by 22.32 percent. Associated with these increased detention costs would be the collateral issue of jail construction that would be required to house the additional pretrial detainees. Across

the state, over 14,000 new jail dormitory beds or jail cells would have to be constructed to accommodate the increase in county detention center populations if surety bonding was not used as a reliable protocol in pretrial release. Depending on which style of construction is used, whether dormitory bed construction or new jail cell construction, the new aggregate construction costs across the state would range from $2811 million dollars to over $983 million dollars. Whether surety bonding is employed as a cost-saving device or as a method by which to ensure the appearance of defendants at trial, the financial or procedural utility of this pretrial release mechanism certainly cannot be disputed.

Comparing Pretrial Release and Non-Pretrial Release Counties: Is There a Difference?

Whether or not there are significant differences between counties with unsecured pretrial release programs and those without such programs is a matter of continued debate and discussion. In the state of Florida, twenty-eight counties utilize government-funded unsecured pretrial release programs, while thirty-nine of them do not utilize such programs. These latter counties rely on other types of pre-release mechanisms, including surety bonding.

It is important to emphasize that just because a county utilizes an *unsecured* pretrial release mechanism does not mean that surety bonding is unavailable in that jurisdiction, Indeed, in all of the twenty-eight counties in Florida who do utilize an unsecured pretrial release mechanism, surety bonding is also available as a pretrial release alternative. In the state of Florida, the twenty-eight counties which utilize an unsecured pretrial release mechanism are as follows: Alachua, Bay, Brevard, Broward, Charlotte, Citrus, Collier, Duval, Escambia, Highlands, Hillsborough, Jackson, Lee,

Leon, Manatee, Miami-Dade, Monroe, Okaloosa, Orange, Osceola, Palm Beach, Pinellas, Polk, Santa Rosa, Sarasota, Seminole, St. Lucie, and Volusia. [51]

Differences Between the Means: The Use of the T-Test to Differentiate Between Pretrial Counties and Non-Pretrial Counties

One important research question is whether or not there are significant differences on critical variables between counties that utilize such programs and those counties which do not. Variables that will be examined to see if such differences exist are the following: county population, days on bond status, average days on bond, detention cost savings, overall ADP average, pretrial felony/misdemeanor ADP average, incarceration rate, per diem costs, average detention costs, overall cost with detention savings added in, and the number of new cells.

The statistic known as the t-test will be used in order to evaluate whether these two different comparison groups are statistically similar or dissimilar with respect to each other relative to the means, or averages, on each of the different variables. In terms of hypothesis testing, the logic may be depicted as follows:

H_0: $\mu_1 - \mu_2 = 0$, where H_0 is the null hypothesis, and μ_1 and μ_2 are the statistical means of groups 1 and 2, respectively.

The two groups themselves are considered to be statistically equivalent, such that $\mu_1 = \mu_2$, if the critical value of the t-test does not surpass the specified level at the standard .05 level of statistical significance.[52] For purposes of this analysis, a two-tailed

[51] Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, State of Florida, Report 10-08, January, 2010. Pasco County, which at one time had such an unsecured pretrial release program, abandoned the program in 2007. Hence, for purposes of analysis, Pasco County is not included in this listing.

[52] A level of statistical significance of $p < .05$ means that the finding could have occurred by chance less than five times out of 100. A level of $p < .01$ means that the finding could have observed by chance less than one time in 100. A level of $p < .001$ indicates that the finding could have occurred fewer than one time in 1,000. A level of $p < .05$ is the minimum level that indicates statistical significance.

test of significance (as opposed to a one-tailed test) is used because no directionality is being hypothesized or predicted as far as the different means are concerned. It is important to note, however, that the t-test actually assesses the extent to which the means, or averages, are statistically different from one another when comparing counties with unsecured pretrial release programs with those counties that do not have them. The t-test assesses only the extent to which the differences between the means are statistically meaningful and not simply random differences between them. Thus, the t-test says nothing about cause-and-effect relationships between the variables under consideration.

According to the statistical analysis performed on these two different groups, there are significant differences between unsecured pretrial release counties (28 counties) and those with no such unsecured pretrial release mechanism (39 counties) on a number of different variables. The major findings of the t-test analysis are as follows, and are borne out in Table IX of this study:

- There are statistically significant differences between these two groups of counties on the variable of *number of cases* in the different counties. Counties with unsecured pretrial release programs have a significantly higher number of cases than those counties without such programs, and also have a higher percentage of cases included in the dataset.
- There are statistically significant differences between these two groups of counties on the variable of *population* and *population tier*. Counties with unsecured pretrial release programs have significantly larger populations than those counties that do not have such programs.
- There are statistically significant differences between these two groups of counties on the variable of *total number of days on bond status*. Total days on surety bond status are significantly higher for those counties with unsecured pretrial release programs than those counties without them.
- There are *no* statistically significant differences between these two groups of counties on the variable of *average number of days on bond status*. In other words, the average number of days a defendant spends on a surety bond is no different for counties with or without unsecured pretrial release programs.
- There are statistically significant differences between these two groups of counties on the *detention cost savings of surety bonding*. Detention cost

savings is actually higher in those counties with unsecured pretrial release programs than in those counties without them.

- There are statistically significant differences between these two groups of counties on *overall ADP and pretrial ADP averages*. Both the overall ADP and the pretrial felony and misdemeanor ADP averages are significantly higher in those counties with unsecured pretrial release programs than in those counties without them.
- There are also statistically significant differences between these two groups of counties in terms of the *incarceration rate*. Counties without unsecured pretrial release programs have a significantly higher mean incarceration rate when compared with those counties that do not have such a program.
- There are statistically significant differences between these two groups of counties on *per diem costs, average detention costs, and the total costs of detention with cost-saving added back into the analysis.* Accordingly, the average per diem costs, the average detention costs, and the total costs of detention are significantly higher in those counties with unsecured pretrial release programs than in those counties without such programs.
- There are statistically significant differences between these two groups of counties on the *number of new cells that would need to be constructed,* as well as the *lower and upper limits of those new cell costs.* The number of new cells that would need to be constructed is actually significantly higher in those counties with unsecured pretrial release programs than in those counties without them. Lower limits and upper limits of new cell construction costs are also significantly higher for those counties with unsecured pretrial programs than those without them.

Although these findings are interesting on their face, one important question needs to be raised: are the statistical differences between the two groups of counties indicative of a "true" difference between the counties, or are these differences a statistical artifact or by-product of the effects of another variable, or variables?

In all of the findings discussed above, it appears that two other variables may themselves be responsible for the differences between the means. One variable that might be affecting the actual means themselves is the number of cases from each county that are utilized in the dataset. Nearly eighty percent of the cases utilized in this study are from those counties that actually have unsecured pretrial release programs in place. Thus, the sheer volume of cases in these counties which also have unsecured pretrial release

programs in place may be skewing the results to some degree. In addition, a vast proportion of the cases in this study come from those counties with larger populations *and* which have unsecured pretrial release programs nominally in place. Thus, it would appear that two variables – the number of cases from the different counties and the county's population – may actually be producing artificially significant differences between the means themselves. This can be tested using an alternative statistical technique known as correlation.

Using Measures of Association to Discern Significant Differences Between Pretrial and Non-Pretrial Counties

While useful in establishing whether there are significant differences between the means of two groups (in this case, groups of counties) on some particular criterion variable, there is no way that one can determine the nature and strength of the relationship between the variables themselves, or if there are any statistical relationships at all. In order to ascertain the degree of relationship between the different variables, some statistical measure to assess covariation, or association, needs to be employed. One typical method by which to establish the degree of association or covariation between two (or more) variables is through the use of correlation-based statistics. Correlation assessment statistical techniques are the fundamental building blocks for more higher-order statistical techniques such as simple and multiple regression which are typically utilized in the development of certain types of statistical models.

Measures of correlation are typically based on the formula for a straight line which is the mathematical foundation of the general linear model. A variation of the more generic formula, $Y = f(X)$, the root, or base, formula for a correlation coefficient is

typically denoted as Y = *b*X + *a*, where Y is the predicted value, "*b*" is the weight of the variable, X is the value of independent variable, and "*a*" is the intercept on the x-axis. Simply stated, zero-order correlations are measures of association between two, and only two, variables. The magnitude of the correlation ranges from a value of -1.0 through zero, and on to +1.0. A correlation coefficient of -1.0 describes a perfect negative correlation while a correlation of +1.0 indicates a perfect positive correlation. In the instance of a perfect positive correlation, for every unit *increase* (or decrease) in one variable, there is an equal corresponding *increase* (or decrease) in the other variable. Both variables are moving in value in the same direction. However, in the example of a perfect negative correlation, for every unit *increase* in one variable, there is a corresponding unit *decrease* in the other one. In this situation, as the value of one variable goes up, the value of the other goes down.

In either case, whether positive or negative, the correlation coefficient indicates that for every unit change in X, there is a corresponding unit change in Y. Most importantly, correlation coefficients do not mean or even begin to suggest that variable X actually causes changes in variable Y, or that variable Y produces changes in variable X. The correlation coefficient simply means that the two variables, X and Y, are correlated, or associated, to some degree or extent. The correlation coefficient implies absolutely nothing about causality of X with respect to Y, or Y with respect to X. The zero-order correlation coefficient measures the relative strength and direction of association, or covariation, between two variables, X and Y, nothing more.

Zero-order correlations, while measuring the degree of association between two and only two variables, are valuable exploratory tools to discern any degree of statistical

relationship between different variables. If one wishes to become more discerning, it is often useful to utilize what is known as a *partial* correlation. A partial correlation, also known as a first-order correlation, allows one to examine the relationship between two variables, X and Y, while adjusting for the effects of a third variable, say Z. The beauty of a partial correlation is that it allows for theoretically an unlimited number of "control" variables to be introduced in order to assess the non-spurious nature of the relationship.

The basic idea behind a partial correlation is this: if the relationship between X and Y maintains its strength even while controlling for the presence of one or more control variables, then the relationship between X and Y, if undiminished statistically, is said to be non-spurious. If, on the other hand, the relationship between X and Y is diminished to the point that it is no longer statistically significant when the presence of other variables are controlled for, then the original relationship between X and Y is said to be spurious. A spurious relationship, then, is a statistical relationship which appears on its face to be true, but is really false after other variables are entered into the mix.

The use of zero-order and partial correlations will allow us to do several things in this study. First, we will be able to assess the nature and extent of any statistical relationship between the variables in this study. Moreover, it will be substantively meaningful to examine these statistical relationships in light of introducing certain control variables (such as the number of cases from each county and population size) which may diminish their overall statistical effect. In particular, this analysis will allow us to look at what happens to the statistical relationship between X and Y, when we statistically control for whether the county has an unsecured pretrial release program or

not. Finally, these statistical tools will allow us to scrutinize more closely the findings that were obtained using the t-test.

To this extent, zero-order correlation and partial correlation statistical techniques will be utilized in order to assess the strength and magnitude of any given relationship between whether a county has a pretrial release program and a number of other correlates. As with the t-test procedures that were used earlier in this analysis, the correlation and partial correlation techniques will employ the $p<.05$ level of statistical significance (two-tailed).

Accordingly to Table X, there are a number of zero-order correlations that are statistically significant at the minimum specified level. Table X illustrates that whether the county has an unsecured pretrial release program or not is related to the following variables: the county's population ($r = .544$, $p<.001$), the county's population tier ($r = -.730$, $p<.001$), the total number of days on bond status ($r = .406$, $p<.001$), detention cost savings ($r = .420$, $p<.001$), overall ADP ($r = .590$, $p<.001$), pretrial ADP ($r = .579$, $p<.001$), felony pretrial ADP ($r=.551$, $p<.001$, misdemeanor pretrial ADP ($r=.666$, $p<.001$), incarceration rate ($r=-.259$, $p<.05$), per diem costs ($r = .444$, $p<.001$), average detention costs ($r = .508$, $p<.001$), detention costs with savings added in ($r = .532$, $p<.001$), and number of new cells, lower cost limits of new cells, and upper cost limits of new cells ($r = .406$, $p<.001$).

From a substantive point of view, these zero-order correlations indicate that counties with unsecured pretrial release programs are associated with higher populations (and population tiers), a higher total number of days on bond status, higher detention cost savings, higher overall average daily population, higher overall pretrial average daily

populations for both felonies and misdemeanors, higher overall pretrial ADP, higher incarceration rates, higher average detention costs, higher total detention costs with savings added back in (overall aggregate detention costs), and higher number of new cells and the costs associated therewith (lower and upper limit costs). These findings appear to be in the expected direction since pretrial counties do tend to be larger in terms of their population bases. Indeed, the strength of the relationship between the population tier and whether the county has a pretrial release program (the county's population tier ($r = -.730$, $p<.001$), is the highest of any of the identified correlation coefficients. Furthermore, this correlation coefficient indicates that over 53 percent of the variance in whether or not a county has a pretrial detention program is explained by the population tier of the county. No other single variable in the analysis has this amount of explanatory power. While the variables identified are, in fact, *statistically* significant, none of them explain more than fifty percent of the variance in whether the county has a pretrial release program or not.

These findings comport generally with the findings observed when the t-test was used as the analysis tool. Again, however, the same cautionary note applies here as well. Are these relationships actually true statistically, or are these relationships a function of a third variable, Z, which is related to both X and Y? In order to address this question, partial correlations may be used.

The results of the statistical analysis when employing partial correlations are shown in Table XI, and reveal some interesting findings. The partial correlation coefficient was computed using the *size of the county's population* as the control variable. The primary observation is that of all the zero-order correlations that were previously identified as being "statistically significant", only three of these remained statistically

significant when the variable of county population size was entered into the analysis. The results indicated that even when county population size was controlled for, there was still a statistically significant relationship between whether or not the county had an unsecured pretrial release program and the county's overall ADP ($r_{xy.z}$ = .292, p<.05), the pretrial misdemeanor ADP ($r_{xy.z}$ = .460, p<.001), and the total pretrial ADP ($r_{xy.z}$ = .260, p<.05). The zero-order correlation relationship originally identified between felony pretrial ADP and whether the county had an unsecured pretrial release program was diminished to the point that there were was no statistically significant relationship between these two variables. None of the other correlation coefficients previously discussed surpassed the minimum threshold for statistical significance (p<.05) when the variable of county population size was introduced into the analysis.

Table XII shows the results of the partial correlation analysis when controlling statistically for *the number of cases* in each county. This table shows that when controlling for the number of cases in any given county, whether the county has an unsecured pretrial release program or not is related to the county population size ($r_{xy.z}$ = .440, p<.001), the overall average daily population ($r_{xy.z}$ = .494, p<.001), the overall felony/misdemeanor pretrial average daily population ($r_{xy.z}$ = .485, p<.001), the misdemeanor pretrial ADP ($r_{xy.z}$ = .586, p<.001, the felony pretrial ADP ($r_{xy.z}$ = .456, p<.001), the per diem costs ($r_{xy.z}$ = .391, p<.001), average detention costs ($r_{xy.z}$ = .424, p<.001), total detention costs with savings added back in ($r_{xy.z}$ = .418, p<.001). Substantively, these results show that when controlling statistically, or adjusting, for the number of cases in each of the counties, those counties with unsecured pretrial release programs have larger populations, higher overall ADPs, higher singular and aggregate

felony/misdemeanor pretrial ADPs, higher per diem costs, higher average detention costs, higher total detention costs when savings from surety bonding are added back in.

To this point, this analysis has focused on zero-order correlations as well as partial correlations when controlling statistically for the size of the county population *or* the number of cases under surety bond from each county. We now examine the results if both of these variables are controlled for *simultaneously* in the analysis. Table XIII displays the results of the partial correlation analysis when the number of cases from each county *and* the size of the county population is statistically controlled for in a simultaneous fashion. The partial correlation coefficients in Table XIII confirm that all but three of the previous zero-order relationships and associations identified as statistically significant in nature (see Table X) and discussed in the foregoing section were essentially spurious, or false, when controlling statistically for the population size of the county and the number of cases from each county.

The only three relationships that may be considered statistically significant are between whether the county has an unsecured pretrial release program or not and the overall ADP ($r_{xy.z} = .274$, $p<.001$), the misdemeanor pretrial ADP ($r_{xy.z} = .433$, $p<.001$), and the total pretrial ADP ($r_{xy.z} = .261$, $p<.05$). Even more interesting is that only three of the relationships or associations previously identified as statistically significant in Tables X, XI, or XII regarding whether the county had an unsecured pretrial release program or not were able to surpass the minimum level of statistical significance *when controlling simultaneously for the presence of the number of surety bond cases and the county's population.*

After an extensive statistical analysis using both zero-order and partial correlations, we have observed that all but three of the relationships that have been previously identified as statistically significant in nature are unable to pass muster once the variables of county population size and number of surety bond cases are entered into the analysis. Even the differences between that means of these different variables that were thought to be of statistical significance using the t-test are somewhat diminished if one considers the variables which might mitigate the differences between the means themselves.

The Use of Multiple Regression Analysis to Predict Differences Between Pretrial and Non-Pretrial Counties

There are several distinct statistical procedures that maybe used to establish some type of predictive model that might enable us to assess the dynamic interplay between these different variables. In essence, these statistical procedures enable us to expand on the general linear model earlier identified, and assess the relative impact of each of these different variables on a predicted outcome.

Multiple regression is a statistical technique that enables one to identify those statistically relevant variables which when entered into the analysis can be used to predict an outcome or score. This statistical tool also allows one to determine the relative weights of these different variables and the statistical impact that they have on a predicted outcome. The form of the equation for regression is as follows:

$$\mathbf{Y} = b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_nX_n + a,$$

where **Y** is the predicted value, or outcome; X is the value of any given variable in the model; *b* is the weight of the variable (also known as the unstandardized regression coefficient), and *a* is the intercept on the X-axis.

In a model that uses *standardized* regression coefficients as opposed to unstandardized ones, an upper-case *B* replaces the lower-case *b*, such that the equation appears as follows:

$$\mathbf{Y} = B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + B_3X_3 + B_4X_4 + B_nX_n$$

In this equation, the regression coefficients (or *B* coefficients) represent the *independent* contributions of each independent variable to the prediction of the dependent variable. Another way to express this fact is to say that, for example, variable X_1 is correlated with the *Y* variable, after controlling for all other independent variables. This type of correlation is also referred to as a *partial correlation*. As with any statistical procedure, there are a number of assumptions that guide its use. These assumptions address the issue of the normality of the distribution, restrictions on number of variables, and multicollinearity, matrix ill-conditioning, and fitting centered polynomial models.[53]

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[53] First of all, as is evident in the name multiple *linear* regression, it is assumed that the relationship between variables is linear. In practice this assumption can virtually never be confirmed; fortunately, multiple regression procedures are not greatly affected by minor deviations from this assumption. However, as a rule it is prudent to *always* look at bivariate display of the variables of interest. If curvature in the relationships is evident, one may consider either transforming the variables, or explicitly allowing for nonlinear components.

It is also assumed in multiple regression that the residuals (predicted minus observed values) are distributed normally (i.e., follow the normal distribution). Again, even though most tests (specifically the *F*-test) are quite robust with regard to violations of this assumption, it is *always* a good idea, before drawing final conclusions, to review the distributions of the major variables of interest. The major conceptual limitation of all regression techniques is that you can only ascertain *relationships*, but never be sure about underlying *causal* mechanism. Most authors recommend that you should have at least 10 to 20 times as many observations (cases, respondents) as you have variables; otherwise the estimates of the regression line are probably very unstable and unlikely to replicate if you were to conduct the study again. Multicollinearity and matrix ill-conditioning is a common problem in many correlation analyses. Trying to decide which one of two measures is a better predictor of the dependent variable may be troublesome and time consuming. When there are very many variables involved, it may not readily apparent that this problem exists, and it may only manifest itself after several variables have already been entered into the regression equation. Nevertheless, when this problem occurs it means that at least one of the predictor variables is (practically) completely redundant with other predictors. There are many statistical indicators of this type of redundancy (tolerances, semi-partial *R*, etc., as well as some remedies (e.g., *Ridge regression*). Furthermore, the fitting of higher-order polynomials of an independent variable with a mean not equal to zero can create difficult multicollinearity problems. Specifically, the polynomials will be highly correlated due to the mean of the primary independent variable. With large numbers (e.g., Julian dates), this problem is very serious, and if

Based upon the concept of "goodness of fit", the smaller the variability of the residual values around the regression line relative to the overall variability, the better is our prediction. For example, if there is no relationship between the *X* and *Y* variables, then the ratio of the residual variability of the *Y* variable to the original variance is equal to 1.0. If *X* and *Y* are perfectly related then there is no residual variance and the ratio of variance would be 0.0. In most cases, the ratio would fall somewhere between these extremes, that is, between 0.0 and 1.0. 1.0 minus this ratio is referred to as *R-square* or the *coefficient of determination*. For example, if we have an *R-square* of 0.4 then we know that the variability of the *Y* values around the regression line is 1-0.4 times the original variance; in other words we have explained forty percent of the original variability, and are left with sixty percent residual variability. Ideally, we would like to explain most if not all of the original variability. Thus, the *R-square* value is an indicator of how well the model fits the data (e.g., an *R-square* close to 1.0 indicates that we have accounted for almost all of the variability with the variables specified in the model).

Based upon the structure of the general linear model, the regression line that minimizes the squared distances between the different data points and the line itself expresses the best prediction of the dependent variable (*Y*), given the independent variables (*X*). Usually, however, there is substantial variation of the observed points around the fitted regression line. Thus, the deviation of a particular point from the regression line (its predicted value) is called the *residual* value.

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proper protections are not put in place, can cause wrong results. The solution is to "center" the independent variable (sometimes, this procedures is referred to as "centered polynomials"), i.e., to subtract the mean, and then to compute the polynomials.

Table XIV shows the results of the regression analysis that was performed on the dataset. It also displays descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analysis. The dependent variable that was utilized in the model was whether the county had an unsecured pretrial release program or not. The independent variables incorporated into the model were as follows: average days on bond, per diem costs, percent increase in detention costs based on savings added in, incarceration rate, pretrial ADP, population tier, population, detention cost savings, overall ADP, detention costs, and number of cases from the particular county. Because of the high degree of redundancy, or multicollinearity, the following variables were *excluded* from the regression model: percentage of cases from each county, total number of days on bond status from each county, total expected detention costs with cost savings added into initial detention costs, the number of new cells required, and the lower and upper limits of the construction costs of new cells. These were the same variables that were included (and excluded) from the 2009 analysis.

There are several different ways to enter these different variables in to the regression model. One way is to add them in to the model, "all in" at one time, as one large block of variables.

According to Table XIV-A, whereby all variables are entered in the model simultaneously, the resulting analysis indicates that the model has a multiple correlation coefficient (R) of .754, which explains 56.9 percent of the variance (R^2). This leaves 43.1 percent (residual variance, or 1-R^2) unexplained by the model in question. Analysis of variance data displayed in the table corroborates this, and shows that the model itself is

statistically significant (F=6.595; p<.001) based upon the amount of variance explained by it.

However, a closer scrutiny of this particular regression model indicates that it is rather unremarkable in terms of the variables which are statistically significant in terms of their magnitude.

Table of Regression Coefficients [a]

"All – In" Block Method of Variable Inclusion

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.257	.499		2.517	.015
	Number of Cases	5.981E-5	.000	.185	..599	.551
	Population	-9.511E-7	.000	-.853	-1.244	.819
	Population Tier	-.225	.065	-.839	-3.459	.001
	Average Days on Bond	.001	.001	.073	.782	.437
	Detention Cost Savings	-3.447E-9	.000	.-.084	-.257	.798
	Overall ADP	.000	.000	-.387	-.596	.553
	Pretrial ADP	.000	.000	.482	.820	.416
	Incarceration Rate	-.002	.027	-.007	-.063	.950
	Per Diem Costs	.002	.003	.083	.500	.619
	Detention Costs	-5.672E-9	.000	.558	.760	.450
	Percent Increase	.001	.001	-.099	-.929	.357

a. Dependent Variable: Pre Trial County (0=NO, 1=YES)

This table indicates that in this entire model, only one variable, county population tier, surpasses the minimum level of statistical significance (p<.05). Both the unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients indicate that the single, best

predictor of whether or not a county has an unsecured pretrial release program is the population tier of the county itself. Thus, larger counties are more likely to have unsecured pretrial release programs than smaller ones (*b*=-.238; s.e.=.071; *B*=-.890; t=-3.339; p<.05). Alternatively stated, smaller counties are less likely to have unsecured pretrial release programs than larger ones. Visual inspection of this table also shows that no other variables in the model appear even remotely close to even approaching the minimum required level of statistical significance. The other variables depicted in this table, explain an extraordinarily low amount of variance in the dependent variable. Quite literally, their contribution to the efficacy of the model is almost miniscule. These findings are directly in line with those observed in last year's study (see Krahl, 2010.

A second method which may be used to enter the different variables into the model is to employ a "step-by-step" method. This method utilizes variable entry in "block" form. In essence, this method creates a subset of smaller models that include different variables. On the basis of these smaller models, one may determine which of the different variables from one model to the next display the greatest impact on the dependent variable. In this particular study, variables were entered so as to produce six different models which are identified in Table XIV-B. The different variables included in the six different models are as follows:

Model 1	***Model 2***	***Model 3***
Population	Population	Population
Population Tier	Population Tier	Population Tier
	Total Days on Bond	Total Days on Bond
	Average Days on Bond	Average Days on Bond
		Overall ADP
		Felony Pretrial ADP
		Misdemeanor Pretrial ADP

Model 4	*Model 5*	*Model 6*
Population	Population	Population
Population Tier	Population Tier	Population Tier
Total Days on Bond	Total Day on Bond	Total Days on Bond
Average Days on Bond	Average Days on Bond	Average Days on Bond
Overall ADP	Overall ADP	Overall ADP
Felony Pretrial ADP	Felony Pretrial ADP	Felony Pretrial ADP
Misdemeanor Pretrial ADP	Misdemeanor Pretrial ADP	Misdemeanor Pretrial ADP
Incarceration Rate	Incarceration Rate	Incarceration Rate
Per Diem Costs	*Per Diem* Costs	*Per Diem* Costs
		Total Avg. Detention Costs
		Percent Increase – Det. Costs

Table XIV-B also displays the results of this particular analysis as applied to the six different models themselves. While each of the models showing the incremental inclusion of additional predictor variables is statistically significant at the .001 level, the only variable in any of the models that surpasses the .05 level of statistical significance is the population tier of the county. Otherwise stated, the single, most important variable that is a consistent across-model predictor of whether the county has an unsecured pretrial release program or not is the population tier of the county itself. No other variables in any of the models surpass the required level of statistical significance. Furthermore, one of the variables in any of the incremental models are solid predictors of the dependent variables except for the county population tier. Thus, in any of the models, the only thing that matters relative to a county having an unsecured pretrial release program or not is the population tier of the county (see Krahl, 2010).

Table of Regression Coefficients [a]

Model 1

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	1.333	.196		6.804	.000
	Population	-8.046E-8	.000	-.072	-.526	.601
	Population Tier	-.211	.037	-.787	-5.728	.001

a. Dependent Variable: Pre Trial County (0=NO, 1=YES)

Table of Regression Coefficients [a]

Model 2

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
2	(Constant)	1.239	.246		5.042	.001
	Population	-8.671E-8	.000	-.078	-.553	.582
	Population Tier	-.217	.039	-.808	-5.505	.001
	Total Days on Bond	-4.931E-8	.000	-.014	-.130	.897
	Average Days on Bond	.001	.001	.075	.858	.394

a. Dependent Variable: Pre Trial County (0=NO, 1=YES)

Table of Regression Coefficients [a]

Model 3

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
3	(Constant)	1.001	.315		3.180	.002
	Population	-3.093E-7	.000	-.277	-.683	.497
	Population Tier	-.172	.051	-.638	-3.374	.001
	Total Days on Bond	-2.987E-7	.000	-.085	-.728	.470
	Average Days Bond	.001	.001	.052	.590	.558
	Overall ADP	5.866E-5	.000	.140	.271	.787
	Felony Pretrial ADP	-1.599E-5	.000	-.023	-.040	.969
	Misdemeanor Pretrial ADP	.002	.001	.328	1.878	.065

a. Dependent Variable: Pre Trial County (0=NO, 1=YES)

Table of Regression Coefficients [a]

Model 4

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
4	(Constant)	1.003	.318		3.155	.003
	Population	-2.943E-7	.000	-.264	-.621	.537
	Population Tier	-.174	.056	-.648	-3.127	.003
	Total Days on Bond	-2.992E-7	.000	.085	-.723	.473
	Average Days on Bond	.001	.001	.051	.579	.565
	Overall ADP	4.859E-5	.000	.116	.208	.836
	Felony Pretrial ADP	-1.14E-5	.000	-.016	-.027	.978
	Misdemeanor Pretrial ADP	.002	.001	.327	1.854	.069
	Incarceration Rate	.003	.026	.012	.119	.905

a. Dependent Variable: Pre Trial County (0=NO, 1=YES)

Table of Regression Coefficients [a]

Model 5

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
5	(Constant)	.906	.355		2.554	.013
	Population	-3.589E-7	.000	-.322	-.737	.464
	Population Tier	-.170	.056	-.632	-3.009	.004
	Total Days on Bond	.-2.672E-7	.000	-.076	-.637	.526
	Average Days on Bond	.001	.001	.051	.574	.568
	Overall ADP	7.994E-5	.000	.190	.333	.741
	Felony Pretrial ADP	3.859E-5	.000	-.055	-.093	.926
	Misdemeanor Pretrial ADP	.002	.001	.306	1.694	.096
	Incarceration Rate	.002	.026	.007	.069	.945
	Per Diem Costs	.001	.002	.074	.630	.531

a. Dependent Variable: Pre Trial County (0=NO, 1=YES)

Table of Regression Coefficients [a]

Model 6

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
6	(Constant)	1.176	.488		2.408	.0159
	Population	-8.897E-7	.000	-.798	-1.192	.238
	Population Tier	-.197	.067	-.734	-2.932	.005
	Total Days on Bond	7.621E-8	.000	.022	.146	.885
	Average Days on Bond	.001	.001	.049	.540	.591
	Overall ADP	-1.050E-5	.000	-.025	-.040	..968
	Felony Pretrial ADP	-6.744E-5	.000	-.095	-.160	.873
	Misdemeanor Pretrial ADP	.001	.001	.292	1.561	.124
	Incarceration Rate	-.002	.027	-.010	-.091	.928

Per Diem Costs	.000	.003	.021	.128	.899
Total Average Detention Costs	6.511E-9	.000	.641	.881	.382
Percent Increase in Detention Costs	-.001	.001	-.065	-.600	.551

a. Dependent Variable: Pre Trial County (0=NO, 1=YES)

The model summary in Table XIV-B indicates that the multiple correlation (R) in Model 1is R= .731. This model accounts for 53.5 percent of the variance in the dependent variable (whether or not the county has an unsecured pretrial release program). Examining incrementally the remaining modes in the analysis, Model 6 has a multiple correlation (R) of R=.762, after having included additional variables within it. This model, Model 6, explains 58.1 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. This indicates, on its face, that the inclusion of additional variables only improves the explanatory power of the model by 4.6 percent in terms of the amount of variance explained.

Even more striking is the fact that if you examine the adjusted R^2 in each of the models, the proportion of variance explained actually *declines* from one model to the next. This indicates that the inclusion of additional variables into the different models actually reduces the explanatory power of the model itself. Thus, the amount of variance that is explained across the multiple models is actually diminished overall. The implication is that adding subsequent variables to the different models does nothing to enhance the predictive power of the different models. And within any model, the only variable that really seems to matter is the population tier of the county. This would

certainly seem to make sense since, insofar as the state of Florida is concerned, it is typically the larger counties with unsecured pretrial release programs.

The Use of Discriminant Analysis to Predict Differences Between Pretrial and Non-Pretrial Counties

In terms of linear modeling, discriminant analysis is a variation of multiple regression. In discriminant analysis, a discriminant score is generated that enables the researcher to determine, or predict, which cases should appear in any given group and the extent to which such prediction is accurate. In this analysis, therefore, we are trying to predict which variables can be combined in a linear fashion to yield that discriminant score that will allow us to correctly predict (or predict as best we can) whether the county is an unsecured pretrial release county or whether it is not. Hence, we are able to use this technique to statistically discriminate between the two different types of counties.

In essence, discriminant analysis builds a predictive model for group membership. The model is composed of a discriminant function (or, for more than two groups, a set of discriminant functions) based on the linear combinations of the predictor variables that essentially provide the best discrimination between the groups. The functions are generated from a sample of cases for which group membership is known. Accordingly, the functions can then be applied to new cases that have measurements for the predictor variables but have unknown group membership. This is the fundamental principle behind the classification function within discriminant analysis. This classification function is depicted as follows:

$$S_i = c_i + w_{i1}*x_1 + w_{i2}*x_2 + \ldots + w_{im}*x_m$$

In this formula, the subscript *i* denotes the respective group; the subscripts *1, 2, ...*, *m* denote the *m* variables; c_i is a constant for the *i*'th group, w_{ij} is the weight for the *j*'th variable in the computation of the classification score for the *i*'th group; x_j is the observed value for the respective case for the *j*'th variable. S_i is the resultant classification score.

As with multiple regression as a tool to assess model linearity, there are a number of assumptions surrounding the use of discriminant analysis as a statistical tool. These assumptions generally deal with the issues of a normal distribution, homogeneity of variances and covariances, correlations between means and variances, the matrix ill-conditioning problem, and the tolerance values.[54]

[54] A brief discussion of the assumptions surrounding discriminant analysis follows. It is assumed that the data (for the variables) represent a sample from a multivariate normal distribution. One may examine whether or not variables are normally distributed with histograms of frequency distributions. However, note that violations of the normality assumption are usually not "fatal," meaning, that the resultant significance tests etc. are still "trustworthy." Under the assumption of homogeneity of variances and covariances, it is assumed that the variance/covariance matrices of variables are homogeneous across groups. Under the assumption of correlations between means and variances. The major "real" threat to the validity of significance tests occurs when the means for variables across groups are correlated with the variances (or standard deviations). Intuitively, if there is large variability in a group with particularly high means on some variables, then those high means are not reliable. However, the overall significance tests are based on pooled variances, that is, the average variance across all groups. Thus, the significance tests of the relatively larger means (with the large variances) would be based on the relatively smaller pooled variances, resulting erroneously in statistical significance. In practice, this pattern may occur if one group in the study contains a few extreme outliers, who have a large impact on the means, and also increase the variability. To guard against this problem, inspect the descriptive statistics, that is, the means and standard deviations or variances for such a correlation. Regarding the matrix ill-conditioning problem, another assumption of discriminant function analysis is that the variables that are used to discriminate between groups are not completely redundant. As part of the computations involved in discriminant analysis, one will invert the variance/covariance matrix of the variables in the model. If any one of the variables is completely redundant with the other variables then the matrix is said to be *ill-conditioned*, and it cannot be inverted. For example, if a variable is the sum of three other variables that are also in the model, then the matrix is ill-conditioned. Finally, regarding tolerance values, in order to guard against matrix ill-conditioning, constantly check the so-called tolerance value for each variable. This tolerance value is computed as *1 minus R-square* of the respective variable with all other variables included in the current model. Thus, it is the proportion of variance that is unique to the respective variable. In general, when a variable is almost completely redundant (and, therefore, the matrix ill-conditioning problem is likely to occur), the tolerance value for that variable will approach 0.

The results of the discriminant analysis produce a very similar picture as far as the structure of the dataset is concerned. Table XV shows the group statistics for counties with and without unsecured pretrial release programs, tests of the equality of group means using Wilks' *lambda*, and pooled within-groups correlation and covariance matrices. Several variables were excluded from the discriminant analysis because they lacked sufficient tolerance, thereby indicating that to use these variables would have more than likely produced a data matrix that was ill-conditioned. The excluded variables were the percent of cases from each county, the total costs of detention with the cost-savings added back in, the number of new cells, and the lower and upper limits on the construction costs of new cells.

As with the regression analysis, the discriminant analysis performed on the 2009 data was fundamentally unremarkable. In fact, the only canonical discriminant function variable that actually proved to be statistically significant was the population tier of the county. This is borne out by the discriminant analysis structure matrix, the table of canonical discriminant function unstandardized coefficients, and the table of classification function coefficients displayed in Table XV. No other variable included in the model surpassed the minimum level of statistical significance ($p<.05$).

One of the advantages in using discriminant analysis is that it allows one to predict the appropriate group membership into which any given case is classified. In this analysis, we are attempting to determine the extent to which the classification function derived from the discriminant analysis accurately classifies any given county into the statistically appropriate group membership (those counties that have unsecured pretrial release programs versus those that do not). In terms of the predictive utility of the

discriminant analysis model's classification function, the general rule is that as the proportion of correctly classified cases increases and approaches one hundred percent, the better the model. Strictly speaking, you want to have a predictive model of group membership that maximizes the correct classification of cases.

Table XV also displays the classification results, and they are included here as well.

Classification Results [a]

		Pre Trial County (NO, YES)	Predicted Group Membership		Total
			Pre Trial = NO	Pre Trial = YES	
Original	Count	NO (39)	36	3	39
		YES (28)	9	19	28
	%	NO (58.2%)	92.3	7.7	100.0
		YES (41.8%)	32.1	67.9	100.0

a. 82.1% of original grouped cases correctly classified.

This embedded table indicates that as a result of the discriminant analysis and the derived classification function, there were a total of twelve cases that were inaccurately classified. More specifically, there were three counties out of thirty-nine *without* an unsecured pretrial release program that were actually classified or predicted to be a county *with* a secured pretrial release program. Thus, 92 percent of counties without unsecured pretrial release programs were appropriately classified. Alternatively, there were nine counties out of twenty-eight that have unsecured pretrial release programs but were classified statistically as counties without pretrial release programs. In this instance, counties with unsecured pretrial release programs were appropriately classified 68 percent of the time. Because of the twelve cases that were predictively misclassified one

way or another, this produced a total of fifty-five, or 82.1 percent, cases that were accurately classified into the appropriate group. This classification function was principally based on the population tier of the county, thereby reflecting the county's overall population size.

So, if there are no real statistical differences between counties with unsecured pretrial release programs when compared with those counties that do not have such programs, what are the substantive differences between these two types of counties? The answer is quite simple. On the one hand, counties with unsecured pretrial release programs fund such programs totally and one hundred percent with government and taxpayer dollars. Those programs are, in essence, front-end loaded with government and taxpayer investment to initially fund the program. Furthermore, to provide for the long-term sustainability of these programs over time, these programs are back-end funded, also at additional government and taxpayer expense. On the other hand and by comparison, counties that do *not* have such taxpayer-funded programs and rely on other forms of pretrial release such as surety bonding do *not* impose that same level of financial burden on the taxpayer. In fact, counties that utilize surety bonding as a form of pretrial release impose *no* tax burden on the public. Zero-tax burden to the citizens. None whatsoever. That is the single, essential, and meaningful substantive difference between these different types of counties when it comes to the issue of pretrial release.

Discussion and Conclusions

This study is both an extension and expansion of three similar studies that were conducted by the author in the last three years (see Krahl, 2008; Krahl, 2009; and Krahl, 2010) that focused on the activities of a single surety bond provider in the state of Florida. This year's study of 2010 data utilizes a more inclusive and expansive dataset to better assess the overall financial impact and the economic utility of surety bonding as a pretrial release mechanism. Similar to last year's study (Krahl, 2010), this year's study also looks at the data not only on a statewide basis, but also on the basis of subsets of the overall population of statewide data whereby the different counties were grouped into tiers based upon the size of the counties' populations.

Consequently, there were six population tiers that were identified and utilized in this year's study. The process of disaggregating the overall statewide dataset into smaller data groups that were based on county population size provided the opportunity for a more extensive and detailed analysis, the implications of which have direct bearing on the financial stability of the counties themselves if they would be required to build new jail or detention facilities and if surety bonding were not utilized or discontinued as a mechanism of pretrial release.

Also similar to last year's study (Krahl, 2010), there was a statistical comparison between those counties with and without unsecured pretrial release programs on a number of different variables which were thought to be of theoretical or substantive relevance as far as the analysis was concerned. These variables included the population size and population tier of the county, the number and percentage of cases from each county, the total days on bond, the average days on bond, the detention cost savings from

using surety bonding, the overall county average daily population (ADP), the county's felony and misdemeanor pretrial ADP, the total county ADP, the county's incarceration rate, the county's *per diem* cost of housing a detainee, the county's total average detention costs, the total cost of detention if surety bonding were not being used, the percentage increase associated with the detention facility's operating costs, the number of new jail beds or cells that would be required in order to accommodate the additional pretrial detainees, and the costs associated with such construction that would be absorbed by the county.

Consistent with the findings in previous studies on the issue of the financial viability of surety bonding (see Krahl, 2008; Krahl, 2009; and Krahl, 2010), this study produced some rather striking and remarkable results: *through the use of surety bonding, one surety bonding company in the state of Florida saved Florida taxpayers and Florida counties over 404 million dollars in detention costs through the use of surety bonding as a mechanism of secured pretrial release for criminal defendants.* The study further demonstrated that if these defendants were actually confined to detention in their pretrial status, counties throughout the state of Florida would be responsible for the construction of over 14,000 new jail dormitory beds or jail cells. Depending on whether the dormitory beds or jail cells were constructed, the total aggregate price tag on this construction would be anywhere between 280.8 million and 982.9 million dollars.

As has been argued previously, it should be emphasized once again that given the structure and functioning of the criminal justice system in contemporary society, the surety bonding industry certainly does not operate within a vacuum. Surety bonding is only one single cog in the gears in the machinery of the larger criminal justice system.

Uniquely, however, surety bonding is truly a private-sector enterprise that is sensitive to both law enforcement operations as well as the functioning of the judicial process within our system of justice, and which continually demonstrates its viability in literally saving millions upon millions of taxpayer dollars on an annual basis. For example, this study has demonstrated that the use of surety bonding by one surety bonding company alone during 2010 saved Florida taxpayers over *four hundred million dollars* in estimated detention costs in a single calendar year. And the over four hundred million dollars saved is nearly twenty-five percent of the entire costs of detention throughout the state of Florida in 2010.

From an historical perspective, the use of surety bonding is certainly nothing new, and reflects the process of continuing to find ways both to secure the pretrial release of defendants and to ensure their subsequent appearance in court. The data in this study indicate that surety bonding continues to be both a legally viable and a financially pragmatic alternative to pretrial detention as well as other types of pretrial release mechanisms. In addition, surety bonding alleviates the problem of detention center overcrowding by *not* contributing to it. Pretrial defendants who are admitted to a surety bonds are not detained pretrial, and this reduces considerably and significantly the cost and expense of pretrial detention to Florida's counties.

One of the reasons that surety bonding actually works so well is because pretrial defendants have every reason, every motivation, to appear in court and to not violate the terms and conditions of their bond. If they fail to appear, for example, not only is a bench warrant issued for their arrest, they forfeit all monies paid toward the surety bond that was used to secure their pretrial release in the first place. Otherwise stated, each of these

pretrial defendants who are admitted to a surety bond has a financial "skin in the game." In addition, bail agents are statutorily empowered to arrest the defendant if he/she absconds on bail or prior to its occurrence, thereby providing an invaluable support service to local law enforcement. No other pretrial release mechanism operating within the parameters of the criminal justice system today offers this level of efficiency and effectiveness at *absolutely zero-cost to the taxpayers*, and that is indeed one of the beauties of the surety bonding process.

This is not to say that surety bonding does not have its critics or detractors. Ironically, however, the criticisms of surety bonding are often made on the basis of ideological arguments and fiery rhetoric that are not empirically persuasive. Nor can the critics of the surety bonding process offer up any viable, pragmatic, and effective alternatives to it that work as well as, or better than, surety bonding does. As a result, many of these criticisms of surety bonding are fraught with flawed notions and implausible arguments that simply do not withstand scientific scrutiny (see, for example, Cohen and Reaves, 2007; and Block, 2005).

The data in this study demonstrate that by saving taxpayers in excess of $82 *million* dollars in 2007, over $230 *million* dollars in 2008, over $180 *million* dollars in 2009, and over $400 *million* dollars in 2010 in pretrial detention costs, the positive financial impact of surety bonding is certainly not insignificant. Indeed, one company can truly make a difference in reducing jail operating costs in the state. In its implementation, surety bonding reduces in an absolute sense the direct expense associated with pretrial detention, and places significant financial limits and constraints on the construction of new detention center beds and cell space that would otherwise

certainly be required if these pretrial defendants were placed in pretrial confinement. Based on these 2010, data alone, *the sheer magnitude of additional cost to construct additional detention center beds or jail cells would run anywhere between $280.8 million and $982.9 million to Florida's taxpayers.*

In addition, if one examines Florida's detention costs in greater detail, statewide detention costs are reduced annually by approximately 22.32 percent on a yearly basis through the use of surety bonding. For the fourteen largest counties in the state, the use of surety bonding result in detention cost savings of approximately $277.9 million, while for the remaining counties across the state, detention costs are reduced by $126.3 million annually through the surety bonding mechanism by a single company alone.

In light of all of the dialogue and debate surrounding unsecured pretrial release programs when compared to other forms of pretrial release, this year's study also examined counties with unsecured pretrial release programs versus those counties without such programs using a wide range of variables. The purpose was to see if there were any fundamental differences between the two types of counties. The detailed statistical analysis demonstrated that while there were some initial findings that were both moderately interesting and statistically significant at the .05 level, there were also several variables in the analysis that indicated that the preliminary findings were, in fact, spurious in nature. For example, zero-order correlations between a number of different variables initially demonstrated statistical significance; however, when the correlations themselves were controlled statistically for the number of cases and the population of the county, the strength and magnitude of the relationship was diminished. When both of these control variables, number of cases and county population size, were entered

simultaneously into a model of partial correlations, there were only three relationships between the remaining variables in the dataset surpassed the required minimum level of statistical significance.

Even when more robust statistical analysis techniques such as multiple regression and discriminant analysis were employed, there was only a single variable – population tier – that proved to be a statistically significant differentiating factor as to whether any given county had an unsecured pretrial release program or not. No other variables in the analysis had the predictive strength of the population-related variable, and no other variable was itself statistically significant in any of the models for either predictive or explanatory purposes.

The financial impact data from this study as well as the data in years past further indicate that there is certainly a compelling reason for the state legislature to re-visit the statutory language of Chapter 903 of the Florida Statutes pertaining to the use of bail generally, and the use of surety bonding specifically. Although the proposed language of any statutory revision is well beyond the scope of this analysis, the legislature, as representatives of taxpaying Floridians and stewards of the public trust, would be well served by offering innovative and creative financial incentives to surety bonding companies to actually expand the scope of their operations, given the fact that the state and counties accrue all of the economic benefit and financial reward of cost savings offered through surety bonding, and absorb, literally, none of the risk and expense associated with the surety bonding process. As mentioned earlier, there was an attempt to pass legislation in the Florida legislature in both 2010 and 2011 legislative sessions that

would have clarified and redefined the role of unsecured pretrial release in the state, but that legislative initiative fell short of the mark.

Ironically, it appears that the greatest continued threat to the surety bonding industry in Florida as well as nationally is posed by *government- funded, government-administered, and taxpayer-sustained unsecured pretrial release programs.* Certainly, Florida is not the only state whereby such challenges are being experienced by the surety bonding industry. Even as of this writing, according to an unnamed source within the Department of Justice coupled with written documentation that supports its strategy, the Department of Justice has made it its very mission, in a very organized way, to systematically deconstruct and dismantle the surety bonding industry, and replace it with unsecured pretrial release programs across the nation. Millions upon millions of dollars in seed money are being funneled and distributed through the Department's Bureau of Justice Assistance to different states and localities across the country to establish unsecured pretrial release programs.

It is truly both remarkable and ironic that the government purports to want greater transparency and to have greater financial accountability. And therein lies the rub – *the federal government, in its pipe-dream folly to fund unsecured pretrial release programs on a national basis, has done nothing more than to throw away good money after bad by continuing to invest in a program alternative that does not work as well as the surety bonding industry. If there is any federal program or governmental effort that screams loudly for a Congressional investigation into its operations, this government-based initiative to dismantle the surety bonding industry and replace it with taxpayer funded unsecured pretrial release programs across the county may well be it.*

The government's effort to establish unsecured pretrial release programs throughout the country through the funneling of large amounts of cash to local jurisdictions is nothing more than a classic case of waste, fraud, and abuse, and at a time when this nation can ill afford it. In this instance, moreover, the government's efforts are nothing less than the attempted manipulation of a free-market economy by the government itself which is actually supposed to protect the American taxpaying public from such nonsense. This whimsical, ill-advised effort by the federal government to cripple and dismantle the surety bonding industry is truly an example of the government using its bully pulpit, along with lots and lots of cash, to organize and facilitate the takeover of private business. To this extent, the government is engaged in an elaborate shell game, robbing Peter to pay Paul, and unnecessarily burdening the American taxpayer with yet another whimsical government program that has absolutely no way to demonstrate its overall financial effectiveness or its programmatic success.

The efforts by the government generally, and the Department of Justice specifically, to cripple the surety bonding industry through its direct intervention is fundamentally different when compared to the bank bailout that occurred in 2008. In the latter instance, the financial institutions were deemed "too big to fail" and banks, all operating within the *private sector*, received $700 billion taxpayer dollars from the government that was to be used to free up credit markets and purchase "troubled assets" in order to prevent a collapse of the financial industry. Under the current circumstances, however, the situation is completely different. The surety bonding industry has not been designated being "too big to fail." In fact, the government has *de facto* declared this private sector industry "ripe for destruction and dismantling." As a result, the government

is infusing *government* entities across the country operating in the *public sector* with millions taxpayer dollars to actually precipitate the demise of this *private sector* industry instead of attempting to strengthen it like it did with the financial institutions in 2008.

By intentionally tinkering with the forces of supply and demand within the operation of a free-market economy, the government's effort is a blatant attempt to replace a private sector industry that *does* work and works quite well (surety bonding) with a government-funded industry and a burgeoning government bureaucracy that *doesn't* (unsecured pretrial release). The federal government funding of unsecured pretrial release programs does nothing more than add to the national debt while reducing the usable tax dollars that could be used to stimulate further economic recovery, job growth, reducing the national debt by cutting government expenses, or other worthy endeavors.

However, for some reason that passes human understanding and rational thinking, the government seems to have a set of misplaced priorities when it comes to the issue of pretrial release. On this particular issue, the government certainly wins the economic trifecta: *it is deaf, dumb, and blind when it comes to its unequivocal and continued support of and its ongoing investment in unsecured pretrial release program which have no baseline or ongoing record of programmatic or financial success.* The government's attempt to dismantle the surety bonding industry and its ongoing financial investment in unsecured pretrial release is yet just another example in long line of missteps by the government in trying to fix something that isn't broken – and all at the expense of the American taxpayer.

So, who gets to foot the bill for the folly of the government's funding of unsecured pretrial release programs at a time when the economy can ill-afford it? The American taxpayers. Do American taxpayers want to add to an already increasing federal deficit? No. Does the American public want the government takeover or destruction of private industry in a free-market economy and replace it with something that cannot pass muster in terms of its programmatic and financial performance? No. Does the American taxpayer want the government to fund programs that have no scientific evidence to substantiate their worth? Again, the answer is, no. And finally, do American taxpayers want to pay more taxes to fund such programs that don't work all that well? No, again.

Because of the availability of federal dollars to *initially* implement unsecured pretrial release programs, local taxpayer dollars are required to ensure their sustainability in the long run, and well beyond the period of initial federal funding. The taxpayer burden is enormous, particularly in the long-run, and the backs of America's taxpayers are only broad enough to bear so much weight. It might well be different if unsecured pretrial release programs could actually demonstrate their effectiveness and efficiency, but evidence that would justify support for their continued use and expansion is woefully lacking for one specific reason: *the justification for their continued use and expansion is based on rhetoric and ideology, not systematically collected data and evidence, or economic considerations such as dollars saved by taxpayers and overall programmatic success and efficiency.* Unsecured pretrial release programs which are all expense and very little revenue simply are in a strictly financially precarious position to compete with surety bonding which operates at an absolute *zero*-expense to the taxpayer and with more demonstrable and effective results. Unsecured pretrial release programs are, financially,

"out on a ledge", while pretrial release predicated upon the use of surety bonding is firmly grounded.

If there was any industry in either the public or private sector that could be the object of a financial and economic stimulus program, the surety bonding industry is surely one of them. All financial risk in the surety bonding enterprise falls squarely on the surety bonding company itself. Even when surety bonds are forfeited because someone has absconded, or "jumped", bail, both the state and the county receive a portion of the forfeited bond after the financial proceeds of the surety bond forfeiture have been deposited into the state's "fines and forfeitures" account. Taxpayers are not negatively affected or impacted, either directly or indirectly, since the surety bonding industry absorbs one hundred percent of the risk in terms of the issuance of the surety bond. Indeed, taxpayers find themselves in the enviable position of not having to fund this particular type of pretrial release program simply because there is no necessity whatsoever to do so. It is totally funded on the "pay-as-you-go" principle by the purchasers of the surety bond. No taxpayer assistance is required, nor is it needed.

Furthermore, since our system of justice is based upon the constitutionally-established principle of "innocent until proven guilty", the use of surety bonding ensures that pretrial defendants do not unnecessarily languish away in pretrial confinement while they await trial. Moreover, surety bonding, as a pretrial release mechanism, affirms the moral imperative of due process upon which our system of justice is based. Defendants in pretrial detention are less able to adequately assist in the preparation of their own defense, and this creates a decided disadvantage for them at the adjudication stage of the legal proceedings. Pretrial detention also creates an undue financial hardship for the

defendant who has not yet been convicted of a crime, along with his/her family, since he/she is at risk of losing any employment that they may have if they are jailed for any appreciable period of time. This job loss, in turn, places a distinct and unnecessary burden on the state's welfare system by having to provide economic and social services to the dependents of the defendant who is confined in pretrial detention.[55]

Clearly, there are some defendants who, by virtue of the crime which they have allegedly committed, have a lower probability of success if they are released back into the community through the use of a surety bond. And there are those defendants who may have a track record of absconding and forfeiting previous surety bonds – a past condition that most likely precludes from being evaluated as a "good" risk by the bonding agency.

However, if there are problems associated with the surety bonding system in the state, those problems may be addressed and corrected through both the legislative process and through proper oversight provided by the surety bonding industry itself in the form of self-regulation. Even at the state level, there is a modicum of administrative and regulatory rules that keep the surety bonding industry "market-centered". Thus, any problems that may exist may be remedied, either through legislative action or industry-based regulatory oversight, and do not provide sufficient grounds for either ending or restricting the practices of the surety bonding industry, let alone dismantling or deconstructing it. That is tantamount to "throwing out the baby with the bath." In reality, the surety bonding enterprise is a cost-containment strategy that is well worth expanding because of the fiscal and pragmatic advantages associated with its operation.

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[55] Nowhere is the issue of pretrial detention more problematic than it is with defendants who have been charged with a VOP, or a violation of probation. Even though the defendant has been charged with an *alleged* violation of probation, should the mere allegation, in and of itself, automatically preclude the individual from any type of release prior to the VOP hearing?

This study does *not* assert that unsecured pretrial release has no place at some point in the criminal justice system. Indeed, unsecured pretrial release may be well equipped to serve in a limited role that particular niche population of defendants that it was originally designed to assist, or to function as an adjunct process to the court system to provide ongoing pretrial monitoring of or case management services to those defendants who are released from custody on a private surety bond.

The aggregate financial net-worth and the financial impact of surety bonding in the state of Florida have been sufficiently demonstrated within the context of this particular study which focuses exclusively on the surety bonding efforts and activities of a single surety bonding company in the state of Florida. Without the services of surety bonding companies all across the state and across the country, the county-based detention center and correctional system's apparatus across the different states would most assuredly be stretched to their limits and pushed to the brink of financial disaster. Certainly, additional research is needed in order to directly compare the financial outcomes of surety bonding with those of other pretrial release mechanisms. Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare defendants in both categories (surety bonded defendants versus those in alternative pretrial arrangements) in terms of their rates of court appearances, and determine whether there were any significant differences between the two groups of defendants.

In short, even with all of the foregoing data notwithstanding, there is one observation that can certainly be made without qualification: the future on this particular issue should certainly be interesting. The ongoing debate will hold the attention of politicians, legislators, and taxpaying citizens for quite some time. This debate will

largely revolve around several critical questions: what is the appropriate size and role of government in the 21st century; does the government have a right to tamper or tinker with the market forces of supply and demand so that causes an unfair advantage to one entity versus another; who has the greatest capacity to provide the best service at the best cost; and should the government stop the failure of some private sector industries while blatantly attempting to destroy others?

APPENDIX A

LISTING OF TABLES

TABLE I

Frequency, Percentage Distribution of Cases, and Number of Days on Surety Bond Status, by County, 2010

(n=52,246)

COUNTY	# CASES	PCT.	COUNTY POPULATION	PCT. OF TOTAL	POPULATION TIER	TOTAL DAYS BOND STATUS	AVG. DAYS ON BOND
Alachua	496	0.95	247,336	1.32%	3	64,889	130.82
Baker	282	0.54	27,115	0.14%	6	27,286	96.76
Bay	378	0.72	168,852	0.90%	4	42,300	111.90
Bradford	17	0.03	28,520	0.15%	6	2,055	120.88
Brevard	79	0.15	543,376	2.90%	1	9,066	114.76
Broward	963	1.84	1,748,066	9.32%	1	100,525	104.39
Calhoun	27	0.05	14,625	0.08%	6	2,131	78.93
Charlotte	798	1.53	159,978	0.85%	4	80,039	100.30
Citrus	971	1.86	141,236	0.75%	5	80,996	83.42
Clay	596	1.14	190,865	1.02%	4	50,483	84.70
Collier	721	1.38	321,520	1.71%	3	76,239	105.74
Columbia	115	0.22	67,531	0.36%	5	10,453	90.90
DeSoto	32	0.06	34,862	0.19%	6	4,722	147.56
Dixie	36	0.07	16,422	0.09%	6	6,252	173.67
Duval	676	1.29	864,263	4.61%	1	59,487	88.00
Escambia	1,415	2.71	297,619	1.59%	3	132,592	93.70
Flagler	1,459	2.79	95,696	0.51%	5	177,315	121.53
Franklin	25	0.05	11,549	0.06%	6	2,611	104.44
Gadsden	393	0.75	46,389	0.25%	5	52,766	134.26
Gilchrist	22	0.04	16,939	0.09%	5	3,092	140.55
Glades	179	0.34	12,884	0.07%	6	24,119	134.74
Gulf	16	0.03	15,863	0.08%	6	2,166	135.38
Hamilton	6	0.01	14,799	0.08%	6	841	140.17
Hardee	512	0.98	27,731	0.15%	6	44,736	87.38
Hendry	450	0.86	39,140	0.21%	6	50,288	111.75
Hernando	1,288	2.47	172,778	0.92%	4	123,469	95.86
Highlands	930	1.78	98,786	0.53%	5	70,793	76.12
Hillsborough	9,826	18.81	1,229,226	6.56%	1	911,571	92.77
Holmes	107	0.20	19,927	0.11%	6	11,993	112.08
Indian River	46	0.09	138,028	0.74%	5	4,933	107.24
Jackson	203	0.39	49,746	0.27%	5	23,068	113.64
Jefferson	4	0.01	14,761	0.08%	6	249	62.25
Lafayette	0	0.00	8,870	0.05%	6	0	0.00
Lake	1,446	2.77	297,052	1.58%	3	126,988	87.82

TABLE I

Frequency, Percentage Distribution of Cases, and Number of Days on Surety Bond Status, by County, 2010

(n=52,246)

Lee	3,593	6.88	618,754	3.30%	1	373,262	103.89
Leon	572	1.09	275,487	1.47%	3	65,137	113.88
Levy	37	0.07	40,801	0.22%	6	3,750	101.35
Liberty	54	0.10	8,365	0.04%	6	8,279	153.31
Madison	4	0.01	19,224	0.10%	6	219	0.00
Manatee	295	0.56	322,833	1.72%	3	22,617	76.67
Marion	1,151	2.20	331,298	1.77%	3	117,758	102.31
Martin	152	0.29	146,318	0.78%	5	16,625	109.38
Miami Dade	1,228	2.35	2,496,435	13.31%	1	133,109	108.39
Monroe	14	0.03	73,090	0.39%	5	2,356	168.29
Nassau	180	0.34	73,314	0.39%	5	14,319	79.55
Okaloosa	253	0.48	180,822	0.96%	4	23,917	94.53
Okeechobee	784	1.50	39,996	0.21%	6	83,670	106.72
Orange	4,285	8.20	1,145,956	6.11%	1	459,152	107.15
Osceola	222	0.42	268,685	1.43%	3	25,224	113.62
Palm Beach	2,278	4.36	1,320,134	7.04%	1	306,678	134.63
Pasco	233	0.45	464,697	2.48%	2	26,276	112.77
Pinellas	271	0.52	916,542	4.89%	1	29,379	108.41
Polk	6,306	12.07	602,095	3.21%	1	439,473	69.69
Putnam	341	0.65	74,364	0.40%	5	36,427	106.82
Santa Rosa	151	0.29	151,372	0.81%	5	25,905	171.56
Sarasota	1,498	2.87	379,448	2.02%	2	135,242	90.28
Seminole	1,588	3.04	422,718	2.25%	2	143,955	90.65
St. Johns	51	0.10	190,039	1.01%	4	4,569	89.59
St. Lucie	663	1.27	277,789	1.48%	4	76,721	115.72
Sumter	288	0.55	93,420	0.50%	5	27,133	94.21
Suwanee	51	0.10	41,551	0.22%	6	5,022	98.47
Taylor	4	0.01	22,570	0.12%	1	172	43.00
Union	4	0.01	15,535	0.08%	6	922	0.00
Volusia	936	1.79	494,593	2.64%	1	109,842	117.35
Wakulla	9	0.02	30,776	0.16%	6	1,276	141.78
Walton	66	0.13	55,043	0.29%	5	7,554	114.45
Washington	170	0.33	24,896	0.13%	6	19,542	114.95
TOTALS	52,246	100.00%	18,801,310	100.27%		5,125,995	98.11
Mean	870.77		313,355.17			85,433.25	98.11
Stand Dev.	1,539.00		445,755.57			141,366.46	33.28

Table I-A
Total Days on Bond
By County
Florida, 2010

V2 = Alachua

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	496	1	362	130.82	88.282
Valid N (listwise)	496				

a. V2 = Alachua

V2 = Baker

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	282	1	357	96.76	75.509
Valid N (listwise)	282				

a. V2 = Baker

V2 = Bay

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	378	1	363	111.90	92.369
Valid N (listwise)	378				

a. V2 = Bay

V2 = Bradford

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	17	25	214	120.88	75.147
Valid N (listwise)	17				

a. V2 = Bradford

V2 = Brevard

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	79	2	365	114.76	85.103
Valid N (listwise)	79				

a. V2 = Brevard

V2 = Broward

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	963	1	448	104.39	83.397
Valid N (listwise)	963				

a. V2 = Broward

V2 = Calhoun

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	27	10	220	78.93	51.810
Valid N (listwise)	27				

a. V2 = Calhoun

V2 = Charlotte

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	798	1	348	100.30	72.397
Valid N (listwise)	798				

a. V2 = Charlotte

V2 = Citrus

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	971	1	380	83.42	65.844
Valid N (listwise)	971				

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	971	1	380	83.42	65.844
Valid N (listwise)	971				

a. V2 = Citrus

V2 = Clay

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	596	1	400	84.70	72.981
Valid N (listwise)	596				

a. V2 = Clay

V2 = Collier

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	721	1	491	105.74	83.089
Valid N (listwise)	721				

a. V2 = Collier

V2 = Columbia

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	115	1	379	90.90	89.441
Valid N (listwise)	115				

a. V2 = Columbia

V2 = De Soto

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	32	9	316	147.56	86.723
Valid N (listwise)	32				

a. V2 = De Soto

V2 = Dixie

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	36	21	361	173.67	101.994
Valid N (listwise)	36				

a. V2 = Dixie

V2 = Duval

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	676	1	385	88.00	75.572
Valid N (listwise)	676				

a. V2 = Duval

V2 = Escambia

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	1415	1	414	93.70	71.562
Valid N (listwise)	1415				

a. V2 = Escambia

V2 = Flagler

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	1459	2	439	121.53	83.556
Valid N (listwise)	1459				

a. V2 = Flagler

V2 = Franklin

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	25	32	271	104.44	60.982
Valid N (listwise)	25				

a. V2 = Franklin

V2 = Gadsden

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	393	1	365	134.26	85.071
Valid N (listwise)	393				

a. V2 = Gadsden

V2 = Gilchrist

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	22	12	364	140.55	99.956
Valid N (listwise)	22				

a. V2 = Gilchrist

V2 = Glades

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	179	1	384	134.74	102.219
Valid N (listwise)	179				

a. V2 = Glades

V2 = Gulf

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	16	32	292	135.38	72.536
Valid N (listwise)	16				

a. V2 = Gulf

V2 = Hamilton

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	6	64	283	140.17	96.981
Valid N (listwise)	6				

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	6	64	283	140.17	96.981
Valid N (listwise)	6				

a. V2 = Hamilton

V2 = Hardee

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	512	3	442	87.37	75.203
Valid N (listwise)	512				

a. V2 = Hardee

V2 = Hendry

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	450	1	451	111.75	82.194
Valid N (listwise)	450				

a. V2 = Hendry

V2 = Hernando

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	1288	1	469	95.86	78.550
Valid N (listwise)	1288				

a. V2 = Hernando

V2 = Highlands

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	930	1	419	76.12	67.742
Valid N (listwise)	930				

a. V2 = Highlands

V2 = Hillsborough

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	9826	1	420	92.77	71.225
Valid N (listwise)	9826				

a. V2 = Hillsborough

V2 = Holmes

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	107	6	283	112.08	66.298
Valid N (listwise)	107				

a. V2 = Holmes

V2 = Indian River

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	46	3	310	107.24	70.365
Valid N (listwise)	46				

a. V2 = Indian River

V2 = Jackson

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	203	1	374	113.64	95.549
Valid N (listwise)	203				

a. V2 = Jackson

V2 = Jefferson

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	4	17	132	62.25	49.033
Valid N (listwise)	4				

a. V2 = Jefferson

V2 = Lake

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	1446	1	365	87.82	67.421
Valid N (listwise)	1446				

a. V2 = Lake

V2 = Lee

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	3593	1	468	103.89	81.272
Valid N (listwise)	3593				

a. V2 = Lee

V2 = Leon

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	572	1	355	113.88	83.752
Valid N (listwise)	572				

a. V2 = Leon

V2 = Levy

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	37	29	282	101.35	62.492
Valid N (listwise)	37				

a. V2 = Levy

V2 = Liberty

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	54	1	334	153.31	84.771
Valid N (listwise)	54				

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	54	1	334	153.31	84.771
Valid N (listwise)	54				

a. V2 = Liberty

V2 = Madison

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	4	33	72	54.75	20.255
Valid N (listwise)	4				

a. V2 = Madison

V2 = Manatee

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	295	2	406	76.67	63.531
Valid N (listwise)	295				

a. V2 = Manatee

V2 = Marion

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	1151	1	424	102.31	92.368
Valid N (listwise)	1151				

a. V2 = Marion

V2 = Martin

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	152	1	359	109.37	81.960
Valid N (listwise)	152				

a. V2 = Martin

V2 = Miami-Dade

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	1228	1	432	108.39	85.118
Valid N (listwise)	1228				

a. V2 = Miami-dade

V2 = Monroe

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	14	52	347	168.29	98.120
Valid N (listwise)	14				

a. V2 = Monroe

V2 = Nassau

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	180	3	341	79.55	61.882
Valid N (listwise)	180				

a. V2 = Nassau

V2 = Okaloosa

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	253	2	363	94.53	65.542
Valid N (listwise)	253				

a. V2 = Okaloosa

V2 = Okeechobee

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	784	1	417	106.72	82.097
Valid N (listwise)	784				

a. V2 = Okeechobee

V2 = Orange

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	4285	1	482	107.15	79.387
Valid N (listwise)	4285				

a. V2 = Orange

V2 = Osceola

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	222	1	362	113.62	75.617
Valid N (listwise)	222				

a. V2 = Osceola

V2 = Palm Beach

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	2278	1	465	134.63	98.095
Valid N (listwise)	2278				

a. V2 = Palm Beach

V2 = Pasco

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	233	1	357	112.77	79.047
Valid N (listwise)	233				

a. V2 = Pasco

V2 = Pinellas

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	271	1	364	108.41	72.944
Valid N (listwise)	271				

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	271	1	364	108.41	72.944
Valid N (listwise)	271				

a. V2 = Pinellas

V2 = Polk

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	6306	1	409	69.69	62.226
Valid N (listwise)	6306				

a. V2 = Polk

V2 = Putnam

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	341	2	484	106.82	85.787
Valid N (listwise)	341				

a. V2 = Putnam

V2 = Saint Johns

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	51	4	322	89.59	88.785
Valid N (listwise)	51				

a. V2 = Saint Johns

V2 = Saint Lucie

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	663	1	367	115.72	85.378
Valid N (listwise)	663				

a. V2 = Saint Lucie

V2 = Santa Rosa

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	151	14	414	171.56	88.687
Valid N (listwise)	151				

a. V2 = Santa Rosa

V2 = Sarasota

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	1498	1	419	90.28	68.340
Valid N (listwise)	1498				

a. V2 = Sarasota

V2 = Seminole

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	1588	1	425	90.65	66.882
Valid N (listwise)	1588				

a. V2 = Seminole

V2 = Sumter

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	288	1	379	94.21	83.871
Valid N (listwise)	288				

a. V2 = Sumter

V2 = Suwannee

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	51	11	304	98.47	71.984
Valid N (listwise)	51				

a. V2 = Suwannee

V2 = Taylor

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	4	1	77	43.00	37.425
Valid N (listwise)	4				

a. V2 = Taylor

V2 = Union

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	4	58	357	230.50	150.821
Valid N (listwise)	4				

a. V2 = Union

V2 = Volusi

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	936	1	412	117.35	81.495
Valid N (listwise)	936				

a. V2 = Volusia

V2 = Wakulla

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	9	32	365	141.78	126.285
Valid N (listwise)	9				

a. V2 = Wakulla

V2 = Walton

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	66	4	282	114.45	67.758
Valid N (listwise)	66				

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	66	4	282	114.45	67.758
Valid N (listwise)	66				

a. V2 = Walton

V2 = Washington

Descriptive Statistics[a]

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
V8	170	1	409	114.95	84.074
Valid N (listwise)	170				

a. V2 = Washington

TABLE II - A

Costs of Detention, Detention Cost Savings Through Surety Bonding, 67 Florida Counties, 2010

(n=52,246)

Lafayette	0	0	$	-	26	$	50.39	$	478,201	$ 478,201
Lake	1,446	126,988	$	5,714,460	1,316	$	45.00	$	21,615,300	$ 27,329,760
Lee	3,593	373,262	$	28,793,431	1,770	$	77.14	$	49,836,297	$ 78,629,728
Leon	572	65,137	$	3,419,693	985	$	52.50	$	18,875,063	$ 22,294,755
Levy	37	3,750	$	228,750	167	$	61.00	$	3,718,255	$ 3,947,005
Liberty	54	8,279	$	331,160	51	$	40.00	$	744,600	$ 1,075,760
Madison	4	219	$	8,979	72	$	41.00	$	1,077,480	$ 1,086,459
Manatee	295	22,617	$	1,018,896	1,081	$	45.05	$	17,775,153	$ 18,794,049
Marion	1,151	117,758	$	5,509,897	1,702	$	46.79	$	29,067,352	$ 34,577,249
Martin	152	16,625	$	1,330,000	620	$	80.00	$	18,104,000	$ 19,434,000
Miami Dade	1,228	133,109	$	17,836,606	5,825	$	134.00	$	284,900,750	$ 302,737,356
Monroe	14	2,356	$	210,509	488	$	89.35	$	15,915,022	$ 16,125,531
Nassau	180	14,319	$	602,830	247	$	42.10	$	3,795,526	$ 4,398,355
Okaloosa	253	23,917	$	1,554,605	508	$	65.00	$	12,052,300	$ 13,606,905
Okeechobee	784	83,670	$	5,856,900	233	$	70.00	$	5,953,150	$ 11,810,050
Orange	4,285	459,152	$	43,591,891	3,613	$	94.94	$	125,201,650	$ 168,793,541
Osceola	222	25,224	$	1,661,505	1,001	$	65.87	$	24,066,593	$ 25,728,097
Palm Beach	2,278	306,678	$	41,401,530	2,721	$	135.00	$	134,077,275	$ 175,478,805
Pasco	233	26,276	$	1,681,664	1,358	$	64.00	$	31,722,880	$ 33,404,544
Pinellas	271	29,379	$	3,704,986	3,162	$	126.11	$	145,547,334	$ 149,252,320
Polk	6,306	439,473	$	22,971,254	2,194	$	52.27	$	41,858,339	$ 64,829,592
Putnam	341	36,427	$	1,766,710	323	$	48.50	$	5,717,908	$ 7,484,617
Santa Rosa	151	25,905	$	1,243,440	471	$	48.00	$	8,251,920	$ 9,495,360
Sarasota	1,498	135,242	$	9,622,468	889	$	71.15	$	23,087,108	$ 32,709,576
Seminole	1,588	143,955	$	11,303,347	890	$	78.52	$	25,507,222	$ 36,810,569
St. Johns	51	4,569	$	411,210	474	$	90.00	$	15,570,900	$ 15,982,110
St. Lucie	663	76,721	$	6,904,890	1,283	$	90.00	$	42,146,550	$ 49,051,440
Sumter	288	27,133	$	1,899,310	302	$	70.00	$	7,716,100	$ 9,615,410
Suwanee	51	5,022	$	296,298	153	$	59.00	$	3,294,855	$ 3,591,153
Taylor	4	172	$	6,527	89	$	37.95	$	1,232,806	$ 1,239,333
Union	4	922	$	18,440	19	$	20.00	$	138,700	$ 157,140
Volusia	936	109,842	$	7,759,239	1,255	$	70.64	$	32,358,418	$ 40,117,657
Wakulla	9	1,276	$	59,972	218	$	47.00	$	3,739,790	$ 3,799,762
Walton	66	7,554	$	498,564	237	$	66.00	$	5,709,330	$ 6,207,894
Washington	170	19,542	$	762,138	121	$	39.00	$	1,722,435	$ 2,484,573
TOTALS	52,246	5,125,995	$	404,231,161		$	64.33	$	1,810,820,137	$ 2,215,051,297

TABLE II - A

Costs of Detention, Detention Cost Savings Through Surety Bonding, 67 Florida Counties, 2010

(n=52,246)

TABLE II-B
COSTS OF DETENTION, DETENTION COST SAVINGS THRU SURETY BONDING, PRETRIAL AVERAGE DAILY POPULATIONS, 67 FLORIDA COUNTIES
(N=52,246)

COUNTY	# CASES	TOTAL DAYS BOND STATUS	DETENTION COST SAVINGS	PER DIEM RATE	FELONY PRETRIAL ADP	MISDEMNR PRETRIAL ADP	TOTAL PRETRIAL ADP	TOTAL AVERAGE COSTS-DETENTION	DETENTION COST TOTAL WITHOUT BOND
Alachua	496	64,889	$ 5,466,249	$ 84.24	481	98	579	$ 17,802,860	$ 23,269,110
Baker	282	27,286	$ 2,311,670	$ 84.72	52	18	70	$ 2,164,596	$ 4,476,266
Bay	378	42,300	$ 2,072,700	$ 49.00	339	92	431	$ 7,708,435	$ 9,781,135
Bradford	17	2,055	$ 65,760	$ 32.00	50	11	61	$ 712,480	$ 778,240
Brevard	79	9,066	$ 609,235	$ 67.20	1,089	175	1,264	$ 31,003,392	$ 31,612,627
Broward	963	100,525	$ 11,359,325	$ 113.00	3,264	254	3,518	$ 145,099,910	$ 156,459,235
Calhoun	27	2,131	$ 80,978	$ 38.00	21	7	28	$ 388,360	$ 469,338
Charlotte	798	80,039	$ 9,509,434	$ 118.81	242	64	306	$ 13,269,889	$ 22,779,322
Citrus	971	80,996	$ 5,036,331	$ 62.18	153	29	182	$ 4,130,617	$ 9,166,949
Clay	596	50,483	$ 3,416,689	$ 67.68	251	33	284	$ 7,015,709	$ 10,432,398
Collier	721	76,239	$ 8,170,534	$ 107.17	520	154	674	$ 26,364,892	$ 34,535,425
Columbia	115	10,453	$ 386,761	$ 37.00	140	25	165	$ 2,228,325	$ 2,615,086
DeSoto	32	4,722	$ 259,710	$ 55.00	103	11	114	$ 2,288,550	$ 2,548,260
Dixie	36	6,252	$ 214,131	$ 34.25	45.41	6.45	52	$ 648,315	$ 862,446
Duval	676	59,487	$ 3,576,953	$ 60.13	1,612	237	1,849	$ 40,580,835	$ 44,157,788
Escambia	1,415	132,592	$ 8,618,480	$ 65.00	896	134	1,030	$ 24,436,750	$ 33,055,230
Flagler	1,459	177,315	$ 18,103,862	$ 102.10	148.67	28.50	177	$ 6,602,506	$ 24,706,367
Franklin	25	2,611	$ 78,852	$ 30.20	45.41	6.45	52	$ 571,653	$ 650,505
Gadsden	393	52,766	$ 2,480,002	$ 47.00	77	32	109	$ 1,869,895	$ 4,349,897
Gilchrist	22	3,092	$ 200,980	$ 65.00	16	4	20	$ 474,500	$ 675,480
Glades	179	24,119	$ 1,944,956	$ 80.64	30	3	33	$ 971,309	$ 2,916,265
Gulf	16	2,166	$ 86,640	$ 40.00	14	2	16	$ 233,600	$ 320,240
Hamilton	6	841	$ 70,022	$ 83.26	24	3	27	$ 820,527	$ 890,549
Hardee	512	44,736	$ 2,988,365	$ 66.80	34	14	48	$ 1,170,336	$ 4,158,701
Hendry	450	50,288	$ 1,986,376	$ 39.50	116	25	141	$ 2,032,868	$ 4,019,244
Hernando	1,288	123,469	$ 6,788,326	$ 54.98	264	51	315	$ 6,321,326	$ 13,109,651
Highlands	930	70,793	$ 3,256,478	$ 46.00	191	28	219	$ 3,677,010	$ 6,933,488
Hillsborough	9,826	911,571	$ 73,673,168	$ 80.82	1,845	304	2,149	$ 63,393,996	$ 137,067,164
Holmes	107	11,993	$ 479,720	$ 40.00	35	10	45	$ 657,000	$ 1,136,720
Indian River	46	4,933	$ 308,313	$ 62.50	269	26	295	$ 6,729,688	$ 7,038,000
Jackson	203	23,068	$ 634,370	$ 27.50	40	14	54	$ 542,025	$ 1,176,395
Jefferson	4	249	$ 13,695	$ 55.00	8	2	10	$ 200,750	$ 214,445
Lafayette	0	0	$ -	$ 50.39	8	1	9	$ 165,531	
Lake	1,446	126,988	$ 5,714,460	$ 45.00	426	50	476	$ 7,818,300	$ 13,532,760
Lee	3,593	373,262	$ 28,793,431	$ 77.14	795	147	942	$ 26,523,046	$ 55,316,477
Leon	572	65,137	$ 3,419,693	$ 52.50	473	86	559	$ 10,711,838	$ 14,131,530
Levy	37	3,750	$ 228,750	$ 61.00	97	23	120	$ 2,671,800	$ 2,900,550
Liberty	54	8,279	$ 331,160	$ 40.00	16	0	16	$ 233,600	$ 564,760
Madison	4	219	$ 8,979	$ 41.00	35	4	39	$ 583,635	
Manatee	295	22,617	$ 1,018,896	$ 45.05	531	100	631	$ 10,375,691	$ 11,394,587
Marion	1,151	117,758	$ 5,509,897	$ 46.79	675	3	678	$ 11,579,121	$ 17,089,018
Martin	152	16,625	$ 1,330,000	$ 80.00	267	52	319	$ 9,314,800	$ 10,644,800
Miami Dade	1,228	133,109	$ 17,836,606	$ 134.00	3,449	200	3,649	$ 178,472,590	$ 196,309,196

TABLE II-B
COSTS OF DETENTION, DETENTION COST SAVINGS THRU SURETY
BONDING, PRETRIAL AVERAGE DAILY POPULATIONS, 67 FLORIDA COUNTIES
(N=52,246)

Monroe	14	2,356	$ 210,509	$ 89.35	212	69	281	$ 9,164,183	$ 9,374,691
Nassau	180	14,319	$ 602,830	$ 42.10	1	0	1	$ 15,367	$ 618,196
Okaloosa	253	23,917	$ 1,554,605	$ 65.00	167	83	250	$ 5,931,250	$ 7,485,855
Okeechobee	784	83,670	$ 5,856,900	$ 70.00	114	20	134	$ 3,423,700	$ 9,280,600
Orange	4,285	459,152	$ 43,591,891	$ 94.94	2,054	428	2,482	$ 86,008,994	$ 129,600,885
Osceola	222	25,224	$ 1,661,505	$ 65.87	562	240	802	$ 19,282,125	$ 20,943,630
Palm Beach	2,278	306,678	$ 41,401,530	$ 135.00	1,628	480	2,108	$ 103,871,700	$ 145,273,230
Pasco	233	26,276	$ 1,681,664	$ 64.00	617	97	714	$ 16,679,040	$ 18,360,704
Pinellas	271	29,379	$ 3,704,986	$ 126.11	1,805	141	1,946	$ 89,574,672	$ 93,279,658
Polk	6,306	439,473	$ 22,971,254	$ 52.27	851	129	980	$ 18,696,979	$ 41,668,233
Putnam	341	36,427	$ 1,766,710	$ 48.50	186	25	211	$ 3,735,228	$ 5,501,937
Santa Rosa	151	25,905	$ 1,243,440	$ 48.00	178	24	202	$ 3,539,040	$ 4,782,480
Sarasota	1,498	135,242	$ 9,622,468	$ 71.15	396	103	499	$ 12,958,905	$ 22,581,374
Seminole	1,588	143,955	$ 11,303,347	$ 78.52	333	148	481	$ 13,785,364	$ 25,088,710
St. Johns	51	4,569	$ 411,210	$ 90.00	207	25	232	$ 7,621,200	$ 8,032,410
St. Lucie	663	76,721	$ 6,904,890	$ 90.00	604	98	702	$ 23,060,700	$ 29,965,590
Sumter	288	27,133	$ 1,899,310	$ 70.00	148.67	28.50	177	$ 4,526,694	$ 6,426,004
Suwanee	51	5,022	$ 296,298	$ 59.00	78	7	85	$ 1,830,475	$ 2,126,773
Taylor	4	172	$ 6,527	$ 37.95	48	7	55	$ 761,846	$ 768,374
Union	4	922	$ 18,440	$ 20.00	10	1	11	$ 80,300	
Volusia	936	109,842	$ 7,759,239	$ 70.64	601	130	731	$ 18,847,812	$ 26,607,050
Wakulla	9	1,276	$ 59,972	$ 47.00	49	5	54	$ 926,370	$ 986,342
Walton	66	7,554	$ 498,564	$ 66.00	70	18	88	$ 2,119,920	$ 2,618,484
Washington	170	19,542	$ 762,138	$ 39.00	41	8	49	$ 697,515	$ 1,459,653
TOTALS	52,246	5,125,995	$ 404,231,161	$ 64.33				$ 1,127,702,231	$ 1,531,076,507

TABLE III -C

AVERAGE DAILY POPULATIONS (ADP) AND INCARCERATION RATES, BY FLORIDA COUNTY, 2008

Pasco	439,786	2	1,267	672	53.04%	117	9.23%	789	62.27%	2.9
Pinellas	931,113	1	3,370	1,918	56.91%	131	3.89%	2,049	60.80%	3.6
Polk	584,343	1	2,363	966	40.88%	280	11.85%	1,246	52.73%	4.0
Putnam	74,608	5	288	129	44.79%	24	8.33%	153	53.13%	3.8
Santa Rosa	144,508	5	520	225	43.27%	30	5.77%	255	49.04%	3.6
Sarasota	389,320	2	1,046	425	40.63%	115	10.99%	540	51.63%	2.7
Seminole	423,759	2	997	395	39.62%	157	15.75%	552	55.37%	2.3
St. Johns	183,572	4	518	217	41.89%	41	7.92%	258	49.81%	2.9
St. Lucie	272,864	4	1,555	652	41.93%	106	6.82%	758	48.75%	5.7
Sumter	95,326	5	224	106	47.32%	34	15.18%	140	62.50%	2.3
Suwanee	40,230	6	163	77	47.24%	11	6.75%	88	53.99%	4.0
Taylor	23,164	6	104	40	38.46%	6	5.77%	46	44.23%	4.5
Union	15,974	6	18	9	50.00%	3	16.67%	12	66.67%	1.1
Volusia	507,105	1	1,386	614	44.30%	147	10.61%	761	54.91%	2.7
Wakulla	31,791	6	268	49	18.28%	7	2.61%	56	20.90%	8.7
Walton	57,917	5	205	62	30.24%	21	10.24%	83	40.49%	3.5
Washington	24,721	6	149	40	26.85%	14	9.40%	54	36.24%	6.0
TOTALS	18,750,881		65,310.00	34,474.00		5,871.00		40,335.00		4.34
			1020.47	538.66	52.79%	91.73	8.99%	61.76%		

TABLE IV

AGGREGATE IMPACT OF PLACING BONDED PRE-TRIAL DEFENDANTS IN PRE-TRIAL DETENTION, BY FLORIDA COUNTY, 2010

COUNTY	# CASES	TOTAL DAYS BOND STATUS	AVG. DAYS ON BOND	DETENTION COST SAVINGS	ADP AVERAGE	PER DIEM RATE	TOTAL AVERAGE COSTS-DETENTION	DETENTION COSTS INCREASE WITHOUT SURETY BONDS	PERCENT INCREASE	NEW CELLS	ADDED COSTS (LL)	ADDED COSTS (UL)
Alachua	496	64,889	130.82	$ 5,466,249	1,039	$ 84.24	$ 31,946,756	$ 37,413,006	117.11%	177.78	$ 3,555,562	$ 12,444,466
Baker	282	27,286	96.76	$ 2,311,670	366	$ 84.72	$ 11,317,745	$ 13,629,415	120.43%	74.76	$ 1,495,123	$ 5,232,932
Bay	378	42,300	111.90	$ 2,072,700	888	$ 49.00	$ 15,881,880	$ 17,954,580	113.05%	115.89	$ 2,317,808	$ 8,112,329
Bradford	17	2,055	120.88	$ 65,760	101	$ 32.00	$ 1,179,680	$ 1,245,440	105.57%	5.63	$ 112,603	$ 394,110
Brevard	79	9,066	114.76	$ 609,235	1,594	$ 67.20	$ 39,097,632	$ 39,706,867	101.56%	24.84	$ 496,767	$ 1,738,685
Broward	963	100,525	104.39	$ 11,359,325	4,525	$ 113.00	$ 186,633,625	$ 197,992,950	106.09%	275.41	$ 5,508,219	$ 19,278,767
Calhoun	27	2,131	78.93	$ 80,978	46	$ 38.00	$ 638,020	$ 718,998	112.69%	5.84	$ 116,767	$ 408,685
Charlotte	798	80,039	100.30	$ 9,509,434	521	$ 118.81	$ 22,593,504	$ 32,102,937	142.09%	219.28	$ 4,385,699	$ 15,349,945
Citrus	971	80,996	83.42	$ 5,036,331	565	$ 62.18	$ 12,823,071	$ 17,859,402	139.28%	221.91	$ 4,438,137	$ 15,533,479
Clay	596	50,483	84.70	$ 3,416,689	449	$ 67.68	$ 11,091,737	$ 14,508,426	130.80%	138.31	$ 2,766,192	$ 9,681,671
Collier	721	76,239	105.74	$ 8,170,534	908	$ 107.17	$ 35,518,281	$ 43,688,815	123.00%	208.87	$ 4,177,479	$ 14,621,178
Columbia	115	10,453	90.90	$ 386,761	255	$ 37.00	$ 3,443,775	$ 3,830,536	111.23%	28.64	$ 572,767	$ 2,004,685
DeSoto	32	4,722	147.56	$ 259,710	188	$ 55.00	$ 3,774,100	$ 4,033,810	106.88%	12.94	$ 258,740	$ 905,589
Dixie	36	6,252	173.67	$ 214,131	92	$ 34.25	$ 1,150,115	$ 1,364,246	118.62%	17.13	$ 342,575	$ 1,199,014
Duval	676	59,487	88.00	$ 3,576,953	3,825	$ 60.13	$ 83,948,996	$ 87,525,950	104.26%	162.98	$ 3,259,562	$ 11,408,466
Escambia	1,415	132,592	93.70	$ 8,618,480	1,631	$ 65.00	$ 38,695,475	$ 47,313,955	122.27%	363.27	$ 7,265,315	$ 25,428,603
Flagler	1,459	177,315	121.53	$ 18,103,862	155	$ 102.10	$ 5,776,308	$ 23,880,169	413.42%	485.79	$ 9,715,890	$ 34,005,616
Franklin	25	2,611	104.44	$ 78,852	90	$ 30.20	$ 992,070	$ 1,070,922	107.95%	7.15	$ 143,068	$ 500,740
Gadsden	393	52,766	134.26	$ 2,480,002	193	$ 47.00	$ 3,310,915	$ 5,790,917	174.90%	144.56	$ 2,891,288	$ 10,119,507
Gilchrist	22	3,092	140.55	$ 200,980	30	$ 65.00	$ 711,750	$ 912,730	128.24%	8.47	$ 169,425	$ 592,986
Glades	179	24,119	134.74	$ 1,944,956	44	$ 80.64	$ 1,295,078	$ 3,240,035	250.18%	66.08	$ 1,321,589	$ 4,625,562
Gulf	16	2,166	135.38	$ 86,640	37	$ 40.00	$ 540,200	$ 626,840	116.04%	5.93	$ 118,685	$ 415,397
Hamilton	6	841	140.17	$ 70,022	59	$ 83.26	$ 1,793,004	$ 1,863,026	103.91%	2.30	$ 46,082	$ 161,288
Hardee	512	44,736	87.38	$ 2,988,365	87	$ 66.80	$ 2,121,234	$ 5,109,599	240.88%	122.56	$ 2,451,288	$ 8,579,507
Hendry	450	50,288	111.75	$ 1,986,376	229	$ 39.50	$ 3,301,608	$ 5,287,984	160.16%	137.78	$ 2,755,507	$ 9,644,274
Hernando	1,288	123,469	95.86	$ 6,788,326	569	$ 54.98	$ 11,418,521	$ 18,206,847	159.45%	338.27	$ 6,765,425	$ 23,678,986
Highlands	930	70,793	76.12	$ 3,256,478	390	$ 46.00	$ 6,548,100	$ 9,804,578	149.73%	193.95	$ 3,879,068	$ 13,576,740
Hillsborough	9,826	911,571	92.77	$ 73,673,168	3,218	$ 80.82	$ 94,928,747	$ 168,601,916	177.61%	2,497.45	$ 49,949,096	$ 174,821,836
Holmes	107	11,993	112.08	$ 479,720	58	$ 40.00	$ 846,800	$ 1,326,520	156.65%	32.86	$ 657,151	$ 2,300,027
Indian River	46	4,933	107.24	$ 308,313	513	$ 62.50	$ 11,702,813	$ 12,011,125	102.63%	13.52	$ 270,301	$ 946,055
Jackson	203	23,068	113.64	$ 634,370	223	$ 27.50	$ 2,238,363	$ 2,872,733	128.34%	63.20	$ 1,264,000	$ 4,424,000
Jefferson	4	249	62.25	$ 13,695	49	$ 55.00	$ 983,675	$ 997,370	101.39%	0.68	$ 13,644	$ 47,753
Lafayette	0	0	0.00	$ -	26	$ 50.39	$ 478,201	$ 478,201	100.00%	0.00	$ -	$ -
Lake	1,446	126,988	87.82	$ 5,714,460	1,316	$ 45.00	$ 21,615,300	$ 27,329,760	126.44%	347.91	$ 6,958,247	$ 24,353,863
Lee	3,593	373,262	103.89	$ 28,793,431	1,770	$ 77.14	$ 49,836,297	$ 78,629,728	157.78%	1,022.64	$ 20,452,712	$ 71,584,493
Leon	572	65,137	113.88	$ 3,419,693	985	$ 52.50	$ 18,875,063	$ 22,294,755	118.12%	178.46	$ 3,569,151	$ 12,492,027
Levy	37	3,750	101.35	$ 228,750	167	$ 61.00	$ 3,718,255	$ 3,947,005	106.15%	10.27	$ 205,479	$ 719,178
Liberty	54	8,279	153.31	$ 331,160	51	$ 40.00	$ 744,600	$ 1,075,760	144.47%	22.68	$ 453,644	$ 1,587,753
Madison	4	219	0.00	$ 8,979	72	$ 41.00	$ 1,077,480	$ 1,086,459	100.83%	0.00	$ -	$ -
Manatee	295	22,617	76.67	$ 1,018,896	1,081	$ 45.05	$ 17,775,153	$ 18,794,049	105.73%	61.96	$ 1,239,288	$ 4,337,507
Marion	1,151	117,758	102.31	$ 5,509,897	1,702	$ 46.79	$ 29,067,352	$ 34,577,249	118.96%	322.62	$ 6,452,493	$ 22,583,726
Martin	152	16,625	109.38	$ 1,330,000	620	$ 80.00	$ 18,104,000	$ 19,434,000	107.35%	45.55	$ 910,959	$ 3,188,356
Miami Dade	1,228	133,109	108.39	$ 17,836,606	5,825	$ 134.00	$ 284,900,750	$ 302,737,356	106.26%	364.68	$ 7,293,644	$ 25,527,753
Monroe	14	2,356	168.29	$ 210,509	488	$ 89.35	$ 15,915,022	$ 16,125,531	101.32%	6.45	$ 129,096	$ 451,836
Nassau	180	14,319	79.55	$ 602,830	247	$ 42.10	$ 3,795,526	$ 4,398,355	115.88%	39.23	$ 784,603	$ 2,746,110
Okaloosa	253	23,917	94.53	$ 1,554,605	508	$ 65.00	$ 12,052,300	$ 13,606,905	112.90%	65.53	$ 1,310,521	$ 4,586,822
Okeechobee	784	83,670	106.72	$ 5,856,900	233	$ 70.00	$ 5,953,150	$ 11,810,050	198.38%	229.23	$ 4,584,658	$ 16,046,301
Orange	4,285	459,152	107.15	$ 43,591,891	3,613	$ 94.94	$ 125,201,650	$ 168,793,541	134.82%	1,257.95	$ 25,159,014	$ 88,056,548
Osceola	222	25,224	113.62	$ 1,661,505	1,001	$ 65.87	$ 24,066,593	$ 25,728,097	106.90%	69.11	$ 1,382,137	$ 4,837,479
Palm Beach	2,278	306,678	134.63	$ 41,401,530	2,721	$ 135.00	$ 134,077,275	$ 175,478,805	130.88%	840.21	$ 16,804,274	$ 58,814,959

TABLE IV

AGGREGATE IMPACT OF PLACING BONDED PRE-TRIAL DEFENDANTS IN PRE-TRIAL DETENTION, BY FLORIDA COUNTY, 2010

Pasco	233	26,276	112.77	$ 1,681,664	1,358	$ 64.00	$ 31,722,880	$ 33,404,544	105.30%	71.99	$ 1,439,781	$ 5,039,233
Pinellas	271	29,379	108.41	$ 3,704,986	3,162	$ 126.11	$ 145,547,334	$ 149,252,320	102.55%	80.49	$ 1,609,808	$ 5,634,329
Polk	6,306	439,473	69.69	$ 22,971,254	2,194	$ 52.27	$ 41,858,339	$ 64,829,592	154.88%	1,204.04	$ 24,080,712	$ 84,282,493
Putnam	341	36,427	106.82	$ 1,766,710	323	$ 48.50	$ 5,717,908	$ 7,484,617	130.90%	99.80	$ 1,996,000	$ 6,986,000
Santa Rosa	151	25,905	171.56	$ 1,243,440	471	$ 48.00	$ 8,251,920	$ 9,495,360	115.07%	70.97	$ 1,419,452	$ 4,968,082
Sarasota	1,498	135,242	90.28	$ 9,622,468	889	$ 71.15	$ 23,087,108	$ 32,709,576	141.68%	370.53	$ 7,410,521	$ 25,936,822
Seminole	1,588	143,955	90.65	$ 11,303,347	890	$ 78.52	$ 25,507,222	$ 36,810,569	144.31%	394.40	$ 7,887,945	$ 27,607,808
St. Johns	51	4,569	89.59	$ 411,210	474	$ 90.00	$ 15,570,900	$ 15,982,110	102.64%	12.52	$ 250,356	$ 876,247
St. Lucie	663	76,721	115.72	$ 6,904,890	1,283	$ 90.00	$ 42,146,550	$ 49,051,440	116.38%	210.19	$ 4,203,890	$ 14,713,616
Sumter	288	27,133	94.21	$ 1,899,310	302	$ 70.00	$ 7,716,100	$ 9,615,410	124.61%	74.34	$ 1,486,740	$ 5,203,589
Suwanee	51	5,022	98.47	$ 296,298	153	$ 59.00	$ 3,294,855	$ 3,591,153	108.99%	13.76	$ 275,178	$ 963,123
Taylor	4	172	43.00	$ 6,527	89	$ 37.95	$ 1,232,806	$ 1,239,333	100.53%	0.47	$ 9,425	$ 32,986
Union	4	922	0.00	$ 18,440	19	$ 20.00	$ 138,700	$ 157,140	113.29%	0.00	$ -	$ -
Volusia	936	109,842	117.35	$ 7,759,239	1,255	$ 70.64	$ 32,358,418	$ 40,117,657	123.98%	300.94	$ 6,018,740	$ 21,065,589
Wakulla	9	1,276	141.78	$ 59,972	218	$ 47.00	$ 3,739,790	$ 3,799,762	101.60%	3.50	$ 69,918	$ 244,712
Walton	66	7,554	114.45	$ 498,564	237	$ 66.00	$ 5,709,330	$ 6,207,894	108.73%	20.70	$ 413,918	$ 1,448,712
Washington	170	19,542	114.95	$ 762,138	121	$ 39.00	$ 1,722,435	$ 2,484,573	144.25%	53.54	$ 1,070,795	$ 3,747,781
TOTALS	52,246	5,125,995	98.11	$ 404,231,161		$ 64.33	$ 1,810,820,137	$ 2,215,051,297	122.32%	14,043.82	$ 280,813,918	$ 982,848,712

Table V-A

Average Aggregate Daily Detention Costs, Average Aggregate Daily Costs Saved Through Surety Bonding, and Percentage of Costs Saved on Daily Basis Statewide and by 14 Largest and Other Counties

	Average Aggregate Daily Detention Costs	Average Aggregate Daily Costs Saved through Surety Bonding	Percentage of Costs Saved on Daily Basis through Surety Bonding
Florida Statewide – All Counties (67)	**$ 4,961,151**	**$ 1,107,483**	**22.32**
14 Largest Florida Counties	**$ 3,558,099**	**$ 761,329**	**21.34**
Remaining 53 Florida Counties	**$ 1,403,052**	**$ 346,154**	**24.67**

Table V-B
Average Aggregate Daily Detention Costs, Average Aggregate Daily Costs Saved Through Surety Bonding, and Percentage of Costs Saved Through Surety Bonding on Daily Basis, by Six Population Tiers

	Average Aggregate Daily Detention Costs	Average Aggregate Daily Costs Saved through Surety Bonding	Percentage of Costs Saved on Daily Basis through Surety Bonding
Tier 1 Counties (11)	**$ 3,333,052**	**$ 699,331**	**20.93 %**
Tier 2 Counties (3)	**$ 220,047**	**$ 61,993**	**28.17 %**
Tier 3 Counties (8)	**$ 623,999**	**$ 112,379**	**18.01 %**
Tier 4 Counties (7)	**$ 330,289**	**$ 80,053**	**24.24 %**
Tier 5 Counties (13)	**$ 295,184**	**$ 96,651**	**32.74 %**
Tier 6 Counties (25)	**$ 153,579**	**$ 57,071**	**37.16 %**

TABLE VI

COSTS OF NEW FACILITY CONSTRUCTION REQUIRED WITHOUT SURETY BONDING AS ALTERNATIVE TO PRETRIAL DETENTION, 2010

COUNTY	# CASES	TOTAL DAYS BOND STATUS	AVG. DAYS ON BOND	DETENTION COST SAVINGS	ADP AVERAGE	PER DIEM RATE	TOTAL AVERAGE COSTS-DETENTION
Alachua	496	64889	130.82	5,466,249	1,039	$ 84.24	$ 31,946,756
Baker	282	27,286	96.76	2,311,670	366	$ 84.72	$ 11,317,745
Bay	378	42,300	111.90	2,072,700	888	$ 49.00	$ 15,881,880
Bradford	17	2,055	120.88	65,760	101	$ 32.00	$ 1,179,680
Brevard	79	9,066	114.76	609,235	1,594	$ 67.20	$ 39,097,632
Broward	963	100,525	104.39	11,359,325	4,525	$ 113.00	$ 186,633,625
Calhoun	27	2,131	78.93	80,978	46	$ 38.00	$ 638,020
Charlotte	798	80,039	100.30	9,509,434	521	$ 118.81	$ 22,593,504
Citrus	971	80,996	83.42	5,036,331	565	$ 62.18	$ 12,823,071
Clay	596	50,483	84.70	3,416,689	449	$ 67.68	$ 11,091,737
Collier	721	76,239	105.74	8,170,534	908	$ 107.17	$ 35,518,281
Columbia	115	10,453	90.90	386,761	255	$ 37.00	$ 3,443,775
DeSoto	32	4,722	147.56	259,710	188	$ 55.00	$ 3,774,100
Dixie	36	6,252	173.67	214,131	92	$ 34.25	$ 1,150,115
Duval	676	59,487	88.00	3,576,953	3,825	$ 60.13	$ 83,948,996
Escambia	1,415	132,592	93.70	8,618,480	1,631	$ 65.00	$ 38,695,475
Flagler	1,459	177,315	121.53	18,103,862	155	$ 102.10	$ 5,776,308
Franklin	25	2,611	104.44	78,852	90	$ 30.20	$ 992,070
Gadsden	393	52,766	134.26	2,480,002	193	$ 47.00	$ 3,310,915
Gilchrist	22	3,092	140.55	200,980	30	$ 65.00	$ 711,750
Glades	179	24,119	134.74	1,944,956	44	$ 80.64	$ 1,295,078
Gulf	16	2,166	135.38	86,640	37	$ 40.00	$ 540,200
Hamilton	6	841	140.17	70,022	59	$ 83.26	$ 1,793,004
Hardee	512	44,736	87.38	2,988,365	87	$ 66.80	$ 2,121,234
Hendry	450	50,288	111.75	1,986,376	229	$ 39.50	$ 3,301,608
Hernando	1,288	123,469	95.86	6,788,326	569	$ 54.98	$ 11,418,521
Highlands	930	70,793	76.12	3,256,478	390	$ 46.00	$ 6,548,100
Hillsborough	9,826	911,571	92.77	73,673,168	3,218	$ 80.82	$ 94,928,747
Holmes	107	11,993	112.08	479,720	58	$ 40.00	$ 846,800
Indian River	46	4,933	107.24	308,313	513	$ 62.50	$ 11,702,813
Jackson	203	23,068	113.64	634,370	223	$ 27.50	$ 2,238,363
Jefferson	4	249	62.25	13,695	49	$ 55.00	$ 983,675

TABLE VI

COSTS OF NEW FACILITY CONSTRUCTION REQUIRED WITHOUT SURETY BONDING AS ALTERNATIVE TO PRETRIAL DETENTION, 2010

Lafayette	0	0	0.00		0	26	$	50.39	$ 478,201
Lake	1,446	126,988	87.82		5,714,460	1,316	$	45.00	$ 21,615,300
Lee	3,593	373,262	103.89		28,793,431	1,770	$	77.14	$ 49,836,297
Leon	572	65,137	113.88		3,419,693	985	$	52.50	$ 18,875,063
Levy	37	3,750	101.35		228,750	167	$	61.00	$ 3,718,255
Liberty	54	8,279	153.31		331,160	51	$	40.00	$ 744,600
Madison	4	219	54.75		8,979	72	$	41.00	$ 1,077,480
Manatee	295	22,617	76.67		1,018,896	1,081	$	45.05	$ 17,775,153
Marion	1,151	117,758	102.31		5,509,897	1,702	$	46.79	$ 29,067,352
Martin	152	16,625	109.38		1,330,000	620	$	80.00	$ 18,104,000
Miami Dade	1,228	133,109	108.39		17,836,606	5,825	$	134.00	$ 284,900,750
Monroe	14	2,356	168.29		210,509	488	$	89.35	$ 15,915,022
Nassau	180	14,319	79.55		602,830	247	$	42.10	$ 3,795,526
Okaloosa	253	23,917	94.53		1,554,605	508	$	65.00	$ 12,052,300
Okeechobee	784	83,670	106.72		5,856,900	233	$	70.00	$ 5,953,150
Orange	4,285	459,152	107.15		43,591,891	3,613	$	94.94	$ 125,201,650
Osceola	222	25,224	113.62		1,661,505	1,001	$	65.87	$ 24,066,593
Palm Beach	2,278	306,678	134.63		41,401,530	2,721	$	135.00	$ 134,077,275
Pasco	233	26,276	112.77		1,681,664	1,358	$	64.00	$ 31,722,880
Pinellas	271	29,379	108.41		3,704,986	3,162	$	126.11	$ 145,547,334
Polk	6,306	439,473	69.69		22,971,254	2,194	$	52.27	$ 41,858,339
Putnam	341	36,427	106.82		1,766,710	323	$	48.50	$ 5,717,908
Santa Rosa	151	25,905	171.56		1,243,440	471	$	48.00	$ 8,251,920
Sarasota	1,498	135,242	90.28		9,622,468	889	$	71.15	$ 23,087,108
Seminole	1,588	143,955	90.65		11,303,347	890	$	78.52	$ 25,507,222
St. Johns	51	4,569	89.59		411,210	474	$	90.00	$ 15,570,900
St. Lucie	663	76,721	115.72		6,904,890	1,283	$	90.00	$ 42,146,550
Sumter	288	27,133	94.21		1,899,310	302	$	70.00	$ 7,716,100
Suwanee	51	5,022	98.47		296,298	153	$	59.00	$ 3,294,855
Taylor	4	172	43.00		6,527	89	$	37.95	$ 1,232,806
Union	4	922	0.00		18,440	19	$	20.00	$ 138,700
Volusia	936	109,842	117.35		7,759,239	1,255	$	70.64	$ 32,358,418
Wakulla	9	1,276	141.78		59,972	218	$	47.00	$ 3,739,790
Walton	66	7,554	114.45		498,564	237	$	66.00	$ 5,709,330
Washington	170	19,542	114.95		762,138	121	$	39.00	$ 1,722,435
TOTALS	52,246	5,125,995	98.11	$	404,231,161	*877.63*	$	71.83	$ 1,810,820,137

TABLE VI

COSTS OF NEW FACILITY CONSTRUCTION REQUIRED WITHOUT SURETY BONDING AS ALTERNATIVE TO PRETRIAL DETENTION, 2010

DETENTION COSTS INCREASE WITHOUT SURETY BONDS	PERCENT INCREASE	NEW CELLS	ADDED COSTS (LL)	ADDED COSTS (UL)
$ 37,413,006	117.11%	177.78	$ 3,555,562	$ 12,444,466
$ 13,629,415	120.43%	74.76	$ 1,495,123	$ 5,232,932
$ 17,954,580	113.05%	115.89	$ 2,317,808	$ 8,112,329
$ 1,245,440	105.57%	5.63	$ 112,603	$ 394,110
$ 39,706,867	101.56%	24.84	$ 496,767	$ 1,738,685
$ 197,992,950	106.09%	275.41	$ 5,508,219	$ 19,278,767
$ 718,998	112.69%	5.84	$ 116,767	$ 408,685
$ 32,102,937	142.09%	219.28	$ 4,385,699	$ 15,349,945
$ 17,859,402	139.28%	221.91	$ 4,438,137	$ 15,533,479
$ 14,508,426	130.80%	138.31	$ 2,766,192	$ 9,681,671
$ 43,688,815	123.00%	208.87	$ 4,177,479	$ 14,621,178
$ 3,830,536	111.23%	28.64	$ 572,767	$ 2,004,685
$ 4,033,810	106.88%	12.94	$ 258,740	$ 905,589
$ 1,364,246	118.62%	17.13	$ 342,575	$ 1,199,014
$ 87,525,950	104.26%	162.98	$ 3,259,562	$ 11,408,466
$ 47,313,955	122.27%	363.27	$ 7,265,315	$ 25,428,603
$ 23,880,169	413.42%	485.79	$ 9,715,890	$ 34,005,616
$ 1,070,922	107.95%	7.15	$ 143,068	$ 500,740
$ 5,790,917	174.90%	144.56	$ 2,891,288	$ 10,119,507
$ 912,730	128.24%	8.47	$ 169,425	$ 592,986
$ 3,240,035	250.18%	66.08	$ 1,321,589	$ 4,625,562
$ 626,840	116.04%	5.93	$ 118,685	$ 415,397
$ 1,863,026	103.91%	2.30	$ 46,082	$ 161,288
$ 5,109,599	240.88%	122.56	$ 2,451,288	$ 8,579,507
$ 5,287,984	160.16%	137.78	$ 2,755,507	$ 9,644,274
$ 18,206,847	159.45%	338.27	$ 6,765,425	$ 23,678,986
$ 9,804,578	149.73%	193.95	$ 3,879,068	$ 13,576,740
$ 168,601,916	177.61%	2,497.45	$ 49,949,096	$ 174,821,836
$ 1,326,520	156.65%	32.86	$ 657,151	$ 2,300,027
$ 12,011,125	102.63%	13.52	$ 270,301	$ 946,055
$ 2,872,733	128.34%	63.20	$ 1,264,000	$ 4,424,000
$ 997,370	101.39%	0.68	$ 13,644	$ 47,753

TABLE VI

COSTS OF NEW FACILITY CONSTRUCTION REQUIRED WITHOUT SURETY BONDING AS ALTERNATIVE TO PRETRIAL DETENTION, 2010

$ 478,201	100.00%	0.00	$ -	$ -
$ 27,329,760	126.44%	347.91	$ 6,958,247	$ 24,353,863
$ 78,629,728	157.78%	1,022.64	$ 20,452,712	$ 71,584,493
$ 22,294,755	118.12%	178.46	$ 3,569,151	$ 12,492,027
$ 3,947,005	106.15%	10.27	$ 205,479	$ 719,178
$ 1,075,760	144.47%	22.68	$ 453,644	$ 1,587,753
$ 1,086,459	100.83%	0.60	$ 12,000	$ 42,000
$ 18,794,049	105.73%	61.96	$ 1,239,288	$ 4,337,507
$ 34,577,249	118.96%	322.62	$ 6,452,493	$ 22,583,726
$ 19,434,000	107.35%	45.55	$ 910,959	$ 3,188,356
$ 302,737,356	106.26%	364.68	$ 7,293,644	$ 25,527,753
$ 16,125,531	101.32%	6.45	$ 129,096	$ 451,836
$ 4,398,355	115.88%	39.23	$ 784,603	$ 2,746,110
$ 13,606,905	112.90%	65.53	$ 1,310,521	$ 4,586,822
$ 11,810,050	198.38%	229.23	$ 4,584,658	$ 16,046,301
$ 168,793,541	134.82%	1,257.95	$ 25,159,014	$ 88,056,548
$ 25,728,097	106.90%	69.11	$ 1,382,137	$ 4,837,479
$ 175,478,805	130.88%	840.21	$ 16,804,274	$ 58,814,959
$ 33,404,544	105.30%	71.99	$ 1,439,781	$ 5,039,233
$ 149,252,320	102.55%	80.49	$ 1,609,808	$ 5,634,329
$ 64,829,592	154.88%	1,204.04	$ 24,080,712	$ 84,282,493
$ 7,484,617	130.90%	99.80	$ 1,996,000	$ 6,986,000
$ 9,495,360	115.07%	70.97	$ 1,419,452	$ 4,968,082
$ 32,709,576	141.68%	370.53	$ 7,410,521	$ 25,936,822
$ 36,810,569	144.31%	394.40	$ 7,887,945	$ 27,607,808
$ 15,982,110	102.64%	12.52	$ 250,356	$ 876,247
$ 49,051,440	116.38%	210.19	$ 4,203,890	$ 14,713,616
$ 9,615,410	124.61%	74.34	$ 1,486,740	$ 5,203,589
$ 3,591,153	108.99%	13.76	$ 275,178	$ 963,123
$ 1,239,333	100.53%	0.47	$ 9,425	$ 32,986
$ 157,140	113.29%	0.00	$ -	$ -
$ 40,117,657	123.98%	300.94	$ 6,018,740	$ 21,065,589
$ 3,799,762	101.60%	3.50	$ 69,918	$ 244,712
$ 6,207,894	108.73%	20.70	$ 413,918	$ 1,448,712
$ 2,484,573	144.25%	53.54	$ 1,070,795	$ 3,747,781
$ 2,215,051,297	122.32%	14,043.82	$ 280,825,918	$ 982,890,712

Table VII–A
Tier 1 Counties New Jail Construction Cost Estimates

TIER 1 COUNTIES (11)	NUMBER NEW BEDS/CELLS	COST DORM STYLE CONSTRUCTION	COST CELL STYLE CONSTRUCTION
Brevard	24.84	$ 496,767	$ 1,738,685
Broward	275.41	$ 5,508,219	$ 19,278,767
Duval	162.98	$ 3,259,562	$ 11,408,466
Hillsborough	2,497.45	$ 49,949,096	$ 174,821,836
Lee	1,022.64	$ 20,452,712	$ 71,584,493
Miami Dade	364.68	$ 7,293,644	$ 25,527,753
Orange	1,257.95	$ 25,159,014	$ 88,056,548
Palm Beach	840.21	$ 16,804,274	$ 58,814,959
Pinellas	80.49	$ 1,609,808	$ 5,634,329
Polk	1,204.04	$ 24,080,712	$ 84,282,493
Volusia	300.94	$ 6,018,740	$ 21,065,589
TOTALS	8,031.63	$ 160,632,548	$ 562,213,918
Average Tier 1	730.15	$ 14,602,959	$ 51,110,356

Table VII–B
Tier 2 Counties New Jail Construction Cost Estimates

TIER 2 COUNTIES (3)	NUMBER NEW BEDS/CELLS	COST DORM STYLE CONSTRUCTION	COST CELL STYLE CONSTRUCTION
Pasco	71.99	$ 1,439,781	$ 5,039,233
Sarasota	370.53	$ 7,410,521	$ 25,936,822
Seminole	394.40	$ 7,887,945	$ 27,607,808
TOTALS	836.91	$ 16,738,247	$ 58,583,863
Average Tier 2	278.97	$ 5,579,415	$ 19,527,954

Table VII–C
Tier 3 Counties New Jail Construction Cost Estimates

TIER 3 COUNTIES (8)	NUMBER NEW BEDS/CELLS	COST DORM STYLE CONSTRUCTION	COST CELL STYLE CONSTRUCTION
Collier	208.87	$ 4,177,479	$ 14,621,178
Escambia	363.27	$ 7,265,315	$ 25,428,603
Lake	347.91	$ 6,958,247	$ 24,353,863
Leon	178.46	$ 3,569,151	$ 12,492,027
Manatee	61.96	$ 1,239,288	$ 4,337,507
Marion	322.62	$ 6,452,493	$ 22,583,726
Osceola	69.11	$ 1,382,137	$ 4,837,479
St. Lucie	210.19	$ 4,203,890	$ 14,713,616

TOTALS	1,762.40	$ 35,248,000	$ 123,368,000
Average Tier 3	220.30	$ 4,406,000	$ 15,421,000

Table VII –D
Tier 4 Counties New Jail Construction Cost Estimates

TIER 4 COUNTIES (7)	NUMBER NEW BEDS/CELLS	COST DORM STYLE CONSTRUCTION	COST CELL STYLE CONSTRUCTION
Alachua	177.78	$ 3,555,562	$ 12,444,466
Bay	115.89	$ 2,317,808	$ 8,112,329
Charlotte	219.28	$ 4,385,699	$ 15,349,945
Clay	138.31	$ 2,766,192	$ 9,681,671
Hernando	338.27	$ 6,765,425	$ 23,678,986
Okaloosa	65.53	$ 1,310,521	$ 4,586,822
St. Johns	12.52	$ 250,356	$ 876,247
TOTALS	1,067.58	$ 21,351,562	$ 74,730,466
Average Tier 4	152.51	$ 3,050,223	$ 10,675,780

Table VII –E
Tier 5 Counties New Jail Construction Cost Estimates

TIER 5 COUNTIES (13)	NUMBER NEW BEDS/CELLS	COST DORM STYLE CONSTRUCTION	COST CELL STYLE CONSTRUCTION
Citrus	221.91	$ 4,438,137	$ 15,533,479
Columbia	28.64	$ 572,767	$ 2,004,685
Flagler	485.79	$ 9,715,890	$ 34,005,616
Highlands	193.95	$ 3,879,068	$ 13,576,740
Indian River	13.52	$ 270,301	$ 946,055
Jackson	63.20	$ 1,264,000	$ 4,424,000
Martin	45.55	$ 910,959	$ 3,188,356
Monroe	6.45	$ 129,096	$ 451,836
Nassau	39.23	$ 784,603	$ 2,746,110
Putnam	99.80	$ 1,996,000	$ 6,986,000
Santa Rosa	70.97	$ 1,419,452	$ 4,968,082
Sumter	74.34	$ 1,486,740	$ 5,203,589
Walton	20.70	$ 413,918	$ 1,448,712
TOTALS	1,364.05	$ 27,280,932	$ 95,483,260
Average Tier 5	104.93	$ 2,098,533	$ 7,344,866

Table VII –F
Tier 6 Counties New Jail Construction Cost Estimates

TIER 6 COUNTIES (25)	NUMBER NEW BEDS/CELLS	COST DORM STYLE CONSTRUCTION	COST CELL STYLE CONSTRUCTION
Baker	74.76	$ 1,495,123	$ 5,232,932
Bradford	5.63	$ 112,603	$ 394,110
Calhoun	5.84	$ 116,767	$ 408,685
DeSoto	12.94	$ 258,740	$ 905,589
Dixie	17.13	$ 342,575	$ 1,199,014
Franklin	7.15	$ 143,068	$ 500,740
Gadsden	144.56	$ 2,891,288	$ 10,119,507
Gilchrist	8.47	$ 169,425	$ 592,986
Glades	66.08	$ 1,321,589	$ 4,625,562
Gulf	5.93	$ 118,685	$ 415,397
Hamilton	2.30	$ 46,082	$ 161,288
Hardee	122.56	$ 2,451,288	$ 8,579,507
Hendry	137.78	$ 2,755,507	$ 9,644,274
Holmes	32.86	$ 657,151	$ 2,300,027
Jefferson	0.68	$ 13,644	$ 47,753
Lafayette	0.00	$ -	$ -
Levy	10.27	$ 205,479	$ 719,178
Liberty	22.68	$ 453,644	$ 1,587,753
Madison	0.60	$ 12,000	$ 42,000
Okeechobee	229.23	$ 4,584,658	$ 16,046,301
Suwanee	13.76	$ 275,178	$ 963,123
Taylor	0.47	$ 9,425	$ 32,986
Union	2.53	$ 50,521	$ 176,822
Wakulla	3.50	$ 69,918	$ 244,712
Washington	53.54	$ 1,070,795	$ 3,747,781
TOTALS	981.26	$ 19,625,151	$ 68,688,027
Average Tier 6	39.25	$ 785,006	$ 2,747,521

TABLE VIII- A

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 1 COUNTIES, 2010

COUNTY	PRE-TRIAL COUNTY	# CASES	PCT.	COUNTY POPULATION	POPULATION TIER	TOTAL DAYS BOND STATUS
Brevard	1	79	0.15	543,376	1	9,066
Broward	1	963	1.84	1,748,066	1	100,525
Duval	1	676	1.29	864,263	1	59,487
Hillsborough	1	9,826	18.81	1,229,226	1	911,571
Lee	1	3,593	6.88	618,754	1	373,262
Miami Dade	1	1,228	2.35	2,496,435	1	133,109
Orange	1	4,285	8.20	1,145,956	1	459,152
Palm Beach	1	2,278	4.36	1,320,134	1	306,678
Pinellas	1	271	0.52	916,542	1	29,379
Polk	1	6,306	12.07	602,095	1	439,473
Volusia	1	936	1.79	494,593	1	109,842
TOTALS		30,441	58.26%	11,979,440		2,931,544
Mean		454.34		1,089,040.00		4,797.94
Stand Dev.		3,039.45		606,716.82		270,443.90

TABLE VIII- A

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 1 COUNTIES, 2010

AVG. DAYS ON BOND		DETENTION COST SAVINGS	OVERALL ADP	FELONY PRETRIAL ADP	MISDEMN. PRETRIAL ADP	TOTAL PRETRIAL ADP	INC. RATE AVERAGE
114.76	$	609,235	1,594	1,089	175	1,264	2.9
104.39	$	11,359,325	4,525	3,264	254	3,518	2.6
88.00	$	3,576,953	3,825	1,612	237	1,849	4.2
92.77	$	73,673,168	3,218	1,845	304	2,149	2.7
103.89	$	28,793,431	1,770	795	147	942	2.9
108.39	$	17,836,606	5,825	3,449	200	3,649	2.4
107.15	$	43,591,891	3,613	2,054	428	2,482	3.3
134.63	$	41,401,530	2,721	1,628	480	2,108	1.7
108.41	$	3,704,986	3,162	1,805	141	1,946	3.4
69.69	$	22,971,254	2,194	851	129	980	3.8
117.35	$	7,759,239	1,255	601	130	731	2.5
96.30	$	255,277,618	3063.82	1726.64	238.64	1965.27	2.95
96.30	$	23,207,056.14	3063.82	1726.64	238.64	1965.27	2.95
16.84	$	22,380,462	1,365.79	937.47	120.80		0.70

TABLE VIII- A

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 1 COUNTIES, 2010

PER DIEM RATE	TOTAL AVERAGE COSTS-DETENTION	DETENTION W/ SAVINGS ADD	PERCENT INCREASE	NEW CELLS	ADDED COSTS (LL)	ADDED COSTS (UL)
$ 67.20	$ 39,097,632	$ 39,706,867	1.558	24.84	$ 496,767	$ 1,738,685
$ 113.00	$ 186,633,625	$ 197,992,950	6.086	275.41	$ 5,508,219	$ 19,278,767
$ 60.13	$ 83,948,996	$ 87,525,950	4.261	162.98	$ 3,259,562	$ 11,408,466
$ 80.82	$ 94,928,747	$ 168,601,916	77.609	2,497.45	$ 49,949,096	$ 174,821,836
$ 77.14	$ 49,836,297	$ 78,629,728	57.776	1,022.64	$ 20,452,712	$ 71,584,493
$ 134.00	$ 284,900,750	$ 302,737,356	6.261	364.68	$ 7,293,644	$ 25,527,753
$ 94.94	$ 125,201,650	$ 168,793,541	34.817	1,257.95	$ 25,159,014	$ 88,056,548
$ 135.00	$ 134,077,275	$ 175,478,805	30.879	840.21	$ 16,804,274	$ 58,814,959
$ 126.11	$ 145,547,334	$ 149,252,320	2.546	80.49	$ 1,609,808	$ 5,634,329
$ 52.27	$ 41,858,339	$ 64,829,592	54.879	1,204.04	$ 24,080,712	$ 84,282,493
$ 70.64	$ 32,358,418	$ 40,117,657	23.979	300.94	$ 6,018,740	$ 21,065,589
$ 91.93	$ 1,218,389,064	$ 1,473,666,682	120.95%	8,031.63	$ 160,632,548	$ 562,213,918
$ 91.93	$ 110,762,642.18	$ 133,969,698.32	11.00%	730.15	$ 14,602,959	$ 51,110,356.16
$ 30.39	$ 76,651,889	$ 80,401,324		740.94	$ 14,818,844	$ 51,865,954

TABLE VIII-B

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 2 COUNTIES, 2010

COUNTY	PRE-TRIAL COUNTY	# CASES	PCT.	COUNTY POPULATION	POPULATION TIER	TOTAL DAYS BOND STATUS	AVG. DAYS ON BOND
Pasco	0	233	0.45	464,697	2	26,276	112.77
Sarasota	1	1,498	2.87	379,448	2	135,242	90.28
Seminole	1	1,588	3.04	422,718	2	143,955	90.65
TOTALS		3,319	6.35%	1,266,863		305,473	92.04
Mean		1106.33		422,287.67		101,824.33	92.04
Stand Dev.		757.67		42,626.13		65,571.66	12.88

TABLE VIII-B

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 2 COUNTIES, 2010

DETENTION COST SAVINGS	OVERALL ADP	FELONY PRETRIAL ADP	MISDEMN. PRETRIAL ADP	TOTAL PRETRIAL ADP	INC. RATE AVERAGE	PER DIEM RATE
$ 1,681,664	1,358	617	97	714	3.1	$ 64.00
$ 9,622,468	889	396	103	499	2.3	$ 71.15
$ 11,303,347	890	333	148	481	2.1	$ 78.52
$ 22,607,479	1045.67	448.67	116.00	564.67	2.50	$ 71.22
$ 7,535,826.30	1045.67	448.67	116.00	564.67	2.50	$ 71.22
$ 5,139,042	270.49	149.15	27.87		0.53	$ 7.26

TABLE VIII-B

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 2 COUNTIES, 2010

TOTAL AVERAGE COSTS-DETENTION	DETENTION W/ SAVINGS ADD	PERCENT INCREASE	NEW CELLS	ADDED COSTS (LL)	ADDED COSTS (UL)
$ 31,722,880	$ 33,404,544	5.301	71.99	$ 1,439,781	$ 5,039,233
$ 23,087,108	$ 32,709,576	41.679	370.53	$ 7,410,521	$ 25,936,822
$ 25,507,222	$ 36,810,569	44.314	394.40	$ 7,887,945	$ 27,607,808
$ 80,317,210	$ 102,924,689	128.15%	836.91	$ 16,738,247	$ 58,583,863
$ 26,772,403.25	$ 34,308,229.55	42.72%	278.97	$ 5,579,415.53	$ 19,527,954.34
$ 4,454,734	$ 2,194,771		179.65	$ 3,592,967	$ 12,575,386

TABLE VIII-C

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 3 COUNTIES, 2010

COUNTY	PRE-TRIAL COUNTY	# CASES	PCT.	COUNTY POPULATION	POPULATION TIER	TOTAL DAYS BOND STATUS	AVG. DAYS ON BOND
Collier	1	721	1.38001	321,520	3	76,239	105.74
Escambia	1	1,415	2.70834	297,619	3	132,592	93.70
Lake	0	1,446	2.76768	297,052	3	126,988	87.82
Leon	1	572	1.09482	275,487	3	65,137	113.88
Manatee	1	295	0.56464	322,833	3	22,617	76.67
Marion	0	1,151	2.20304	331,298	3	117,758	102.31
Osceola	1	222	0.42491	268,685	3	25,224	113.62
St. Lucie	1	663	1.27	277,789	3	76,721	115.72
TOTALS		6,485	12.41%	2,392,283		643,276	99.19
Mean		810.63		299,035.38		80,409.50	99.19
Stand Dev.		475.69		24,040.98		42,990.27	14.06

TABLE VIII-C

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 3 COUNTIES, 2010

DETENTION COST SAVINGS	OVERALL ADP	FELONY PRETRIAL ADP	MISDEMN. PRETRIAL ADP	TOTAL PRETRIAL ADP	INC. RATE AVERAGE	PER DIEM RATE
$ 8,170,534	908	520	154	674	2.7	$ 107.17
$ 8,618,480	1,631	896	134	1,030	5.3	$ 65.00
$ 5,714,460	1,316	426	50	476	4.4	$ 45.00
$ 3,419,693	985	473	86	559	3.6	$ 52.50
$ 1,018,896	1,081	531	100	631	3.3	$ 45.05
$ 5,509,897	1,702	675	3	678	5.2	$ 46.79
$ 1,661,505	1,001	562	240	802	3.6	$ 65.87
$ 6,904,890	1,283	604	98	702	4.7	$ 90.00
$ 41,018,354	1238.38	585.88	108.13	694.00	4.10	$ 64.67
$ 5,127,294.21	1238.38	585.88	108.13	694.00	4.10	$ 64.67
$ 2,851,246	300.38	146.71	70.97		0.94	$ 22.96

TABLE VIII-C

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 3 COUNTIES, 2010

TOTAL AVERAGE COSTS-DETENTION	DETENTION W/ SAVINGS ADD	PERCENT INCREASE	NEW CELLS	ADDED COSTS (LL)	ADDED COSTS (UL)
$ 35,518,281	$ 43,688,815	23.004	208.87	$ 4,177,479	$ 14,621,178
$ 38,695,475	$ 47,313,955	22.273	363.27	$ 7,265,315	$ 25,428,603
$ 21,615,300	$ 27,329,760	26.437	347.91	$ 6,958,247	$ 24,353,863
$ 18,875,063	$ 22,294,755	18.118	178.46	$ 3,569,151	$ 12,492,027
$ 17,775,153	$ 18,794,049	5.732	61.96	$ 1,239,288	$ 4,337,507
$ 29,067,352	$ 34,577,249	18.956	322.62	$ 6,452,493	$ 22,583,726
$ 24,066,593	$ 25,728,097	6.904	69.11	$ 1,382,137	$ 4,837,479
$ 42,146,550	$ 49,051,440	16.383	210.19	$ 4,203,890	$ 14,713,616
$ 227,759,766	$ 268,778,120	118.01%	1,762.40	$ 35,248,000	$ 123,368,000
$ 28,469,970.80	$ 33,597,265.01	14.75%	220.30	$ 4,406,000.00	$ 15,421,000.00
$ 9,369,121	$ 11,819,271		117.78	$ 2,355,631	$ 8,244,708

TABLE VIII-D

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 4 COUNTIES, 2010

COUNTY	PRE-TRIAL COUNTY	# CASES	PCT.	COUNTY POPULATION	POPULATION TIER	TOTAL DAYS BOND STATUS	AVG. DAYS ON BOND
Alachua	1	496	0.95	247,336	4	64,889	130.82
Bay	1	378	0.72	168,852	4	42,300	111.90
Charlotte	1	798	1.53	159,978	4	80,039	100.30
Clay	0	596	1.14	190,865	4	50,483	84.70
Hernando	0	1,288	2.47	172,778	4	123,469	95.86
Okaloosa	1	253	0.48	180,822	4	23,917	94.53
St. Johns	0	51	0.10	190,039	4	4,569	89.59
TOTALS		3,860	7.39%	1,310,670		389,666	100.95
Mean		551.43		187,238.57		55,666.57	100.95
Stand Dev.		403.72		28,763.92		38,946.05	15.67

TABLE VIII-D

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 4 COUNTIES, 2010

DETENTION COST SAVINGS	OVERALL ADP	FELONY PRETRIAL ADP	MISDEMN. PRETRIAL ADP	TOTAL PRETRIAL ADP	INC. RATE AVERAGE	PER DIEM RATE
$ 5,466,249	1,039	481	98	579	4.1	$ 84.24
$ 2,072,700	888	339	92	431	5.2	$ 49.00
$ 9,509,434	521	242	64	306	3.1	$ 118.81
$ 3,416,689	449	251	33	284	2.4	$ 67.68
$ 6,788,326	569	264	51	315	3.4	$ 54.98
$ 1,554,605	508	167	83	250	2.6	$ 65.00
$ 411,210	474	207	25	232	2.6	$ 90.00
$ 29,219,213	635.43	278.71	63.71	342.43	3.34	$ 75.67
$ 4,174,173.29	635.43	278.71	63.71	342.43	3.34	$ 75.67
$ 3,239,863	231.38	103.69	28.73		1.01	$ 24.00

TABLE VIII-D

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 4 COUNTIES, 2010

TOTAL AVERAGE COSTS-DETENTION	DETENTION W/ SAVINGS ADD	PERCENT INCREASE	NEW CELLS	ADDED COSTS (LL)	ADDED COSTS (UL)
$ 31,946,756	$ 37,413,006	17.110	177.78	$ 3,555,562	$ 12,444,466
$ 15,881,880	$ 17,954,580	13.051	115.89	$ 2,317,808	$ 8,112,329
$ 22,593,504	$ 32,102,937	42.089	219.28	$ 4,385,699	$ 15,349,945
$ 11,091,737	$ 14,508,426	30.804	138.31	$ 2,766,192	$ 9,681,671
$ 11,418,521	$ 18,206,847	59.450	338.27	$ 6,765,425	$ 23,678,986
$ 12,052,300	$ 13,606,905	12.899	65.53	$ 1,310,521	$ 4,586,822
$ 15,570,900	$ 15,982,110	2.641	12.52	$ 250,356	$ 876,247
$ 120,555,598	$ 149,774,811	124.24%	1,067.58	$ 21,351,562	$ 74,730,466
$ 17,222,228.31	$ 21,396,401.59	17.75%	152.51	$ 3,050,223.09	$ 10,675,780.82
$ 7,617,741	$ 9,404,041		106.70	$ 2,134,030	$ 7,469,106

TABLE VIII-E

SUMMARY TABLE, TIER 5 COUNTIES, 2010

COUNTY	PRE-TRIAL COUNTY	# CASES	PCT.	COUNTY POPULATION	POPULATION TIER	TOTAL DAYS BOND STATUS	AVG. DAYS ON BOND
Citrus	1	971	1.86	141,236	5	80,996	83.42
Columbia	0	115	0.22	67,531	5	10,453	90.90
Flagler	0	1,459	2.79	95,696	5	177,315	121.53
Highlands	1	930	1.78	98,786	5	70,793	76.12
Indian River	0	46	0.09	138,028	5	4,933	107.24
Jackson	1	203	0.39	49,746	5	23,068	113.64
Martin	0	152	0.29	146,318	5	16,625	109.38
Monroe	1	14	0.03	73,090	5	2,356	168.29
Nassau	0	180	0.34	73,314	5	14,319	79.55
Putnam	0	341	0.65	74,364	5	36,427	106.82
Santa Rosa	1	151	0.29	151,372	5	25,905	171.56
Sumter	0	288	0.55	93,420	5	27,133	94.21
Walton	0	66	0.13	55,043	5	7,554	114.45
TOTALS		4,916	9.41%	1,257,944		497,877	101.28
Mean		378.15		96,764.92		38,298.23	101.28
Stand Dev.		448.71		36,000.63		48,208.55	29.95

TABLE VIII-E

SUMMARY TABLE, TIER 5 COUNTIES, 2010

DETENTION COST SAVINGS	OVERALL ADP	FELONY PRETRIAL ADP	MISDEMN. PRETRIAL ADP	TOTAL PRETRIAL ADP	INC. RATE AVERAGE	PER DIEM RATE
$ 5,036,331	565	153	29	182	4.0	$ 62.18
$ 386,761	255	140	25	165	4.0	$ 37.00
$ 18,103,862	155	148.67	28.50	177.17	1.6	$ 102.10
$ 3,256,478	390	191	28	219	3.9	$ 46.00
$ 308,313	513	269	26	295	3.7	$ 62.50
$ 634,370	223	40	14	54	5.1	$ 27.50
$ 1,330,000	620	267	52	319	4.4	$ 80.00
$ 210,509	488	212	69	281	6.3	$ 89.35
$ 602,830	247	1	0	1	3.4	$ 42.10
$ 1,766,710	323	186	25	211	4.4	$ 48.50
$ 1,243,440	471	178	24	202	3.3	$ 48.00
$ 1,899,310	302	148.67	28.50	177.17	3.4	$ 70.00
$ 498,564	237	70	18	88	4.3	$ 66.00
$ 35,277,476	368.38	154.18	28.23	182.41	3.98	$ 60.09
$ 2,713,652.02	368.38	154.18	28.23	182.41	3.98	$ 60.09
$ 4,824,722	148.93	79.60	16.77		1.08	$ 21.52

TABLE VIII-E

SUMMARY TABLE, TIER 5 COUNTIES, 2010

TOTAL AVERAGE COSTS-DETENTION	DETENTION W/ SAVINGS ADD	PERCENT INCREASE	NEW CELLS	ADDED COSTS (LL)	ADDED COSTS (UL)
$ 12,823,071	$ 17,859,402	39.276	221.91	$ 4,438,137	$ 15,533,479
$ 3,443,775	$ 3,830,536	11.231	28.64	$ 572,767	$ 2,004,685
$ 5,776,308	$ 23,880,169	313.416	485.79	$ 9,715,890	$ 34,005,616
$ 6,548,100	$ 9,804,578	49.732	193.95	$ 3,879,068	$ 13,576,740
$ 11,702,813	$ 12,011,125	2.635	13.52	$ 270,301	$ 946,055
$ 2,238,363	$ 2,872,733	28.341	63.20	$ 1,264,000	$ 4,424,000
$ 18,104,000	$ 19,434,000	7.346	45.55	$ 910,959	$ 3,188,356
$ 15,915,022	$ 16,125,531	1.323	6.45	$ 129,096	$ 451,836
$ 3,795,526	$ 4,398,355	15.883	39.23	$ 784,603	$ 2,746,110
$ 5,717,908	$ 7,484,617	30.898	99.80	$ 1,996,000	$ 6,986,000
$ 8,251,920	$ 9,495,360	15.068	70.97	$ 1,419,452	$ 4,968,082
$ 7,716,100	$ 9,615,410	24.615	74.34	$ 1,486,740	$ 5,203,589
$ 5,709,330	$ 6,207,894	8.732	20.70	$ 413,918	$ 1,448,712
$ 107,742,233	$ 143,019,709	132.74%	1,364.05	$ 27,280,932	$ 95,483,260
$ 8,287,864.08	$ 11,001,516.10	10.21%	104.93	$ 2,098,533.19	$ 7,344,866.17
$ 4,915,276	$ 6,540,538		132.08	$ 2,641,564	$ 9,245,475

TABLE VIII-F

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 6 COUNTIES, 2010

COUNTY	PRE-TRIAL COUNTY	# CASES	PCT.	COUNTY POPULATION	POPULATION TIER	TOTAL DAYS BOND STATUS	AVG. DAYS ON BOND
Baker	0	282	0.54	27,115	6	27,286	96.76
Bradford	0	17	0.03	28,520	6	2,055	120.88
Calhoun	0	27	0.05	14,625	6	2,131	78.93
DeSoto	0	32	0.06	34,862	6	4,722	147.56
Dixie	0	36	0.07	16,422	6	6,252	173.67
Franklin	0	25	0.05	11,549	6	2,611	104.44
Gadsden	0	393	0.75	46,389	6	52,766	134.26
Gilchrist	0	22	0.04	16,939	6	3,092	140.55
Glades	0	179	0.34	12,884	6	24,119	134.74
Gulf	0	16	0.03	15,863	6	2,166	135.38
Hamilton	0	6	0.01	14,799	6	841	140.17
Hardee	0	512	0.98	27,731	6	44,736	87.38
Hendry	0	450	0.86	39,140	6	50,288	111.75
Holmes	0	107	0.20	19,927	6	11,993	112.08
Jefferson	0	4	0.01	14,761	6	249	62.25
Lafayette	0	0	0.00	8,870	6	0	0.00
Levy	0	37	0.07	40,801	6	3,750	101.35
Liberty	0	54	0.10	8,365	6	8,279	153.31
Madison	0	4	0.01	19,224	6	219	54.75
Okeechobee	0	784	1.50	39,996	6	83,670	106.72
Suwanee	0	51	0.10	41,551	6	5,022	98.47
Taylor	0	4	0.01	22,570	6	172	43.00
Union	0	4	0.01	15,535	6	922	230.50
Wakulla	0	9	0.02	30,776	6	1,276	141.78
Washington	0	170	0.33	24,896	6	19,542	114.95
TOTALS		3,225	6.17%	594,110		358,159	111.06
Mean		129.00		23,764.40		14,326.36	111.06
Stand Dev.		202.22		11,329.35		21,639.41	45.78

TABLE VIII-F

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 6 COUNTIES, 2010

DETENTION COST SAVINGS	OVERALL ADP	FELONY PRETRIAL ADP	MISDEMN. PRETRIAL ADP	TOTAL PRETRIAL ADP	INC. RATE AVERAGE	PER DIEM RATE
$ 2,311,670	366	52	18	70	15.3	$ 84.72
$ 65,760	101	50	11	61	4.1	$ 32.00
$ 80,978	46	21	7	28	3.6	$ 38.00
$ 259,710	188	103	11	114	5.8	$ 55.00
$ 214,131	92	45.41	8.45	53.86	6.1	$ 34.25
$ 78,852	90	45.41	8.45	53.86	8.5	$ 30.20
$ 2,480,002	193	77	32	109	4.1	$ 47.00
$ 200,980	30	16	4	20	1.8	$ 65.00
$ 1,944,956	44	30	3	33	4.5	$ 80.64
$ 86,640	37	14	2	16	2.7	$ 40.00
$ 70,022	59	24	3	27	5.0	$ 83.26
$ 2,988,365	87	34	14	48	3.3	$ 66.80
$ 1,986,376	229	116	25	141	5.8	$ 39.50
$ 479,720	58	35	10	45	3.2	$ 40.00
$ 13,695	49	8	2	10	3.6	$ 55.00
$ -	26	8	1	9	3.9	$ 50.39
$ 228,750	167	97	23	120	4.1	$ 61.00
$ 331,160	51	16	0	16	7.7	$ 40.00
$ 8,979	72	35	4	39	3.9	$ 41.00
$ 5,856,900	233	114	20	134	6.2	$ 70.00
$ 296,298	153	78	7	85	3.7	$ 59.00
$ 6,527	89	48	7	55	4.5	$ 37.95
$ 18,440	19	10	1	11	1.7	$ 20.00
$ 59,972	218	49	5	54	7.5	$ 47.00
$ 762,138	121	41	8	49	5.4	$ 39.00
$ 20,831,021	112.72	46.67	9.40	56.07	5.04	$ 50.27
$ 833,240.85	112.72	46.67	9.40	56.07	5.04	$ 50.27
$ 1,389,654	85.57	33.04	8.35		2.73	$ 17.31

TABLE VIII-F

SUMMARY PAGE, TIER 6 COUNTIES, 2010

TOTAL AVERAGE COSTS-DETENTION	DETENTION W/ SAVINGS ADD	PERCENT INCREASE	NEW CELLS	ADDED COSTS (LL)	ADDED COSTS (UL)
$ 11,317,745	$ 13,629,415	20.425	74.76	$ 1,495,123	$ 5,232,932
$ 1,179,680	$ 1,245,440	5.574	5.63	$ 112,603	$ 394,110
$ 638,020	$ 718,998	12.692	5.84	$ 116,767	$ 408,685
$ 3,774,100	$ 4,033,810	6.881	12.94	$ 258,740	$ 905,589
$ 1,150,115	$ 1,364,246	18.618	17.13	$ 342,575	$ 1,199,014
$ 992,070	$ 1,070,922	7.948	7.15	$ 143,068	$ 500,740
$ 3,310,915	$ 5,790,917	74.904	144.56	$ 2,891,288	$ 10,119,507
$ 711,750	$ 912,730	28.237	8.47	$ 169,425	$ 592,986
$ 1,295,078	$ 3,240,035	150.181	66.08	$ 1,321,589	$ 4,625,562
$ 540,200	$ 626,840	16.039	5.93	$ 118,685	$ 415,397
$ 1,793,004	$ 1,863,026	3.905	2.30	$ 46,082	$ 161,288
$ 2,121,234	$ 5,109,599	140.879	122.56	$ 2,451,288	$ 8,579,507
$ 3,301,608	$ 5,287,984	60.164	137.78	$ 2,755,507	$ 9,644,274
$ 846,800	$ 1,326,520	56.651	32.86	$ 657,151	$ 2,300,027
$ 983,675	$ 997,370	1.392	0.68	$ 13,644	$ 47,753
$ 478,201	$ 478,201	0.000	0.00	$ -	$ -
$ 3,718,255	$ 3,947,005	6.152	10.27	$ 205,479	$ 719,178
$ 744,600	$ 1,075,760	44.475	22.68	$ 453,644	$ 1,587,753
$ 1,077,480	$ 1,086,459	0.833	0.60	$ 12,000	$ 42,000
$ 5,953,150	$ 11,810,050	98.383	229.23	$ 4,584,658	$ 16,046,301
$ 3,294,855	$ 3,591,153	8.993	13.76	$ 275,178	$ 963,123
$ 1,232,806	$ 1,239,333	0.529	0.47	$ 9,425	$ 32,986
$ 138,700	$ 157,140	13.295	2.53	$ 50,521	$ 176,822
$ 3,739,790	$ 3,799,762	1.604	3.50	$ 69,918	$ 244,712
$ 1,722,435	$ 2,484,573	44.248	53.54	$ 1,070,795	$ 3,747,781
$ 56,056,266	$ 76,887,287	137.16%	981.26	$ 19,625,151	$ 68,688,027
$ 2,242,250.63	$ 3,075,491.47	5.49%	39.25	$ 785,006.03	$ 2,747,521.10
$ 2,372,092	$ 3,347,187		59.29	$ 1,185,721	$ 4,150,024

TABLE VIII -G
SUMMARY PAGE
TIER 1 AND TIER 2 COUNTIES
2010

COUNTY	PRE-TRIAL COUNTY	# CASES	PCT.	COUNTY POPULATION	POPULATION TIER	TOTAL DAYS BOND STATUS	AVG. DAYS ON BOND
Brevard	1	79	0.15121	543,376	1	9,066	114.76
Broward	1	963	1.84320	1,748,066	1	100,525	104.39
Duval	1	676	1.29388	864,263	1	59,487	88.00
Hillsborough	1	9,826	18.80718	1,229,226	1	911,571	92.77
Lee	1	3,593	6.87708	618,754	1	373,262	103.89
Miami Dade	1	1,228	2.35042	2,496,435	1	133,109	108.39
Orange	1	4,285	8.20158	1,145,956	1	459,152	107.15
Palm Beach	1	2,278	4.36014	1,320,134	1	306,678	134.63
Pasco	0	233	0.44597	464,697	2	26,276	112.77
Pinellas	1	271	0.51870	916,542	1	29,379	108.41
Polk	1	6,306	12.06982	602,095	1	439,473	69.69
Sarasota	1	1,498	2.86721	379,448	2	135,242	90.28
Seminole	1	1,588	3.03947	422,718	2	143,955	90.65
Volusia	1	936	1.79152	494,593	1	109,842	117.35
TOTALS		33,760	64.62%	13,246,303		3,237,017	95.88
Mean		2411.43		946,164.50		231,215.50	95.88
Stand Dev.		2,773.98		603,360.80		248,676.90	15.86

TABLE VIII -G
SUMMARY PAGE
TIER 1 AND TIER 2 COUNTIES
2010

DETENTION COST SAVINGS	OVERALL ADP	FELONY PRETRIAL ADP	MISDEMN. PRETRIAL ADP	TOTAL PRETRIAL ADP	INC. RATE AVERAGE	PER DIEM RATE	TOTAL AVERAGE COSTS-DETENTION
$ 609,235	1,594	1,089	175	1,264	2.9	$ 67.20	$ 39,097,632
$ 11,359,325	4,525	3,264	254	3,518	2.6	$ 113.00	$ 186,633,625
$ 3,576,953	3,825	1,612	237	1,849	4.2	$ 60.13	$ 83,948,996
$ 73,673,168	3,218	1,845	304	2,149	2.7	$ 80.82	$ 94,928,747
$ 28,793,431	1,770	795	147	942	2.9	$ 77.14	$ 49,836,297
$ 17,836,606	5,825	3,449	200	3,649	2.4	$ 134.00	$ 284,900,750
$ 43,591,891	3,613	2,054	428	2,482	3.3	$ 94.94	$ 125,201,650
$ 41,401,530	2,721	1,628	480	2,108	1.7	$ 135.00	$ 134,077,275
$ 1,681,664	1,358	617	97	714	3.1	$ 64.00	$ 31,722,880
$ 3,704,986	3,162	1,805	141	1,946	3.4	$ 126.11	$ 145,547,334
$ 22,971,254	2,194	851	129	980	3.8	$ 52.27	$ 41,858,339
$ 9,622,468	889	396	103	499	2.3	$ 71.15	$ 23,087,108
$ 11,303,347	890	333	148	481	2.1	$ 78.52	$ 25,507,222
$ 7,759,239	1,255	601	130	731	2.5	$ 70.64	$ 32,358,418
$ 277,885,096	2631.36	1452.79	212.36	1665.14	2.85	$ 87.49	$ 1,298,706,274
$ 19,848,935.46	2631.36	1452.79	212.36	1665.14	2.85	$ 87.49	$ 92,764,733.84
$ 20,829,999	1,478.06	987.72	118.62	1,047.77	0.67	$ 28.22	$ 76,169,318

TABLE VIII -G
SUMMARY PAGE
TIER 1 AND TIER 2 COUNTIES
2010

DETENTION W/ SAVINGS ADD	PERCENT INCREASE	NEW CELLS	ADDED COSTS (LL)	ADDED COSTS (UL)
$ 39,706,867	1.558	24.84	$ 496,767	$ 1,738,685
$ 197,992,950	6.086	275.41	$ 5,508,219	$ 19,278,767
$ 87,525,950	4.261	162.98	$ 3,259,562	$ 11,408,466
$ 168,601,916	77.609	2,497.45	$ 49,949,096	$ 174,821,836
$ 78,629,728	57.776	1,022.64	$ 20,452,712	$ 71,584,493
$ 302,737,356	6.261	364.68	$ 7,293,644	$ 25,527,753
$ 168,793,541	34.817	1,257.95	$ 25,159,014	$ 88,056,548
$ 175,478,805	30.879	840.21	$ 16,804,274	$ 58,814,959
$ 33,404,544	5.301	71.99	$ 1,439,781	$ 5,039,233
$ 149,252,320	2.546	80.49	$ 1,609,808	$ 5,634,329
$ 64,829,592	54.879	1,204.04	$ 24,080,712	$ 84,282,493
$ 32,709,576	41.679	370.53	$ 7,410,521	$ 25,936,822
$ 36,810,569	44.314	394.40	$ 7,887,945	$ 27,607,808
$ 40,117,657	23.979	300.94	$ 6,018,740	$ 21,065,589
$ 1,576,591,370	121.40%	8,868.54	$ 177,370,795	$ 620,797,781
$ 112,613,669.30	8.67%	633.47	$ 12,669,342.47	$ 44,342,698.63
$ 82,305,934	24.77	681.31	$ 13,626,132	$ 47,691,460

TABLE VIII-H
SUMMARY PAGE
TIER 3, 4, 5,, AND 6 COUNTIES
2010

COUNTY	PRE-TRIAL COUNTY	# CASES	PCT.	COUNTY POPULATION	POPULATION TIER	TOTAL DAYS BOND STATUS	AVG. DAYS ON BOND
Alachua	1	496	0.94935	247,336	4	64,889	130.82
Baker	0	282	0.53975	27,115	6	27,286	96.76
Bay	1	378	0.72350	168,852	4	42,300	111.90
Bradford	0	17	0.03254	28,520	6	2,055	120.88
Calhoun	0	27	0.05168	14,625	6	2,131	78.93
Charlotte	1	798	1.52739	159,978	4	80,039	100.30
Citrus	1	971	1.85852	141,236	5	80,996	83.42
Clay	0	596	1.14076	190,865	4	50,483	84.70
Collier	1	721	1.38001	321,520	3	76,239	105.74
Columbia	0	115	0.22011	67,531	5	10,453	90.90
DeSoto	0	32	0.06125	34,862	6	4,722	147.56
Dixie	0	36	0.06890	16,422	6	6,252	173.67
Escambia	1	1,415	2.70834	297,619	3	132,592	93.70
Flagler	0	1,459	2.79256	95,696	5	177,315	121.53
Franklin	0	25	0.04785	11,549	6	2,611	104.44
Gadsden	0	393	0.75221	46,389	6	52,766	134.26
Gilchrist	0	22	0.04211	16,939	6	3,092	140.55
Glades	0	179	0.34261	12,884	6	24,119	134.74
Gulf	0	16	0.03062	15,863	6	2,166	135.38
Hamilton	0	6	0.01148	14,799	6	841	140.17
Hardee	0	512	0.97998	27,731	6	44,736	87.38
Hendry	0	450	0.86131	39,140	6	50,288	111.75
Hernando	0	1,288	2.46526	172,778	4	123,469	95.86
Highlands	1	930	1.78004	98,786	5	70,793	76.12
Holmes	0	107	0.20480	19,927	6	11,993	112.08
Indian River	0	46	0.08805	138,028	5	4,933	107.24
Jackson	1	203	0.38855	49,746	5	23,068	113.64
Jefferson	0	4	0.00766	14,761	6	249	62.25
Lafayette	0	0	0.00000	8,870	6	0	0.00

TABLE VIII-H
SUMMARY PAGE
TIER 3, 4, 5,, AND 6 COUNTIES
2010

Lake	0	1,446	2.76768	297,052	3	126,988	87.82
Leon	1	572	1.09482	275,487	3	65,137	113.88
Levy	0	37	0.07082	40,801	6	3,750	101.35
Liberty	0	54	0.10336	8,365	6	8,279	153.31
Madison	0	4	0.00766	19,224	6	219	54.75
Manatee	1	295	0.56464	322,833	3	22,617	76.67
Marion	0	1,151	2.20304	331,298	3	117,758	102.31
Martin	0	152	0.29093	146,318	5	16,625	109.38
Monroe	1	14	0.02680	73,090	5	2,356	168.29
Nassau	0	180	0.34452	73,314	5	14,319	79.55
Okaloosa	1	253	0.48425	180,822	4	23,917	94.53
Okeechobee	0	784	1.50059	39,996	6	83,670	106.72
Osceola	1	222	0.42491	268,685	3	25,224	113.62
Putnam	0	341	0.65268	74,364	5	36,427	106.82
Santa Rosa	1	151	0.28902	151,372	5	25,905	171.56
St. Johns	0	51	0.09762	190,039	4	4,569	89.59
St. Lucie	1	663	1.26900	277,789	3	76,721	115.72
Sumter	0	288	0.55124	93,420	5	27,133	94.21
Suwanee	0	51	0.09762	41,551	6	5,022	98.47
Taylor	0	4	0.00766	22,570	6	172	43.00
Union	0	4	0.00766	15,535	6	922	230.50
Wakulla	0	9	0.01723	30,776	6	1,276	141.78
Walton	0	66	0.12633	55,043	5	7,554	114.45
Washington	0	170	0.32538	24,896	6	19,542	114.95
TOTALS		18,486	35.38%	5,555,007		1,888,978	102.18
Mean		348.79		104,811.45		35,641.09	102.18
Stand Dev.		419.98		102,097.56		41,937.58	35.43

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TIER 3, 4, 5,, AND 6 COUNTIES
2010

DETENTION COST SAVINGS	OVERALL ADP	FELONY PRETRIAL ADP	MISDEMN. PRETRIAL ADP	TOTAL PRETRIAL ADP	INC. RATE AVERAGE	PER DIEM RATE
$ 5,466,249	1,039	481	98	579	4.1	$ 84.24
$ 2,311,670	366	52	18	70	15.3	$ 84.72
$ 2,072,700	888	339	92	431	5.2	$ 49.00
$ 65,760	101	50	11	61	4.1	$ 32.00
$ 80,978	46	21	7	28	3.6	$ 38.00
$ 9,509,434	521	242	64	306	3.1	$ 118.81
$ 5,036,331	565	153	29	182	4.0	$ 62.18
$ 3,416,689	449	251	33	284	2.4	$ 67.68
$ 8,170,534	908	520	154	674	2.7	$ 107.17
$ 386,761	255	140	25	165	4.0	$ 37.00
$ 259,710	188	103	11	114	5.8	$ 55.00
$ 214,131	92			0	6.1	$ 34.25
$ 8,618,480	1,631	896	134	1,030	5.3	$ 65.00
$ 18,103,862	155			0	1.6	$ 102.10
$ 78,852	90			0	8.5	$ 30.20
$ 2,480,002	193	77	32	109	4.1	$ 47.00
$ 200,980	30	16	4	20	1.8	$ 65.00
$ 1,944,956	44	30	3	33	4.5	$ 80.64
$ 86,640	37	14	2	16	2.7	$ 40.00
$ 70,022	59	24	3	27	5.0	$ 83.26
$ 2,988,365	87	34	14	48	3.3	$ 66.80
$ 1,986,376	229	116	25	141	5.8	$ 39.50
$ 6,788,326	569	264	51	315	3.4	$ 54.98
$ 3,256,478	390	191	28	219	3.9	$ 46.00
$ 479,720	58	35	10	45	3.2	$ 40.00
$ 308,313	513	269	26	295	3.7	$ 62.50
$ 634,370	223	40	14	54	5.1	$ 27.50
$ 13,695	49	8	2	10	3.6	$ 55.00
$ -	26	8	1	9	3.9	$ 50.39

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$	5,714,460	1,316	426	50	476	4.4	$	45.00
$	3,419,693	985	473	86	559	3.6	$	52.50
$	228,750	167	97	23	120	4.1	$	61.00
$	331,160	51	16	0	16	7.7	$	40.00
$	8,979	72	35	4	39	3.9	$	41.00
$	1,018,896	1,081	531	100	631	3.3	$	45.05
$	5,509,897	1,702	675	3	678	5.2	$	46.79
$	1,330,000	620	267	52	319	4.4	$	80.00
$	210,509	488	212	69	281	6.3	$	89.35
$	602,830	247	1	0	1	3.4	$	42.10
$	1,554,605	508	167	83	250	2.6	$	65.00
$	5,856,900	233	114	20	134	6.2	$	70.00
$	1,661,505	1,001	562	240	802	3.6	$	65.87
$	1,766,710	323	186	25	211	4.4	$	48.50
$	1,243,440	471	178	24	202	3.3	$	48.00
$	411,210	474	207	25	232	2.6	$	90.00
$	6,904,890	1,283	604	98	702	4.7	$	90.00
$	1,899,310	302			0	3.4	$	70.00
$	296,298	153	78	7	85	3.7	$	59.00
$	6,527	89	48	7	55	4.5	$	37.95
$	18,440	19	10	1	11	1.7	$	20.00
$	59,972	218	49	5	54	7.5	$	47.00
$	498,564	237	70	18	88	4.3	$	66.00
$	762,138	121	41	8	49	5.4	$	39.00
$	126,346,064	414.38	177.75	34.70	212.45	4.42	$	58.21
$	2,383,888.00	414.38	177.75	34.70	212.45	4.42	$	58.21
$	3,367,670	426.77	209.71	47.65	246.11	2.09	$	21.48

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TIER 3, 4, 5,, AND 6 COUNTIES
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TOTAL AVERAGE COSTS-DETENTION	DETENTION W/ SAVINGS ADD	PERCENT INCREASE	NEW CELLS	ADDED COSTS (LL)	ADDED COSTS (UL)
$ 31,946,756	$ 37,413,006	17.110	177.78	$ 3,555,562	$ 12,444,466
$ 11,317,745	$ 13,629,415	20.425	74.76	$ 1,495,123	$ 5,232,932
$ 15,881,880	$ 17,954,580	13.051	115.89	$ 2,317,808	$ 8,112,329
$ 1,179,680	$ 1,245,440	5.574	5.63	$ 112,603	$ 394,110
$ 638,020	$ 718,998	12.692	5.84	$ 116,767	$ 408,685
$ 22,593,504	$ 32,102,937	42.089	219.28	$ 4,385,699	$ 15,349,945
$ 12,823,071	$ 17,859,402	39.276	221.91	$ 4,438,137	$ 15,533,479
$ 11,091,737	$ 14,508,426	30.804	138.31	$ 2,766,192	$ 9,681,671
$ 35,518,281	$ 43,688,815	23.004	208.87	$ 4,177,479	$ 14,621,178
$ 3,443,775	$ 3,830,536	11.231	28.64	$ 572,767	$ 2,004,685
$ 3,774,100	$ 4,033,810	6.881	12.94	$ 258,740	$ 905,589
$ 1,150,115	$ 1,364,246	18.618	17.13	$ 342,575	$ 1,199,014
$ 38,695,475	$ 47,313,955	22.273	363.27	$ 7,265,315	$ 25,428,603
$ 5,776,308	$ 23,880,169	313.416	485.79	$ 9,715,890	$ 34,005,616
$ 992,070	$ 1,070,922	7.948	7.15	$ 143,068	$ 500,740
$ 3,310,915	$ 5,790,917	74.904	144.56	$ 2,891,288	$ 10,119,507
$ 711,750	$ 912,730	28.237	8.47	$ 169,425	$ 592,986
$ 1,295,078	$ 3,240,035	150.181	66.08	$ 1,321,589	$ 4,625,562
$ 540,200	$ 626,840	16.039	5.93	$ 118,685	$ 415,397
$ 1,793,004	$ 1,863,026	3.905	2.30	$ 46,082	$ 161,288
$ 2,121,234	$ 5,109,599	140.879	122.56	$ 2,451,288	$ 8,579,507
$ 3,301,608	$ 5,287,984	60.164	137.78	$ 2,755,507	$ 9,644,274
$ 11,418,521	$ 18,206,847	59.450	338.27	$ 6,765,425	$ 23,678,986
$ 6,548,100	$ 9,804,578	49.732	193.95	$ 3,879,068	$ 13,576,740
$ 846,800	$ 1,326,520	56.651	32.86	$ 657,151	$ 2,300,027
$ 11,702,813	$ 12,011,125	2.635	13.52	$ 270,301	$ 946,055
$ 2,238,363	$ 2,872,733	28.341	63.20	$ 1,264,000	$ 4,424,000
$ 983,675	$ 997,370	1.392	0.68	$ 13,644	$ 47,753
$ 478,201	$ 478,201	0.000	0.00	$ -	$ -

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$	21,615,300	$	27,329,760	26.437	347.91	$ 6,958,247	$ 24,353,863
$	18,875,063	$	22,294,755	18.118	178.46	$ 3,569,151	$ 12,492,027
$	3,718,255	$	3,947,005	6.152	10.27	$ 205,479	$ 719,178
$	744,600	$	1,075,760	44.475	22.68	$ 453,644	$ 1,587,753
$	1,077,480	$	1,086,459	0.833	0.60	$ 12,000	$ 42,000
$	17,775,153	$	18,794,049	5.732	61.96	$ 1,239,288	$ 4,337,507
$	29,067,352	$	34,577,249	18.956	322.62	$ 6,452,493	$ 22,583,726
$	18,104,000	$	19,434,000	7.346	45.55	$ 910,959	$ 3,188,356
$	15,915,022	$	16,125,531	1.323	6.45	$ 129,096	$ 451,836
$	3,795,526	$	4,398,355	15.883	39.23	$ 784,603	$ 2,746,110
$	12,052,300	$	13,606,905	12.899	65.53	$ 1,310,521	$ 4,586,822
$	5,953,150	$	11,810,050	98.383	229.23	$ 4,584,658	$ 16,046,301
$	24,066,593	$	25,728,097	6.904	69.11	$ 1,382,137	$ 4,837,479
$	5,717,908	$	7,484,617	30.898	99.80	$ 1,996,000	$ 6,986,000
$	8,251,920	$	9,495,360	15.068	70.97	$ 1,419,452	$ 4,968,082
$	15,570,900	$	15,982,110	2.641	12.52	$ 250,356	$ 876,247
$	42,146,550	$	49,051,440	16.383	210.19	$ 4,203,890	$ 14,713,616
$	7,716,100	$	9,615,410	24.615	74.34	$ 1,486,740	$ 5,203,589
$	3,294,855	$	3,591,153	8.993	13.76	$ 275,178	$ 963,123
$	1,232,806	$	1,239,333	0.529	0.47	$ 9,425	$ 32,986
$	138,700	$	157,140	13.295	2.53	$ 50,521	$ 176,822
$	3,739,790	$	3,799,762	1.604	3.50	$ 69,918	$ 244,712
$	5,709,330	$	6,207,894	8.732	20.70	$ 413,918	$ 1,448,712
$	1,722,435	$	2,484,573	44.248	53.54	$ 1,070,795	$ 3,747,781
$	512,113,863	$	638,459,927	124.67%	5,175.28	$ 103,505,644	$ 362,269,753
$	9,662,525.72	$	12,046,413.72	2.35%	97.65	$ 1,952,936.68	$ 6,835,278.37
$	10,758,259	$	12,893,284	50.42	114.90	$ 2,297,950	$ 8,042,824

Table IX

T-Tests
Differences between Means
67 Florida Counties, 2010
Group Breakdown Classification = PreTrial County

Group Statistics

	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
POPULATION	0	39	76527.00	100260.079
	1	28	564884.18	572357.530
POPULATION_TIER	0	39	5.36	1.013
	1	28	2.64	1.569
TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	0	39	28268.23	42264.202
	1	28	143697.64	195688.431
AVG_DAYS_BOND	0	39	108.2761	37.67747
	1	28	107.1525	23.56028
DET_COST_SAVINGS	0	39	1775631.18	3250963.522
	1	28	11963626.66	16683376.958
OVERALL_ADP	0	39	290.72	379.384
	1	28	1695.11	1423.198
FELONY_PT_ADP	0	39	124.0297	155.68127
	1	28	903.9643	898.56723
MISDEM_PT_ADP	0	39	17.7667	19.41254
	1	28	149.6071	112.32108
TOTAL_PT_ADP	0	39	141.7964	169.59865
	1	28	1053.5714	976.42558
INCAR_RATE	0	39	4.521	2.3518
	1	28	3.486	1.0903
PER_DIEM	0	39	54.7015	18.60984
	1	28	77.7354	28.56594
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	0	39	6115608.04	7721495.231
	1	28	56153979.05	65219884.666
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDI	0	39	7891239.17	9242035.617
N	1	28	68117606.13	73623685.016
NEW_CELLS	0	39	77.4472	115.79233
	1	28	393.6922	536.13269

NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	0	39	1548944.14	2315846.612
	1	28	7873843.43	10722653.735
NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	0	39	5421304.53	8105463.335
	1	28	27558452.36	37529288.768
CASES	0	39	272.74	409.947
	1	28	1486.04	2159.769

Group Statistics

	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Std. Error Mean
POPULATION	0	16054.461
	1	108165.406
POPULATION_TIER	0	.162
	1	.296
TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	0	6767.689
	1	36981.637
AVG_DAYS_BOND	0	6.03322
	1	4.45247
DET_COST_SAVINGS	0	520570.787
	1	3152861.890
OVERALL_ADP	0	60.750
	1	268.959
FELONY_PT_ADP	0	24.92895
	1	169.81325
MISDEM_PT_ADP	0	3.10849
	1	21.22669
TOTAL_PT_ADP	0	27.15752
	1	184.52709
INCAR_RATE	0	.3766
	1	.2060
PER_DIEM	0	2.97996
	1	5.39846
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	0	1236428.776
	1	12325399.669
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	0	1479910.101
	1	13913568.654
NEW_CELLS	0	18.54161

	1	101.31955
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	0	370832.242
	1	2026391.084
NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	0	1297912.880
	1	7092368.926
CASES	0	65.644
	1	408.158

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances	
		F	Sig.
POPULATION	Equal variances assumed	31.173	.000
	Equal variances not assumed		
POPULATION_TIER	Equal variances assumed	13.530	.000
	Equal variances not assumed		
TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Equal variances assumed	16.032	.000
	Equal variances not assumed		
AVG_DAYS_BOND	Equal variances assumed	2.543	.116
	Equal variances not assumed		
DET_COST_SAVINGS	Equal variances assumed	21.190	.000
	Equal variances not assumed		
OVERALL_ADP	Equal variances assumed	34.649	.000
	Equal variances not assumed		
FELONY_PT_ADP	Equal variances assumed	37.054	.000
	Equal variances not assumed		
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Equal variances assumed	28.011	.000
	Equal variances not assumed		

TOTAL_PT_ADP	Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed	40.702	.000
INCAR_RATE	Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed	2.980	.089
PER_DIEM	Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed	5.169	.026
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed	34.660	.000
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed	42.280	.000
NEW_CELLS	Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed	16.032	.000
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed	16.032	.000
NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed	16.032	.000
CASES	Equal variances assumed Equal variances not assumed	15.404	.000

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means				
		t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference
POPULATION	Equal variances assumed	-5.233	65	.000	-488357.179	93325.328
	Equal variances not assumed	-4.466	28.193	.000	-488357.179	109350.358

POPULATION_TIER	Equal variances assumed	8.611	65	.000	2.716	.315
	Equal variances not assumed	8.039	42.853	.000	2.716	.338
TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Equal variances assumed	-3.579	65	.001	-115429.412	32249.556
	Equal variances not assumed	-3.070	28.816	.005	-115429.412	37595.786
AVG_DAYS_BOND	Equal variances assumed	.139	65	.890	1.12363	8.06639
	Equal variances not assumed	.150	63.962	.881	1.12363	7.49829
DET_COST_SAVINGS	Equal variances assumed	-3.727	65	.000	-10187995.483	2733634.179
	Equal variances not assumed	-3.188	28.477	.003	-10187995.483	3195548.786
OVERALL_ADP	Equal variances assumed	-5.893	65	.000	-1404.389	238.295
	Equal variances not assumed	-5.093	29.770	.000	-1404.389	275.735
FELONY_PT_ADP	Equal variances assumed	-5.326	65	.000	-779.93454	146.44923
	Equal variances not assumed	-4.544	28.167	.000	-779.93454	171.63330
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Equal variances assumed	-7.203	65	.000	-131.84048	18.30437
	Equal variances not assumed	-6.146	28.161	.000	-131.84048	21.45309
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Equal variances assumed	-5.729	65	.000	-911.77502	159.15499
	Equal variances not assumed	-4.888	28.173	.000	-911.77502	186.51482
INCAR_RATE	Equal variances assumed	2.164	65	.034	1.0348	.4782
	Equal variances not assumed	2.411	56.970	.019	1.0348	.4293
PER_DIEM	Equal variances assumed	-3.996	65	.000	-23.03382	5.76363

	Equal variances not assumed	-3.735	43.117	.001	-23.03382	6.16632
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Equal variances assumed	-4.759	65	.000	-50038371.018	10514128.649
	Equal variances not assumed	-4.040	27.544	.000	-50038371.018	12387260.920
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Equal variances assumed	-5.068	65	.000	-60226366.953	11883163.591
	Equal variances not assumed	-4.304	27.612	.000	-60226366.953	13992052.265
NEW_CELLS	Equal variances assumed	-3.579	65	.001	-316.24496	88.35495
	Equal variances not assumed	-3.070	28.816	.005	-316.24496	103.00215
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Equal variances assumed	-3.579	65	.001	-6324899.288	1767098.938
	Equal variances not assumed	-3.070	28.816	.005	-6324899.288	2060043.052
NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Equal variances assumed	-3.579	65	.001	-22137147.826	6184846.400
	Equal variances not assumed	-3.070	28.816	.005	-22137147.826	7210150.818
CASES	Equal variances assumed	-3.433	65	.001	-1213.292	353.427
	Equal variances not assumed	-2.935	28.401	.007	-1213.292	413.403

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means	
		95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		Lower	Upper
POPULATION	Equal variances assumed	-674740.728	-301973.629
	Equal variances not assumed	-712282.171	-264432.187
POPULATION_TIER	Equal variances assumed	2.086	3.346
	Equal variances not assumed	2.035	3.398

TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Equal variances assumed	-179836.222	-51022.602
	Equal variances not assumed	-192342.789	-38516.035
AVG_DAYS_BOND	Equal variances assumed	-14.98607	17.23333
	Equal variances not assumed	-13.85610	16.10335
DET_COST_SAVINGS	Equal variances assumed	-15647439.930	-4728551.037
	Equal variances not assumed	-16728842.820	-3647148.147
OVERALL_ADP	Equal variances assumed	-1880.297	-928.481
	Equal variances not assumed	-1967.697	-841.082
FELONY_PT_ADP	Equal variances assumed	-1072.41386	-487.45523
	Equal variances not assumed	-1131.41555	-428.45354
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Equal variances assumed	-168.39682	-95.28413
	Equal variances not assumed	-175.77380	-87.90715
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Equal variances assumed	-1229.62949	-593.92055
	Equal variances not assumed	-1293.72769	-529.82235
INCAR_RATE	Equal variances assumed	.0797	1.9899
	Equal variances not assumed	.1752	1.8944
PER_DIEM	Equal variances assumed	-34.54458	-11.52306
	Equal variances not assumed	-35.46841	-10.59922
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Equal variances assumed	-71036535.916	-29040206.119
	Equal variances not assumed	-75431456.417	-24645285.618
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Equal variances assumed	-83958683.433	-36494050.474
	Equal variances not assumed	-88905948.300	-31546785.606
NEW_CELLS	Equal variances assumed	-492.70198	-139.78795
	Equal variances not assumed	-526.96654	-105.52338
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMI	Equal variances assumed	-9854039.565	-2795759.011

T	Equal variances not assumed	-10539330.891	-2110467.686
NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Equal variances assumed	-34489139.029	-9785156.624
	Equal variances not assumed	-36887658.711	-7386636.941
CASES	Equal variances assumed	-1919.134	-507.451
	Equal variances not assumed	-2059.571	-367.013

Table X

Table of Correlations
67 Florida Counties, 2010

Correlations

		PRETRIAL	POPULATION	POP_TIER	TOTAL_BOND_DAYS	AVG_DAYS_BOND	DETENTION_COST_SAVINGS
PRETRIAL	Pearson Correlation	1	.544**	-.730**	.406**	-.017	.420**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.001	.890	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
POPULATION	Pearson Correlation	.544**	1	-.784**	.531**	-.052	.619**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000	.678	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
POP_TIER	Pearson Correlation	-.730**	-.784**	1	-.581**	.121	-.589**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000	.330	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL_BOND_DAYS	Pearson Correlation	.406**	.531**	-.581**	1	-.114	.966**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.000		.360	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
AVG_DAYS_BOND	Pearson Correlation	-.017	-.052	.121	-.114	1	-.061
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.890	.678	.330	.360		.621

	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
DETENTION_COST_SAVINGS	Pearson Correlation	.420**	.619**	-.589**	.966**	-.061	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.621	
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
FELONY_PT_ADP	Pearson Correlation	.551**	.975**	-.778**	.493**	-.049	.570**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.695	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Pearson Correlation	.666**	.782**	-.811**	.639**	-.018	.740**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.884	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
OVERALL_ADP	Pearson Correlation	.590**	.964**	-.831**	.533**	-.079	.587**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.526	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Pearson Correlation	.579**	.975**	-.801**	.523**	-.046	.606**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.711	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
INCARCERATION_RATE	Pearson Correlation	-.259*	-.309*	.388**	-.213	.061	-.251*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.034	.011	.001	.083	.625	.041
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
PER_DIEM	Pearson Correlation	.444**	.632**	-.537**	.310*	.002	.448**

	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.011	.990	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Pearson Correlation	.508**	.976**	-.707**	.422**	-.021	.529**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.865	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL_DET_COST_SAVADD	Pearson Correlation	.532**	.982**	-.742**	.574**	-.032	.674**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.800	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
DET_COST_PERCENT_INCR	Pearson Correlation	-.113	-.080	.077	.280*	.054	.273*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.362	.518	.538	.022	.661	.026
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
NEW_CELLS	Pearson Correlation	.406**	.531**	-.581**	1.000**	-.114	.966**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.000	.000	.360	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
LOWER_LIMIT_COST	Pearson Correlation	.406**	.531**	-.581**	1.000**	-.114	.966**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.000	.000	.360	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
UPPER_LIMIT_COST	Pearson Correlation	.406**	.531**	-.581**	1.000**	-.114	.966**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.000	.000	.360	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67

Correlations

		FELONY_PT_ADP	MISDEM_PT_ADP	OVERALL_ADP	TOTAL_PT_ADP	INCARCERATION_RATE	PER_DIEM
PRETRIAL	Pearson Correlation	.551**	.666**	.590**	.579**	-.259*	.444**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.034	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
POPULATION	Pearson Correlation	.975**	.782**	.964**	.975**	-.309*	.632**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.011	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
POP_TIER	Pearson Correlation	-.778**	-.811**	-.831**	-.801**	.388**	-.537**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL_BOND_DAYS	Pearson Correlation	.493**	.639**	.533**	.523**	-.213	.310*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.083	.011
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
AVG_DAYS_BOND	Pearson Correlation	-.049	-.018	-.079	-.046	.061	.002
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.695	.884	.526	.711	.625	.990
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
DETENTION_COST_SAVINGS	Pearson Correlation	.570**	.740**	.587**	.606**	-.251*	.448**

	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.041	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
FELONY_PT_ADP	Pearson Correlation	1	.779**	.979**	.997**	-.261*	.616**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.033	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Pearson Correlation	.779**	1	.788**	.826**	-.304*	.592**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000	.013	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
OVERALL_ADP	Pearson Correlation	.979**	.788**	1	.979**	-.237	.586**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000	.053	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Pearson Correlation	.997**	.826**	.979**	1	-.273*	.628**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.026	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
INCARCERATION_RATE	Pearson Correlation	-.261*	-.304*	-.237	-.273*	1	-.216
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.033	.013	.053	.026		.079
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
PER_DIEM	Pearson Correlation	.616**	.592**	.586**	.628**	-.216	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.079	
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67

TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Pearson Correlation	.969**	.727**	.948**	.963**	-.243*	.680**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.048	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL_DET_COST_SAVADD	Pearson Correlation	.965**	.791**	.951**	.967**	-.265*	.688**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.030	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
DET_COST_PERCENT_INCR	Pearson Correlation	-.103	-.049	-.117	-.099	-.134	.160
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.408	.695	.346	.428	.278	.197
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
NEW_CELLS	Pearson Correlation	.493**	.639**	.533**	.523**	-.213	.310*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.083	.011
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
LOWER_LIMIT_COST	Pearson Correlation	.493**	.639**	.533**	.523**	-.213	.310*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.083	.011
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
UPPER_LIMIT_COST	Pearson Correlation	.493**	.639**	.533**	.523**	-.213	.310*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.083	.011
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67

Correlations

		TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	TOTAL_DET_COST_SAVADD	DET_COST_PERCENT_INCR	NEW_CELLS	LOWER_LIMIT_COST	UPPER_LIMIT_COST
PRETRIAL	Pearson Correlation	.508**	.532**	-.113	.406**	.406**	.406**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.362	.001	.001	.001
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
POPULATION	Pearson Correlation	.976**	.982**	-.080	.531**	.531**	.531**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.518	.000	.000	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
POP_TIER	Pearson Correlation	-.707**	-.742**	.077	-.581**	-.581**	-.581**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.538	.000	.000	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL_BOND_DAYS	Pearson Correlation	.422**	.574**	.280*	1.000**	1.000**	1.000**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.022	.000	.000	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
AVG_DAYS_BOND	Pearson Correlation	-.021	-.032	.054	-.114	-.114	-.114
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.865	.800	.661	.360	.360	.360
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67

DETENTION_COST_SAVINGS	Pearson Correlation	.529**	.674**	.273*	.966**	.966**	.966**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.026	.000	.000	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
FELONY_PT_ADP	Pearson Correlation	.969**	.965**	-.103	.493**	.493**	.493**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.408	.000	.000	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Pearson Correlation	.727**	.791**	-.049	.639**	.639**	.639**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.695	.000	.000	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
OVERALL_ADP	Pearson Correlation	.948**	.951**	-.117	.533**	.533**	.533**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.346	.000	.000	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Pearson Correlation	.963**	.967**	-.099	.523**	.523**	.523**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.428	.000	.000	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
INCARCERATION_RATE	Pearson Correlation	-.243*	-.265*	-.134	-.213	-.213	-.213
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.048	.030	.278	.083	.083	.083
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
PER_DIEM	Pearson Correlation	.680**	.688**	.160	.310*	.310*	.310*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.197	.011	.011	.011

	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Pearson Correlation	1	.983**	-.106	.422**	.422**	.422**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.393	.000	.000	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
TOTAL_DET_COST_SAVADD	Pearson Correlation	.983**	1	-.034	.574**	.574**	.574**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.787	.000	.000	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
DET_COST_PERCENT_INCR	Pearson Correlation	-.106	-.034	1	.280*	.280*	.280*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.393	.787		.022	.022	.022
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
NEW_CELLS	Pearson Correlation	.422**	.574**	.280*	1	1.000**	1.000**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.022		.000	.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
LOWER_LIMIT_COST	Pearson Correlation	.422**	.574**	.280*	1.000**	1	1.000**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.022	.000		.000
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67
UPPER_LIMIT_COST	Pearson Correlation	.422**	.574**	.280*	1.000**	1.000**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.022	.000	.000	
	N	67	67	67	67	67	67

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table XI

Table of Partial Correlations Controlling for County Population Size
67 Florida Counties, 2010

Correlations

Control Variables			PRETRIAL_COUNTY	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	AVG_DAYS_BOND	DET_COST_SAVINGS
POPULATION	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Correlation	1.000	.164	.013	.125
		Significance (2-tailed)	.	.188	.917	.316
		df	0	64	64	64
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.164	1.000	-.102	.957
		Significance (2-tailed)	.188	.	.417	.000
		df	64	0	64	64
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.013	-.102	1.000	-.038
		Significance (2-tailed)	.917	.417	.	.765
		df	64	64	0	64
	DET_COST_SAVINGS	Correlation	.125	.957	-.038	1.000
		Significance (2-tailed)	.316	.000	.765	.
		df	64	64	64	0
	OVERALL_ADP	Correlation	.292	.096	-.108	-.046
		Significance (2-tailed)	.017	.445	.387	.711

	df	64	64	64	64
FELONY_PT_ADP	Correlation	.109	-.135	.008	-.192
	Significance (2-tailed)	.384	.280	.952	.122
	df	64	64	64	64
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Correlation	.460	.423	.036	.522
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.776	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Correlation	.260	.029	.019	.013
	Significance (2-tailed)	.035	.817	.877	.920
	df	64	64	64	64
INCAR_RATE	Correlation	-.114	-.061	.047	-.080
	Significance (2-tailed)	.361	.625	.707	.522
	df	64	64	64	64
PER_DIEM	Correlation	.154	-.040	.044	.093
	Significance (2-tailed)	.218	.753	.724	.456
	df	64	64	64	64
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Correlation	-.128	-.525	.136	-.445
	Significance (2-tailed)	.306	.000	.277	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
DET_COST_SAVING	Correlation	-.015	.331	.102	.449

	_ADDIN	Significance (2-tailed)	.902	.007	.415	.000
		df	64	64	64	64
	NEW_CELLS	Correlation	.164	1.000	-.102	.957
		Significance (2-tailed)	.188	.000	.417	.000
		df	64	64	64	64
	NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Correlation	.164	1.000	-.102	.957
		Significance (2-tailed)	.188	.000	.417	.000
		df	64	64	64	64
	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Correlation	.164	1.000	-.102	.957
		Significance (2-tailed)	.188	.000	.417	.000
		df	64	64	64	64
	CASES	Correlation	.173	.982	-.148	.895
		Significance (2-tailed)	.166	.000	.236	.000
		df	64	64	64	64

Correlations

Control Variables			OVERALL_ADP	FELONY_PT_ADP	MISDEM_PT_ADP	TOTAL_PT_ADP
POPULATION	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Correlation	.292	.109	.460	.260
		Significance (2-tailed)	.017	.384	.000	.035
		df	64	64	64	64

	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.096	-.135	.423	.029
		Significance (2-tailed)	.445	.280	.000	.817
		df	64	64	64	64
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	-.108	.008	.036	.019
		Significance (2-tailed)	.387	.952	.776	.877
		df	64	64	64	64
	DET_COST_SAVINGS	Correlation	-.046	-.192	.522	.013
		Significance (2-tailed)	.711	.122	.000	.920
		df	64	64	64	64
	OVERALL_ADP	Correlation	1.000	.663	.206	.666
		Significance (2-tailed)	.	.000	.097	.000
		df	0	64	64	64
	FELONY_PT_ADP	Correlation	.663	1.000	.118	.936
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.	.347	.000
		df	64	0	64	64
	MISDEM_PT_ADP	Correlation	.206	.118	1.000	.459
		Significance (2-tailed)	.097	.347	.	.000
		df	64	64	0	64
	TOTAL_PT_ADP	Correlation	.666	.936	.459	1.000

	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.
	df	64	64	64	0
INCAR_RATE	Correlation	.236	.191	-.105	.134
	Significance (2-tailed)	.057	.124	.402	.284
	df	64	64	64	64
PER_DIEM	Correlation	-.113	-.003	.201	.068
	Significance (2-tailed)	.366	.979	.105	.586
	df	64	64	64	64
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Correlation	.127	.355	-.271	.221
	Significance (2-tailed)	.308	.003	.028	.074
	df	64	64	64	64
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Correlation	.086	.182	.196	.232
	Significance (2-tailed)	.494	.144	.114	.061
	df	64	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS	Correlation	.096	-.135	.423	.029
	Significance (2-tailed)	.445	.280	.000	.817
	df	64	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Correlation	.096	-.135	.423	.029
	Significance (2-tailed)	.445	.280	.000	.817

		df	64	64	64	64
	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Correlation	.096	-.135	.423	.029
		Significance (2-tailed)	.445	.280	.000	.817
		df	64	64	64	64
	CASES	Correlation	.142	-.120	.346	.015
		Significance (2-tailed)	.256	.337	.004	.903
		df	64	64	64	64

Correlations

Control Variables			INCAR_RATE	PER_DIEM	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN
POPULATION	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Correlation	-.114	.154	-.128	-.015
		Significance (2-tailed)	.361	.218	.306	.902
		df	64	64	64	64
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	-.061	-.040	-.525	.331
		Significance (2-tailed)	.625	.753	.000	.007
		df	64	64	64	64
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.047	.044	.136	.102
		Significance (2-tailed)	.707	.724	.277	.415
		df	64	64	64	64
	DET_COST_SAVING	Correlation	-.080	.093	-.445	.449

S	Significance (2-tailed)	.522	.456	.000	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
OVERALL_ADP	Correlation	.236	-.113	.127	.086
	Significance (2-tailed)	.057	.366	.308	.494
	df	64	64	64	64
FELONY_PT_ADP	Correlation	.191	-.003	.355	.182
	Significance (2-tailed)	.124	.979	.003	.144
	df	64	64	64	64
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Correlation	-.105	.201	-.271	.196
	Significance (2-tailed)	.402	.105	.028	.114
	df	64	64	64	64
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Correlation	.134	.068	.221	.232
	Significance (2-tailed)	.284	.586	.074	.061
	df	64	64	64	64
INCAR_RATE	Correlation	1.000	-.028	.284	.211
	Significance (2-tailed)	.	.823	.021	.088
	df	0	64	64	64
PER_DIEM	Correlation	-.028	1.000	.375	.457
	Significance (2-tailed)	.823	.	.002	.000

	df	64	0	64	64
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Correlation	.284	.375	1.000	.600
	Significance (2-tailed)	.021	.002	.	.000
	df	64	64	0	64
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Correlation	.211	.457	.600	1.000
	Significance (2-tailed)	.088	.000	.000	.
	df	64	64	64	0
NEW_CELLS	Correlation	-.061	-.040	-.525	.331
	Significance (2-tailed)	.625	.753	.000	.007
	df	64	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Correlation	-.061	-.040	-.525	.331
	Significance (2-tailed)	.625	.753	.000	.007
	df	64	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Correlation	-.061	-.040	-.525	.331
	Significance (2-tailed)	.625	.753	.000	.007
	df	64	64	64	64
CASES	Correlation	-.049	-.095	-.540	.261
	Significance (2-tailed)	.697	.447	.000	.035
	df	64	64	64	64

Correlations

Control Variables			NEW_CELLS	NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	CASES
POPULATION	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Correlation	.164	.164	.164	.173
		Significance (2-tailed)	.188	.188	.188	.166
		df	64	64	64	64
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	1.000	1.000	1.000	.982
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		df	64	64	64	64
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	-.102	-.102	-.102	-.148
		Significance (2-tailed)	.417	.417	.417	.236
		df	64	64	64	64
	DET_COST_SAVINGS	Correlation	.957	.957	.957	.895
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		df	64	64	64	64
	OVERALL_ADP	Correlation	.096	.096	.096	.142
		Significance (2-tailed)	.445	.445	.445	.256
		df	64	64	64	64
	FELONY_PT_ADP	Correlation	-.135	-.135	-.135	-.120

	Significance (2-tailed)	.280	.280	.280	.337
	df	64	64	64	64
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Correlation	.423	.423	.423	.346
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.004
	df	64	64	64	64
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Correlation	.029	.029	.029	.015
	Significance (2-tailed)	.817	.817	.817	.903
	df	64	64	64	64
INCAR_RATE	Correlation	-.061	-.061	-.061	-.049
	Significance (2-tailed)	.625	.625	.625	.697
	df	64	64	64	64
PER_DIEM	Correlation	-.040	-.040	-.040	-.095
	Significance (2-tailed)	.753	.753	.753	.447
	df	64	64	64	64
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Correlation	-.525	-.525	-.525	-.540
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Correlation	.331	.331	.331	.261
	Significance (2-tailed)	.007	.007	.007	.035

	df	64	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS	Correlation	1.000	1.000	1.000	.982
	Significance (2-tailed)	.	.000	.000	.000
	df	0	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Correlation	1.000	1.000	1.000	.982
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.	.000	.000
	df	64	0	64	64
NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Correlation	1.000	1.000	1.000	.982
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.	.000
	df	64	64	0	64
CASES	Correlation	.982	.982	.982	1.000
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.
	df	64	64	64	0

Table XII

Table of Partial Correlations Controlling for Number of Cases
67 Florida Counties, 2010

Correlations

Control Variables			PRETRIAL_COUNTY	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	AVG_DAYS_BOND	DET_COST_SAVINGS
CASES	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Correlation	1.000	.125	.047	.165
		Significance (2-tailed)	.	.315	.705	.187
		df	0	64	64	64
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.125	1.000	.227	.923
		Significance (2-tailed)	.315	.	.067	.000
		df	64	0	64	64
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.047	.227	1.000	.201
		Significance (2-tailed)	.705	.067	.	.106
		df	64	64	0	64
	DET_COST_SAVINGS	Correlation	.165	.923	.201	1.000
		Significance (2-tailed)	.187	.000	.106	.

	df	64	64	64	0
OVERALL_ADP	Correlation	.494	.255	-.001	.363
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.039	.991	.003
	df	64	64	64	64
FELONY_PT_ADP	Correlation	.456	.307	.024	.436
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.012	.849	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Correlation	.586	.549	.086	.659
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.493	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Correlation	.485	.344	.032	.475
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.005	.800	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
INCAR_RATE	Correlation	-.204	-.148	.032	-.193
	Significance (2-tailed)	.100	.234	.797	.121
	df	64	64	64	64
PER_DIEM	Correlation	.391	.418	.041	.577
	Significance (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.745	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
TOTAL_AVG_DET_CO	Correlation	.424	.337	.040	.500

ST	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.006	.751	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Correlation	.418	.412	.058	.574
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.001	.644	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS	Correlation	.125	1.000	.227	.923
	Significance (2-tailed)	.315	.000	.067	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Correlation	.125	1.000	.227	.923
	Significance (2-tailed)	.315	.000	.067	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Correlation	.125	1.000	.227	.923
	Significance (2-tailed)	.315	.000	.067	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
POPULATION	Correlation	.440	.338	.027	.492
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.006	.828	.000
	df	64	64	64	64

Correlations

Control Variables			OVERALL_ADP	FELONY_PT_ADP	MISDEM_PT_ADP	TOTAL_PT_ADP
CASES	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Correlation	.494	.456	.586	.485
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
		df	64	64	64	64
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.255	.307	.549	.344
		Significance (2-tailed)	.039	.012	.000	.005
		df	64	64	64	64
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	-.001	.024	.086	.032
		Significance (2-tailed)	.991	.849	.493	.800
		df	64	64	64	64
	DET_COST_SAVINGS	Correlation	.363	.436	.659	.475
		Significance (2-tailed)	.003	.000	.000	.000
		df	64	64	64	64
	OVERALL_ADP	Correlation	1.000	.975	.706	.973
		Significance (2-tailed)	.	.000	.000	.000
		df	0	64	64	64
	FELONY_PT_ADP	Correlation	.975	1.000	.711	.997

	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.	.000	.000
	df	64	0	64	64
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Correlation	.706	.711	1.000	.767
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.	.000
	df	64	64	0	64
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Correlation	.973	.997	.767	1.000
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.
	df	64	64	64	0
INCAR_RATE	Correlation	-.166	-.199	-.241	-.210
	Significance (2-tailed)	.182	.108	.051	.090
	df	64	64	64	64
PER_DIEM	Correlation	.553	.585	.568	.601
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Correlation	.948	.967	.674	.962
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Correlation	.933	.959	.704	.958
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000

	df	64	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS	Correlation	.255	.307	.549	.344
	Significance (2-tailed)	.039	.012	.000	.005
	df	64	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Correlation	.255	.307	.549	.344
	Significance (2-tailed)	.039	.012	.000	.005
	df	64	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Correlation	.255	.307	.549	.344
	Significance (2-tailed)	.039	.012	.000	.005
	df	64	64	64	64
POPULATION	Correlation	.952	.969	.703	.968
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	df	64	64	64	64

Correlations

Control Variables			INCAR_RATE	PER_DIEM	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN
CASES	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Correlation	-.204	.391	.424	.418
		Significance (2-tailed)	.100	.001	.000	.000
		df	64	64	64	64

TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	-.148	.418	.337	.412
	Significance (2-tailed)	.234	.000	.006	.001
	df	64	64	64	64
AVG_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.032	.041	.040	.058
	Significance (2-tailed)	.797	.745	.751	.644
	df	64	64	64	64
DET_COST_SAVINGS	Correlation	-.193	.577	.500	.574
	Significance (2-tailed)	.121	.000	.000	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
OVERALL_ADP	Correlation	-.166	.553	.948	.933
	Significance (2-tailed)	.182	.000	.000	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
FELONY_PT_ADP	Correlation	-.199	.585	.967	.959
	Significance (2-tailed)	.108	.000	.000	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Correlation	-.241	.568	.674	.704
	Significance (2-tailed)	.051	.000	.000	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Correlation	-.210	.601	.962	.958

	Significance (2-tailed)	.090	.000	.000	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
INCAR_RATE	Correlation	1.000	-.178	-.188	-.198
	Significance (2-tailed)	.	.153	.130	.112
	df	0	64	64	64
PER_DIEM	Correlation	-.178	1.000	.655	.678
	Significance (2-tailed)	.153	.	.000	.000
	df	64	0	64	64
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Correlation	-.188	.655	1.000	.996
	Significance (2-tailed)	.130	.000	.	.000
	df	64	64	0	64
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Correlation	-.198	.678	.996	1.000
	Significance (2-tailed)	.112	.000	.000	.
	df	64	64	64	0
NEW_CELLS	Correlation	-.148	.418	.337	.412
	Significance (2-tailed)	.234	.000	.006	.001
	df	64	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Correlation	-.148	.418	.337	.412
	Significance (2-tailed)	.234	.000	.006	.001

		df	64	64	64	64
	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Correlation	-.148	.418	.337	.412
		Significance (2-tailed)	.234	.000	.006	.001
		df	64	64	64	64
	POPULATION	Correlation	-.251	.606	.981	.977
		Significance (2-tailed)	.042	.000	.000	.000
		df	64	64	64	64

Correlations

Control Variables			NEW_CELLS	NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	POPULATION
CASES	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Correlation	.125	.125	.125	.440
		Significance (2-tailed)	.315	.315	.315	.000
		df	64	64	64	64
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	1.000	1.000	1.000	.338
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.006
		df	64	64	64	64
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.227	.227	.227	.027
		Significance (2-tailed)	.067	.067	.067	.828
		df	64	64	64	64
	DET_COST_SAVINGS	Correlation	.923	.923	.923	.492

	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
OVERALL_ADP	Correlation	.255	.255	.255	.952
	Significance (2-tailed)	.039	.039	.039	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
FELONY_PT_ADP	Correlation	.307	.307	.307	.969
	Significance (2-tailed)	.012	.012	.012	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Correlation	.549	.549	.549	.703
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Correlation	.344	.344	.344	.968
	Significance (2-tailed)	.005	.005	.005	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
INCAR_RATE	Correlation	-.148	-.148	-.148	-.251
	Significance (2-tailed)	.234	.234	.234	.042
	df	64	64	64	64
PER_DIEM	Correlation	.418	.418	.418	.606
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000

	df	64	64	64	64
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Correlation	.337	.337	.337	.981
	Significance (2-tailed)	.006	.006	.006	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Correlation	.412	.412	.412	.977
	Significance (2-tailed)	.001	.001	.001	.000
	df	64	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS	Correlation	1.000	1.000	1.000	.338
	Significance (2-tailed)	.	.000	.000	.006
	df	0	64	64	64
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Correlation	1.000	1.000	1.000	.338
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.	.000	.006
	df	64	0	64	64
NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Correlation	1.000	1.000	1.000	.338
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.	.006
	df	64	64	0	64
POPULATION	Correlation	.338	.338	.338	1.000
	Significance (2-tailed)	.006	.006	.006	.
	df	64	64	64	0

Table XIII

Table of Partial Correlations Controlling for County Population Size and Number of Cases
67 Florida Counties, 2010

Correlations

Control Variables			PRETRIAL_COUNTY	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	AVG_DAYS_BOND
CASES & POPULATION	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Correlation	1.000	-.027	.040
		Significance (2-tailed)	.	.828	.754
		df	0	63	63
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	-.027	1.000	.232
		Significance (2-tailed)	.828	.	.064
		df	63	0	63
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.040	.232	1.000
		Significance (2-tailed)	.754	.064	.
		df	63	63	0
	DET_COST_SAVINGS	Correlation	-.066	.924	.215
		Significance (2-tailed)	.601	.000	.085
		df	63	63	63
	OVERALL_ADP	Correlation	.274	-.232	-.089
		Significance (2-tailed)	.027	.063	.480

	df	63	63	63
FELONY_PT_ADP	Correlation	.132	-.091	-.010
	Significance (2-tailed)	.293	.471	.935
	df	63	63	63
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Correlation	.433	.465	.094
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.457
	df	63	63	63
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Correlation	.261	.073	.022
	Significance (2-tailed)	.035	.561	.862
	df	63	63	63
INCAR_RATE	Correlation	-.108	-.070	.040
	Significance (2-tailed)	.393	.582	.749
	df	63	63	63
PER_DIEM	Correlation	.173	.285	.031
	Significance (2-tailed)	.167	.022	.809
	df	63	63	63
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Correlation	-.042	.032	.067
	Significance (2-tailed)	.741	.803	.595
	df	63	63	63
DET_COST_SAVING_	Correlation	-.064	.409	.147

	ADDIN	Significance (2-tailed)	.615	.001	.242
		df	63	63	63
	NEW_CELLS	Correlation	-.027	1.000	.232
		Significance (2-tailed)	.828	.000	.064
		df	63	63	63
	NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Correlation	-.027	1.000	.232
		Significance (2-tailed)	.828	.000	.064
		df	63	63	63
	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Correlation	-.027	1.000	.232
		Significance (2-tailed)	.828	.000	.064
		df	63	63	63

Correlations

Control Variables			DET_COST_SAVINGS	OVERALL_ADP	FELONY_PT_ADP
CASES & POPULATION	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Correlation	-.066	.274	.132
		Significance (2-tailed)	.601	.027	.293
		df	63	63	63
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.924	-.232	-.091
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.063	.471
		df	63	63	63

	AVG_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.215	-.089	-.010
		Significance (2-tailed)	.085	.480	.935
		df	63	63	63
	DET_COST_SAVINGS	Correlation	1.000	-.393	-.192
		Significance (2-tailed)	.	.001	.126
		df	0	63	63
	OVERALL_ADP	Correlation	-.393	1.000	.692
		Significance (2-tailed)	.001	.	.000
		df	63	0	63
	FELONY_PT_ADP	Correlation	-.192	.692	1.000
		Significance (2-tailed)	.126	.000	.
		df	63	63	0
	MISDEM_PT_ADP	Correlation	.506	.169	.171
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.179	.173
		df	63	63	63
	TOTAL_PT_ADP	Correlation	-.002	.671	.945
		Significance (2-tailed)	.986	.000	.000
		df	63	63	63
	INCAR_RATE	Correlation	-.082	.246	.187

	Significance (2-tailed)	.517	.049	.136
	df	63	63	63
PER_DIEM	Correlation	.402	-.101	-.015
	Significance (2-tailed)	.001	.424	.906
	df	63	63	63
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Correlation	.102	.245	.347
	Significance (2-tailed)	.418	.049	.005
	df	63	63	63
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Correlation	.502	.051	.222
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.687	.075
	df	63	63	63
NEW_CELLS	Correlation	.924	-.232	-.091
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.063	.471
	df	63	63	63
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Correlation	.924	-.232	-.091
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.063	.471
	df	63	63	63
NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Correlation	.924	-.232	-.091
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.063	.471

		df	63	63	63

Correlations

Control Variables			MISDEM_PT_ADP	TOTAL_PT_ADP	INCAR_RATE
CASES & POPULATION	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Correlation	.433	.261	-.108
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.035	.393
		df	63	63	63
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.465	.073	-.070
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.561	.582
		df	63	63	63
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.094	.022	.040
		Significance (2-tailed)	.457	.862	.749
		df	63	63	63
	DET_COST_SAVINGS	Correlation	.506	-.002	-.082
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.986	.517
		df	63	63	63
	OVERALL_ADP	Correlation	.169	.671	.246
		Significance (2-tailed)	.179	.000	.049
		df	63	63	63
	FELONY_PT_ADP	Correlation	.171	.945	.187

	Significance (2-tailed)	.173	.000	.136
	df	63	63	63
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Correlation	1.000	.484	-.094
	Significance (2-tailed)	.	.000	.457
	df	0	63	63
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Correlation	.484	1.000	.135
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.	.285
	df	63	0	63
INCAR_RATE	Correlation	-.094	.135	1.000
	Significance (2-tailed)	.457	.285	.
	df	63	63	0
PER_DIEM	Correlation	.251	.070	-.033
	Significance (2-tailed)	.044	.579	.794
	df	63	63	63
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Correlation	-.106	.273	.306
	Significance (2-tailed)	.401	.028	.013
	df	63	63	63
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Correlation	.117	.236	.233
	Significance (2-tailed)	.354	.058	.062

		df	63	63	63
	NEW_CELLS	Correlation	.465	.073	-.070
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.561	.582
		df	63	63	63
	NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Correlation	.465	.073	-.070
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.561	.582
		df	63	63	63
	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Correlation	.465	.073	-.070
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.561	.582
		df	63	63	63

Correlations

Control Variables			PER_DIEM	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN
CASES & POPULATION	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Correlation	.173	-.042	-.064
		Significance (2-tailed)	.167	.741	.615
		df	63	63	63
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.285	.032	.409
		Significance (2-tailed)	.022	.803	.001
		df	63	63	63
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.031	.067	.147

	Significance (2-tailed)	.809	.595	.242
	df	63	63	63
DET_COST_SAVINGS	Correlation	.402	.102	.502
	Significance (2-tailed)	.001	.418	.000
	df	63	63	63
OVERALL_ADP	Correlation	-.101	.245	.051
	Significance (2-tailed)	.424	.049	.687
	df	63	63	63
FELONY_PT_ADP	Correlation	-.015	.347	.222
	Significance (2-tailed)	.906	.005	.075
	df	63	63	63
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Correlation	.251	-.106	.117
	Significance (2-tailed)	.044	.401	.354
	df	63	63	63
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Correlation	.070	.273	.236
	Significance (2-tailed)	.579	.028	.058
	df	63	63	63
INCAR_RATE	Correlation	-.033	.306	.233
	Significance (2-tailed)	.794	.013	.062

	df	63	63	63
PER_DIEM	Correlation	1.000	.386	.501
	Significance (2-tailed)	.	.002	.000
	df	0	63	63
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Correlation	.386	1.000	.912
	Significance (2-tailed)	.002	.	.000
	df	63	0	63
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Correlation	.501	.912	1.000
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.
	df	63	63	0
NEW_CELLS	Correlation	.285	.032	.409
	Significance (2-tailed)	.022	.803	.001
	df	63	63	63
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Correlation	.285	.032	.409
	Significance (2-tailed)	.022	.803	.001
	df	63	63	63
NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Correlation	.285	.032	.409
	Significance (2-tailed)	.022	.803	.001
	df	63	63	63

Correlations

Control Variables			NEW_CELLS	NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT
CASES & POPULATION	PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Correlation	-.027	-.027	-.027
		Significance (2-tailed)	.828	.828	.828
		df	63	63	63
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	1.000	1.000	1.000
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		df	63	63	63
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	Correlation	.232	.232	.232
		Significance (2-tailed)	.064	.064	.064
		df	63	63	63
	DET_COST_SAVINGS	Correlation	.924	.924	.924
		Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
		df	63	63	63
	OVERALL_ADP	Correlation	-.232	-.232	-.232
		Significance (2-tailed)	.063	.063	.063
		df	63	63	63
	FELONY_PT_ADP	Correlation	-.091	-.091	-.091

	Significance (2-tailed)	.471	.471	.471
	df	63	63	63
MISDEM_PT_ADP	Correlation	.465	.465	.465
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000
	df	63	63	63
TOTAL_PT_ADP	Correlation	.073	.073	.073
	Significance (2-tailed)	.561	.561	.561
	df	63	63	63
INCAR_RATE	Correlation	-.070	-.070	-.070
	Significance (2-tailed)	.582	.582	.582
	df	63	63	63
PER_DIEM	Correlation	.285	.285	.285
	Significance (2-tailed)	.022	.022	.022
	df	63	63	63
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	Correlation	.032	.032	.032
	Significance (2-tailed)	.803	.803	.803
	df	63	63	63
DET_COST_SAVING_ADDIN	Correlation	.409	.409	.409
	Significance (2-tailed)	.001	.001	.001

	df	63	63	63
NEW_CELLS	Correlation	1.000	1.000	1.000
	Significance (2-tailed)	.	.000	.000
	df	0	63	63
NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	Correlation	1.000	1.000	1.000
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.	.000
	df	63	0	63
NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	Correlation	1.000	1.000	1.000
	Significance (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.
	df	63	63	0

TABLE XIV-A

Multiple Regression Analysis
"All-In"/Block Method of Variable Entry – Single Step
67 Counties, Florida, 2010
Dependent Variable = Pretrial County

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.754[a]	.569	.483	.357	.569	6.595	11	55	.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), PERCENT_INCREASE, AVG_DAYS_BOND, POPULATION, INCAR_RATE, CASES, PER_DIEM, POPULATION_TIER, DET_COST_SAVINGS, TOTAL_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST

ANOVA[b]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	9.270	11	.843	6.595	.000[a]
	Residual	7.029	55	.128		
	Total	16.299	66			

a. Predictors: (Constant), PERCENT_INCREASE, AVG_DAYS_BOND, POPULATION, INCAR_RATE, CASES, PER_DIEM, POPULATION_TIER, DET_COST_SAVINGS, TOTAL_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST

b. Dependent Variable: PRETRIAL_COUNTY

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients	
		B	Std. Error
1	(Constant)	1.257	.499
	CASES	5.981E-5	.000
	POPULATION	-9.511E-7	.000
	POPULATION_TIER	-.225	.065
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	.001	.001
	DET_COST_SAVINGS	-3.447E-9	.000
	OVERALL_ADP	.000	.000
	TOTAL_PT_ADP	.000	.000
	INCAR_RATE	-.002	.027
	PER_DIEM	.002	.003
	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	5.672E-9	.000
	PERCENT_INCREASE	-.001	.001

Coefficients[a]

Model		Standardized Coefficients			95.0% Confidence Interval for B		Collinearity Statistics	
		Beta	t	Sig.	Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)		2.517	.015	.256	2.257		
	CASES	.185	.599	.551	.000	.000	.082	12.180
	POPULATION	-.853	-1.244	.219	.000	.000	.017	59.986
	POPULATION_TIER	-.839	-3.459	.001	-.356	-.095	.133	7.502
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	.073	.782	.437	-.002	.004	.909	1.100
	DET_COST_SAVINGS	-.084	-.257	.798	.000	.000	.074	13.554
	OVERALL_ADP	-.387	-.596	.553	-.001	.000	.019	53.713
	TOTAL_PT_ADP	.482	.820	.416	.000	.001	.023	44.172
	INCAR_RATE	-.007	-.063	.950	-.056	.053	.671	1.491
	PER_DIEM	.083	.500	.619	-.005	.008	.283	3.537
	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	.558	.760	.450	.000	.000	.015	68.820
	PERCENT_INCREASE	-.099	-.929	.357	-.003	.001	.697	1.435

a. Dependent Variable: PRETRIAL_COUNTY

Collinearity Diagnostics[a]

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Condition Index	Variance Proportions					
				(Constant)	CASES	POPULATION	POPULATION_TIER	AVG_DAYS_BOND	DET_COST_SAVINGS
1	1	7.558	1.000	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
	2	2.506	1.737	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
	3	1.087	2.637	.00	.02	.00	.00	.00	.01
	4	.461	4.047	.00	.03	.00	.00	.00	.01
	5	.132	7.561	.00	.01	.00	.00	.09	.02
	6	.082	9.580	.00	.07	.00	.00	.17	.12
	7	.063	10.914	.01	.07	.01	.05	.04	.13
	8	.059	11.316	.01	.05	.00	.13	.46	.04
	9	.025	17.369	.02	.40	.02	.00	.14	.30
	10	.013	23.918	.09	.11	.44	.13	.04	.03
	11	.009	29.115	.01	.25	.07	.00	.00	.33
	12	.003	47.471	.85	.00	.45	.69	.05	.01

Collinearity Diagnostics[a]

Model	Dimension	Variance Proportions					
		OVERALL_ADP	TOTAL_PT_ADP	INCAR_RATE	PER_DIEM	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	PERCENT_INCREASE
1	1	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
	2	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.01
	3	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.12
	4	.00	.00	.02	.00	.00	.60
	5	.00	.00	.54	.02	.00	.16
	6	.01	.00	.08	.15	.00	.04
	7	.01	.00	.01	.21	.02	.00
	8	.00	.00	.16	.00	.00	.00
	9	.03	.16	.01	.04	.10	.01
	10	.02	.14	.10	.04	.06	.01
	11	.56	.67	.07	.02	.05	.00
	12	.37	.04	.01	.50	.77	.03

a. Dependent Variable: PRETRIAL_COUNTY

Table XIV-B

Multiple Regression Analysis
Multiple Models/Multiple Steps
67 Florida Counties, 2010
Dependent Variable = Pretrial County

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics				
					R Square Change	F Change	df1	df2	Sig. F Change
1	.731[a]	.535	.520	.344	.535	36.800	2	64	.000
2	.735[b]	.541	.511	.348	.006	.386	2	62	.681
3	.754[c]	.568	.517	.345	.028	1.259	3	59	.297
4	.754[d]	.568	.509	.348	.000	.014	1	58	.905
5	.756[e]	.571	.504	.350	.003	.397	1	57	.531
6	.762[f]	.581	.497	.352	.010	.650	2	55	.526

a. Predictors: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION

b. Predictors: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND

c. Predictors: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND, MISDEM_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, FELONY_PT_ADP

d. Predictors: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND, MISDEM_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, FELONY_PT_ADP, INCAR_RATE

e. Predictors: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND, MISDEM_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, FELONY_PT_ADP, INCAR_RATE, PER_DIEM

f. Predictors: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND, MISDEM_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, FELONY_PT_ADP, INCAR_RATE, PER_DIEM, PERCENT_INCREASE, TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST

ANOVA[g]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	8.718	2	4.359	36.800	.000[a]
	Residual	7.581	64	.118		
	Total	16.299	66			
2	Regression	8.811	4	2.203	18.240	.000[b]
	Residual	7.488	62	.121		
	Total	16.299	66			
3	Regression	9.261	7	1.323	11.093	.000[c]
	Residual	7.037	59	.119		
	Total	16.299	66			
4	Regression	9.263	8	1.158	9.546	.000[d]
	Residual	7.035	58	.121		
	Total	16.299	66			
5	Regression	9.312	9	1.035	8.441	.000[e]
	Residual	6.987	57	.123		
	Total	16.299	66			
6	Regression	9.473	11	.861	6.940	.000[f]
	Residual	6.825	55	.124		
	Total	16.299	66			

ANOVA[g]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	8.718	2	4.359	36.800	.000[a]
	Residual	7.581	64	.118		
	Total	16.299	66			
2	Regression	8.811	4	2.203	18.240	.000[b]
	Residual	7.488	62	.121		
	Total	16.299	66			
3	Regression	9.261	7	1.323	11.093	.000[c]
	Residual	7.037	59	.119		
	Total	16.299	66			
4	Regression	9.263	8	1.158	9.546	.000[d]
	Residual	7.035	58	.121		
	Total	16.299	66			
5	Regression	9.312	9	1.035	8.441	.000[e]
	Residual	6.987	57	.123		
	Total	16.299	66			
6	Regression	9.473	11	.861	6.940	.000[f]
	Residual	6.825	55	.124		
	Total	16.299	66			

a. Predictors: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION

b. Predictors: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND

c. Predictors: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND, MISDEM_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, FELONY_PT_ADP

d. Predictors: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND, MISDEM_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, FELONY_PT_ADP, INCAR_RATE

e. Predictors: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND, MISDEM_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, FELONY_PT_ADP, INCAR_RATE, PER_DIEM

f. Predictors: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND, MISDEM_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, FELONY_PT_ADP, INCAR_RATE,

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	95.0% Confidence Interval for B		Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1.333	.196		6.804	.000	.942	1.725		
	POPULATION	-8.046E-8	.000	-.072	-.526	.601	.000	.000	.385	2.594
	POPULATION_TIER	-.211	.037	-.787	-5.728	.000	-.285	-.138	.385	2.594
2	(Constant)	1.239	.246		5.042	.000	.748	1.731		
	POPULATION	-8.671E-8	.000	-.078	-.553	.582	.000	.000	.375	2.670
	POPULATION_TIER	-.217	.039	-.808	-5.505	.000	-.296	-.138	.344	2.908
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	-4.913E-8	.000	-.014	-.130	.897	.000	.000	.645	1.550
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	.001	.001	.075	.858	.394	-.002	.004	.976	1.024
3	(Constant)	1.001	.315		3.180	.002	.371	1.631		
	POPULATION	-3.093E-7	.000	-.277	-.683	.497	.000	.000	.044	22.555
	POPULATION_TIER	-.172	.051	-.638	-3.374	.001	-.273	-.070	.204	4.892
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	-2.987E-7	.000	-.085	-.728	.470	.000	.000	.537	1.863
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	.001	.001	.052	.590	.558	-.002	.003	.950	1.052
	OVERALL_ADP	5.866E-5	.000	.140	.271	.787	.000	.000	.028	36.206
	FELONY_PT_ADP	-1.599E-5	.000	-.023	-.040	.969	-.001	.001	.022	44.675
	MISDEM_PT_ADP	.002	.001	.328	1.878	.065	.000	.003	.239	4.179
4	(Constant)	1.003	.318		3.155	.003	.367	1.639		
	POPULATION	-2.943E-7	.000	-.264	-.621	.537	.000	.000	.041	24.266
	POPULATION_TIER	-.174	.056	-.648	-3.127	.003	-.286	-.063	.173	5.770
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	-2.992E-7	.000	-.085	-.723	.473	.000	.000	.537	1.863

	AVG_DAYS_BOND	.001	.001	.051	.579	.565	-.002	.004	.948	1.054
	OVERALL_ADP	4.859E-5	.000	.116	.208	.836	.000	.001	.024	41.626
	FELONY_PT_ADP	-1.114E-5	.000	-.016	-.027	.978	-.001	.001	.022	45.120
	MISDEM_PT_ADP	.002	.001	.327	1.854	.069	.000	.003	.239	4.189
	INCAR_RATE	.003	.026	.012	.119	.905	-.049	.055	.699	1.430
5	(Constant)	.906	.355		2.554	.013	.196	1.617		
	POPULATION	-3.589E-7	.000	-.322	-.737	.464	.000	.000	.039	25.393
	POPULATION_TIER	-.170	.056	-.632	-3.009	.004	-.283	-.057	.171	5.859
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	-2.672E-7	.000	-.076	-.637	.526	.000	.000	.529	1.891
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	.001	.001	.051	.574	.568	-.002	.004	.948	1.054
	OVERALL_ADP	7.994E-5	.000	.190	.333	.741	.000	.001	.023	43.492
	FELONY_PT_ADP	-3.859E-5	.000	-.055	-.093	.926	-.001	.001	.022	45.626
	MISDEM_PT_ADP	.002	.001	.306	1.694	.096	.000	.003	.230	4.341
	INCAR_RATE	.002	.026	.007	.069	.945	-.050	.054	.695	1.439
	PER_DIEM	.001	.002	.074	.630	.531	-.003	.006	.538	1.858
6	(Constant)	1.176	.488		2.408	.019	.197	2.155		
	POPULATION	-8.897E-7	.000	-.798	-1.192	.238	.000	.000	.017	58.827
	POPULATION_TIER	-.197	.067	-.734	-2.932	.005	-.332	-.062	.121	8.231
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	7.612E-8	.000	.022	.146	.885	.000	.000	.345	2.898
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	.001	.001	.049	.540	.591	-.002	.004	.927	1.079
	OVERALL_ADP	-1.050E-5	.000	-.025	-.040	.968	-.001	.001	.020	50.261
	FELONY_PT_ADP	-6.744E-5	.000	-.095	-.160	.873	-.001	.001	.021	46.538
	MISDEM_PT_ADP	.001	.001	.292	1.561	.124	.000	.003	.218	4.591
	INCAR_RATE	-.002	.027	-.010	-.091	.928	-.056	.051	.669	1.495
	PER_DIEM	.000	.003	.021	.128	.899	-.006	.007	.291	3.431

	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	6.511E-9	.000	.641	.881	.382	.000	.000	.014	69.462
	PERCENT_INCREASE	-.001	.001	-.065	-.600	.551	-.003	.002	.652	1.534

a. Dependent Variable: PRETRIAL_COUNTY

Excluded Variables[g]

Model		Beta In	t	Sig.	Partial Correlation	Collinearity Statistics		
						Tolerance	VIF	Minimum Tolerance
1	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	-.020[a]	-.187	.852	-.024	.648	1.544	.348
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	.076[a]	.876	.385	.110	.981	1.020	.379
	OVERALL_ADP	.102[a]	.283	.778	.036	.057	17.647	.057
	FELONY_PT_ADP	.208[a]	.531	.597	.067	.048	20.795	.047
	MISDEM_PT_ADP	.296[a]	1.895	.063	.232	.287	3.487	.285
	TOTAL_PT_ADP	.431[a]	1.081	.284	.135	.046	21.953	.046
	INCAR_RATE	.028[a]	.301	.764	.038	.849	1.178	.362
	PER_DIEM	.113[a]	1.021	.311	.128	.596	1.679	.323
	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	.590[a]	1.359	.179	.169	.038	26.273	.029
	PERCENT_INCREASE	-.059[a]	-.687	.494	-.086	.993	1.007	.385
	NEW_CELLS	-.020[a]	-.187	.852	-.024	.648	1.544	.348
	NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	-.020[a]	-.187	.852	-.024	.648	1.544	.348
	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	-.020[a]	-.187	.852	-.024	.648	1.544	.348
2	OVERALL_ADP	.117[b]	.321	.749	.041	.056	17.766	.056
	FELONY_PT_ADP	.198[b]	.494	.623	.063	.047	21.446	.045

	MISDEM_PT_ADP	.326[b]	1.942	.057	.241	.251	3.979	.251
	TOTAL_PT_ADP	.411[b]	1.016	.314	.129	.045	22.091	.045
	INCAR_RATE	.027[b]	.288	.775	.037	.849	1.178	.324
	PER_DIEM	.107[b]	.956	.343	.122	.591	1.692	.313
	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	.672[b]	1.361	.178	.172	.030	33.295	.023
	PERCENT_INCREASE	-.070[b]	-.736	.465	-.094	.821	1.218	.336
	NEW_CELLS	.[b]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	.[b]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	.[b]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
3	TOTAL_PT_ADP	.[c]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	INCAR_RATE	.012[c]	.119	.905	.016	.699	1.430	.022
	PER_DIEM	.075[c]	.643	.523	.084	.541	1.847	.022
	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	.657[c]	1.183	.242	.153	.024	42.367	.021
	PERCENT_INCREASE	-.045[c]	-.466	.643	-.061	.783	1.277	.022
	NEW_CELLS	.[c]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	.[c]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	.[c]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
4	TOTAL_PT_ADP	.[d]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	PER_DIEM	.074[d]	.630	.531	.083	.538	1.858	.022
	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	.656[d]	1.167	.248	.153	.023	42.678	.019
	PERCENT_INCREASE	-.045[d]	-.449	.655	-.059	.765	1.308	.022
	NEW_CELLS	.[d]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	.[d]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	.[d]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
5	TOTAL_PT_ADP	.[e]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	.699[e]	.975	.334	.129	.015	68.232	.015
	PERCENT_INCREASE	-.078[e]	-.725	.471	-.096	.664	1.506	.022

	NEW_CELLS	.[e]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	.[e]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	.[e]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
6	TOTAL_PT_ADP	.[f]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	NEW_CELLS	.[f]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	NEW_CELLS_LOWER_LIMIT	.[f]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000
	NEW_CELLS_UPPER_LIMIT	.[f]	.	.	.	.000	.	.000

a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION

b. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND

c. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND, MISDEM_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, FELONY_PT_ADP

d. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND, MISDEM_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, FELONY_PT_ADP, INCAR_RATE

e. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND, MISDEM_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, FELONY_PT_ADP, INCAR_RATE, PER_DIEM

f. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), POPULATION_TIER, POPULATION, AVG_DAYS_BOND, TOTAL_DAYS_BOND, MISDEM_PT_ADP, OVERALL_ADP, FELONY_PT_ADP, INCAR_RATE, PER_DIEM, PERCENT_INCREASE, TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST

g. Dependent Variable: PRETRIAL_COUNTY

Collinearity Diagnostics[a]

Model	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Condition Index	Variance Proportions											
				(Constant)	POPULATION	POPULATION_TIER	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	AVG_DAYS_BOND	OVERALL_ADP	FELONY_PT_ADP	MISDEM_PT_ADP	INCAR_RATE	PER_DIEM	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	PERCENT_INCREASE
1	1	2.171	1.000	.01	.02	.01									
	2	.804	1.643	.00	.26	.02									
	3	.025	9.318	.99	.72	.97									
2	1	3.408	1.000	.00	.01	.00	.02	.01							
	2	1.154	1.718	.00	.08	.01	.16	.00							
	3	.356	3.096	.00	.35	.00	.72	.00							
	4	.062	7.418	.02	.15	.25	.00	.83							
	5	.020	13.062	.98	.41	.73	.11	.16							
3	1	5.458	1.000	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00				
	2	1.764	1.759	.00	.00	.01	.01	.01	.00	.00	.00				
	3	.502	3.297	.00	.00	.00	.63	.00	.00	.00	.01				
	4	.165	5.744	.00	.01	.01	.25	.01	.00	.00	.69				
	5	.057	9.799	.02	.00	.13	.02	.91	.00	.00	.11				
	6	.029	13.669	.09	.39	.09	.00	.02	.24	.00	.03				
	7	.017	18.074	.27	.53	.22	.07	.03	.00	.32	.03				
	8	.007	27.565	.62	.06	.54	.02	.02	.76	.67	.12				
4	1	5.981	1.000	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00			
	2	2.115	1.682	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01			
	3	.502	3.450	.00	.00	.00	.63	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00			
	4	.171	5.911	.00	.01	.00	.22	.03	.00	.00	.57	.07			
	5	.128	6.842	.00	.01	.01	.04	.08	.00	.00	.13	.62			
	6	.054	10.530	.02	.01	.15	.01	.79	.00	.00	.10	.06			

	7	.026	15.172	.20	.30	.07	.01	.05	.20	.00	.05	.12			
	8	.016	19.311	.17	.66	.18	.07	.02	.00	.36	.02	.05			
	9	.007	29.830	.60	.01	.59	.01	.02	.79	.63	.12	.07			
5	1	6.860	1.000	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00		
	2	2.152	1.785	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.00	.01	.01	.00		
	3	.505	3.686	.00	.00	.00	.62	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00		
	4	.180	6.172	.00	.00	.00	.17	.02	.00	.00	.41	.12	.03		
	5	.131	7.223	.00	.01	.01	.07	.03	.00	.00	.24	.54	.02		
	6	.076	9.498	.00	.00	.00	.00	.42	.00	.00	.02	.01	.54		
	7	.048	11.943	.02	.00	.23	.02	.43	.00	.00	.21	.08	.23		
	8	.026	16.282	.16	.30	.05	.01	.05	.19	.00	.03	.13	.01		
	9	.015	21.418	.15	.67	.11	.10	.02	.00	.42	.00	.03	.08		
	10	.006	33.329	.67	.00	.61	.00	.03	.80	.57	.07	.08	.09		
6	1	7.770	1.000	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
	2	2.520	1.756	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.01
	3	.829	3.061	.00	.00	.00	.11	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.27
	4	.399	4.415	.00	.00	.00	.25	.00	.00	.00	.04	.01	.00	.00	.37
	5	.186	6.459	.00	.00	.00	.17	.02	.00	.00	.38	.11	.02	.00	.00
	6	.112	8.344	.00	.00	.01	.13	.09	.00	.00	.16	.56	.00	.00	.15
	7	.072	10.381	.00	.00	.00	.05	.37	.01	.00	.02	.01	.28	.00	.10
	8	.047	12.871	.01	.00	.15	.04	.40	.00	.01	.23	.05	.17	.00	.03
	9	.038	14.378	.04	.01	.03	.03	.06	.11	.01	.10	.07	.02	.07	.00
	10	.015	23.078	.07	.37	.07	.12	.02	.00	.35	.00	.06	.05	.00	.03
	11	.009	28.884	.00	.18	.04	.01	.00	.39	.55	.06	.10	.03	.23	.01
	12	.003	48.402	.88	.43	.69	.09	.04	.49	.08	.00	.01	.44	.68	.02

a. Dependent Variable: PRETRIAL_COUNTY

Table XV

Discriminant Analysis
Classification and Prediction of Group Membership
67 Florida Counties, 2010

Dependent Variable = PreTrial County

Analysis Case Processing Summary

Unweighted Cases		N	Percent
Valid		67	100.0
Excluded	Missing or out-of-range group codes	0	.0
	At least one missing discriminating variable	0	.0
	Both missing or out-of-range group codes and at least one missing discriminating variable	0	.0
	Total	0	.0
Total		67	100.0

Group Statistics

PRETRIAL_COUNTY		Valid N (listwise)	
		Unweighted	Weighted
0	POPULATION_TIER	39	39.000
	POPULATION	39	39.000
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	39	39.000
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	39	39.000
	OVERALL_ADP	39	39.000
	FELONY_PT_ADP	39	39.000
	MISDEM_PT_ADP	39	39.000
	INCAR_RATE	39	39.000
	PER_DIEM	39	39.000
	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	39	39.000
	PERCENT_INCREASE	39	39.000
1	POPULATION_TIER	28	28.000
	POPULATION	28	28.000
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	28	28.000
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	28	28.000
	OVERALL_ADP	28	28.000
	FELONY_PT_ADP	28	28.000
	MISDEM_PT_ADP	28	28.000
	INCAR_RATE	28	28.000
	PER_DIEM	28	28.000
	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	28	28.000
	PERCENT_INCREASE	28	28.000

Total	POPULATION_TIER	67	67.000
	POPULATION	67	67.000
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	67	67.000
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	67	67.000
	OVERALL_ADP	67	67.000
	FELONY_PT_ADP	67	67.000
	MISDEM_PT_ADP	67	67.000
	INCAR_RATE	67	67.000
	PER_DIEM	67	67.000
	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	67	67.000
	PERCENT_INCREASE	67	67.000

Analysis 1

Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices

Log Determinants

PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Rank	Log Determinant
0	1	.025
1	1	.900
Pooled within-groups	1	.483

The ranks and natural logarithms of determinants printed are those of the group covariance matrices.

Test Results

Box's M		6.151
F	Approx.	6.057
	df1	1
	df2	11734.287
	Sig.	.014

Tests null hypothesis of equal population covariance matrices.

Stepwise Statistics

Variables Entered/Removed[a,b,c,d]

Step	Entered	Wilks' Lambda							
						Exact F			
		Statistic	df1	df2	df3	Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
1	POPULATION_TIER	.467	1	1	65.000	74.149	1	65.000	.000

At each step, the variable that minimizes the overall Wilks' Lambda is entered.

a. Maximum number of steps is 22.

b. Minimum partial F to enter is 3.84.

c. Maximum partial F to remove is 2.71.

d. F level, tolerance, or VIN insufficient for further computation.

Variables in the Analysis

Step		Tolerance	F to Remove
1	POPULATION_TIER	1.000	74.149

Variables Not in the Analysis

Step		Tolerance	Min. Tolerance	F to Enter	Wilks' Lambda
0	POPULATION_TIER	1.000	1.000	74.149	.467
	POPULATION	1.000	1.000	27.383	.704
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	1.000	1.000	12.811	.835
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	1.000	1.000	.019	1.000
	OVERALL_ADP	1.000	1.000	34.733	.652
	FELONY_PT_ADP	1.000	1.000	28.362	.696
	MISDEM_PT_ADP	1.000	1.000	51.879	.556
	INCAR_RATE	1.000	1.000	4.682	.933
	PER_DIEM	1.000	1.000	15.971	.803
	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	1.000	1.000	22.650	.742
	PERCENT_INCREASE	1.000	1.000	.842	.987
1	POPULATION	.545	.545	.276	.465
	TOTAL_DAYS_BOND	.792	.792	.070	.467
	AVG_DAYS_BOND	.975	.975	.708	.462
	OVERALL_ADP	.473	.473	.124	.466
	FELONY_PT_ADP	.567	.567	.094	.466

	MISDEM_PT_ADP	.594	.594	2.285	.451
	INCAR_RATE	.909	.909	.094	.466
	PER_DIEM	.879	.879	.523	.463
	TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST	.674	.674	.017	.467
	PERCENT_INCREASE	1.000	1.000	.454	.464

Wilks' Lambda

Step	Number of Variables	Lambda	df1	df2	df3	Exact F			
						Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
1	1	.467	1	1	65	74.149	1	65.000	.000

Summary of Canonical Discriminant Functions

Eigenvalues

Function	Eigenvalue	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Canonical Correlation
1	1.141[a]	100.0	100.0	.730

a. First 1 canonical discriminant functions were used in the analysis.

Wilks' Lambda

Test of Function(s)	Wilks' Lambda	Chi-square	df	Sig.

Wilks' Lambda

Test of Function(s)	Wilks' Lambda	Chi-square	df	Sig.
1	.467	49.095	1	.000

Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients

	Function
	1
POPULATION_TIER	1.000

Structure Matrix

	Function
	1
POPULATION_TIER	1.000
OVERALL_ADP[a]	-.726
POPULATION[a]	-.674
FELONY_PT_ADP[a]	-.658
MISDEM_PT_ADP[a]	-.637
TOTAL_AVG_DET_COST[a]	-.571
TOTAL_DAYS_BOND[a]	-.456
PER_DIEM[a]	-.348
INCAR_RATE[a]	.301
AVG_DAYS_BOND[a]	.158
PERCENT_INCREASE[a]	-.009

Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables and standardized canonical discriminant functions

Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation within function.

a. This variable not used in the analysis.

Functions at Group Centroids

	Function
PRETRIAL_COUNTY	1
0	.891
1	-1.242

Unstandardized canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means

Classification Statistics

Classification Processing Summary

Processed		67
Excluded	Missing or out-of-range group codes	0
	At least one missing discriminating variable	0
Used in Output		67

Prior Probabilities for Groups

PRETRIAL_COUNTY	Prior	Cases Used in Analysis	
		Unweighted	Weighted
0	.582	39	39.000
1	.418	28	28.000
Total	1.000	67	67.000

Classification Results[a]

			Predicted Group Membership		
		PRETRIAL_COUNTY	0	1	Total
Original	Count	0	36	3	39
		1	9	19	28
	%	0	92.3	7.7	100.0
		1	32.1	67.9	100.0

Classification Results[a]

			Predicted Group Membership		
		PRETRIAL_COUNTY	0	1	Total
Original	Count	0	36	3	39
		1	9	19	28
	%	0	92.3	7.7	100.0
		1	32.1	67.9	100.0

a. 82.1% of original grouped cases correctly classified.

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